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A Mind is a Terrible Thing to Change: Confirmatory Bias in Financial Markets
Abstract
This paper studies the impact of the confirmatory bias on financial markets. Building
on Rabin and Schrag (1999), we propose a model in which some traders may ignore
new evidence when it is inconsistent with their favorite hypothesis regarding the state
of the world. The confirmatory bias provides a unified rationale for several existing
stylized facts including excess volatility, excess volume and momentum. It also delivers
novel predictions: at the individual level, traders’ belief updating depends on the sign
of past signals and previous beliefs, and, at the stock level, differences of opinion should
be larger when past subsequent signals have different signs. Using data on US firms’
earnings announcements and analysts’ earnings forecasts from 1982 to 2014, we find
strong empirical support for these predictions, suggesting that the confirmatory bias
is at work in financial markets.
Keywords: financial markets, psychological biases, confirmatory bias, momentum,
bubbles, trading strategies, differences of opinion, analysts’ forecasts.
1
“A mind is a terrible thing to change... you believe stocks are going to outperform other
assets, and all you can hear are warnings of the bloodbath to come in the bond and commodity
markets. In short, your own mind acts like a compulsive yes-man who echoes whatever you
want to believe.” (Jason Zweig, in the Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2009)
The psychology literature defines the confirmatory bias as “the seeking or interpreting
of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs” (Nickerson, 1998).1 This bias is
intimately related to the dynamics of belief formation and thus appears particularly relevant
in the context of trading and investing activities. To the best of our knowledge, the present
paper is the first to study how the confirmatory bias affects beliefs and asset pricing in
financial markets.
Building on Rabin and Schrag (1999), we propose a simple dynamic model of financial
markets in which some traders are prone to the confirmatory bias: biased traders may
ignore information when it is inconsistent with their prior views. In a framework with public
information only, this bias creates differences of opinion between rational speculators and
confirmatory-biased traders over the interpretation of public information.
These differences of opinion give rise to trading. Speculators take opposite positions with
respect to biased traders and thus have a corrective impact on prices. Transaction costs
however limit the effectiveness of corrective strategies causing the views of both speculators
and biased traders to be incorporated into asset prices.
To understand how the confirmatory bias affects financial markets, consider that traders
initially hold positive views about an asset’s future cash flow. If subsequent information is
1In his book surveying biases in human reasoning, Jonathan Evans, a leading scholar in psychology, refers
to the confirmatory bias as “the best known and most widely accepted notion of inferential error” (Evans,
1989). Starting with the seminal contributions of Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979) and Darley and Gross
(1983), the confirmatory bias has been extensively documented by psychologists. The prevalence of this bias
has recently been confirmed by Hart et al. (2009) in a meta-analysis based on 67 articles and more than
8,000 individuals. See also the experiments on political stock markets by Forsythe, Nelson, Neumann, and
Wright (1992) that display belief patterns consistent with the confirmatory bias.
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also positive, then all traders interpret it correctly. However, if this information is negative,
confirmatory-biased traders have a given probability to ignore the negative information.2
Our theoretical analysis shows that the confirmatory bias provides a unified explanation
for several stylized facts, including excess volume (De Bondt and Thaler (1995)), excess
volatility (Leroy and Porter (1981), Shiller (1981)), and momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman
(1993)). Some behavioral finance theories have been proposed to account for these stylized
facts (see for example Hirshleifer (2001) for a survey). Overconfidence may explain excess
volume, excess volatility and even momentum when coupled with self-attribution bias (see
Benos (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), and Odean (1998)). The
representativeness heuristics may also rationalize momentum (see Barberis, Shleifer and
Vishny (1998) and Rabin and Vayanos (2010)). As shown by Bouchaud, Krueger, Landier,
and Thesmar (2016), sticky expectations can also be invoked to explain momentum, as well
as other asset pricing phenomena such as the quality anomaly. Finally, Hong and Stein
(2007) argue that gradual information flow and limited attention may explain excess volume
and momentum.
To show the unique impact of the confirmatory bias, we then derive novel theoretical
predictions. The core predictions of our model are that, at the individual level, i) after
initial positive (respectively, negative) signals, some traders tend to ignore subsequent signals
that are negative (respectively, positive), and ii) traders that have previously updated their
beliefs upward (respectively, downward) are more likely to ignore subsequent signals that
are negative (respectively, positive).
At the stock level, as conflicting signals opens opportunities for biased traders to mis-
interpret information, this creates differences of opinion. As a consequence, our model also
predicts that when some traders suffer from the confirmatory bias, differences of opinion
2This is in line with the experimental psychology literature, e.g., Bodenhausen (1988), that shows that
people are more likely to forget news that are inconsistent with their priors. All our results hold if we assume
instead that biased traders misinterpret contradicting signals as supportive, as in Rabin and Schrag (1999).
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should be larger when past subsequent signals have different signs.3
We next test these novel theoretical predictions using data on US firms’ earnings an-
nouncements and analysts’ earnings forecasts over the period 1982 to 2014. First, consistent
with the basic prediction of the model, we find that analysts are less likely to revise their
forecasts upward (respectively, downward) after good (respectively, bad) earnings surprises
when one of the previous earnings surprises was negative (respectively, positive). Using pre-
vious analysts’ forecast revisions (either upwards or downwards) as a proxy for their prior
beliefs about an asset (either bearish or bullish), we also find consistent with the model
that analysts are less likely to revise their forecasts upward (respectively, downward) after
good (respectively, bad) earnings surprises, for earnings surprises that are of a different sign
compared to their prior beliefs.
Finally, to test the last prediction, we follow the literature (see, e.g., Diether, Malloy,
and Scherbina (2002)) and use dispersion in analysts’ annual earnings forecasts as a proxy
for differences of opinion. We find that forecasts dispersion is significantly larger when news
revealed by earnings announcements over the previous quarters have different signs. Our
findings hold when we consider changes in the sign of earnings surprises over either the pre-
vious two or previous three quarters.4 These empirical results suggest that the confirmatory
bias is at work in financial markets.
Overall, our paper’s contribution is threefold. First, we propose a parsimonious and
tractable model in which departure from perfect rationality is well-grounded in psychology
3Better understanding the formation of differences of opinion is important for several reasons. On the
one hand, differences of opinion have been invoked to explain overvaluation in financial markets with short-
selling restrictions (see Miller (1977)’s model and empirical tests by Chen, Hong and Stein (2002), Diether,
Malloy, and Scherbina (2002), and Goetzmann and Massa (2005)). On the other hand, differences of opinion
also seem to play an important role in volume formation (see Banerjee and Kremer (2010)), and, when they
relate to the variance of returns, excess volatility (see Duchin and Levy (2010)).
4Our analyses control for numerous factors that are known to affect analysts’ earnings forecasts and
differences of opinion, including analyst coverage, market capitalization, stock returns volatility (a measure of
uncertainty), book-to-market ratio, and return on asset. Finally, we obtain identical results when uncertainty
is proxied by implied volatility as measured from option prices and when the sample is restricted to firms
with fiscal year ending in December.
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and driven by only one parameter: when the severity of the confirmatory bias is null, we
are back to the perfectly rational benchmark. Second, we show that the confirmatory bias
alone offers a unified rationale for several existing stylized facts, complementing previous
explanations offered in the behavioral finance literature. Finally, we deliver and find support
in the data for novel empirical predictions that follow from the confirmatory bias.
1. The model
We consider a pure exchange economy with one risky asset in fixed supply and a riskless
asset in perfectly elastic supply. The riskless asset rate of return is normalized to zero. There
are T dates of trading indexed by t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., T − 1}. Consumption occurs only at date T
when the risky asset distributes a cash flow v. For simplicity, we set T = 4.5 The probability
distribution of the random variable v depends on the non observable state of the economy
H or L. We assume that, conditional on the state of nature X ∈ {H,L}, v has a Bernoulli
distribution.6 This distribution is given by:
P(v = 1|X) = pX = 1− P(v = 0|X) with pH > pL. (1.1)
There is a continuum of traders with mass normalized to one indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. A
trader pertains to one of two groups of agents. Speculators are represented by the subset
[λ, 1], and biased traders are represented by the subset [0, λ]. Therefore, the mass of specu-
5One could extend the model to include an arbitrary number of trading periods T , finite or infinite, and
cash flow distribution and consumption could take place at various dates across time (for example, our set up
with 4 dates of trading followed by the distribution of a cash flow could be repeated any number of times).
This would not affect our results because the state of the world is not revealed in our model, even when a
cash flow is distributed.
6We have also studied a more general model, presented in the Online Appendix, in which the cash flow is
distributed according to a log-normal distribution: v = ed, in which d is normally distributed with mean mX
and variance σ2, and with mH = 1 = −mL. The signals are assumed independent and identically normally
distributed with mean µX and variance σ
2, for simplicity. Our results hold in this continuous distribution
model.
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lators is 1 − λ while the mass of biased traders is λ. Each trader is endowed with one unit
of the risky asset and no cash. Finally, information about the cash flow is generated by
the observation of public signals st whose probability distribution depends on the state of
nature. More precisely, we assume:
P(st = 0) = 1− δ,P(st = 1|X = H) = P(st = −1|X = L) = δθ, with θ > 1
2
. (1.2)
Parameters δ and θ represent, respectively, the likelihood that the signal is informative
and the level of informativeness. We introduce an uninformative signal, st = 0, so that
biased traders who, as explained below, might neglect the informational content of news
cannot realize that they are actually biased: in our model, it is also the case that rational
traders do sometimes perceive that signals are uninformative.7
In order to focus on the informational aspects of financial markets, we assume that traders
are risk neutral.8 Absent market frictions, risk neutrality implies that traders would stand
ready to exchange infinite amounts as long as prices do not equal their expectation of the
asset value. This would prevent the existence of an equilibrium since the market would
not clear. In order to avoid this phenomenon, we assume that traders incur an exogenous
trading cost that is quadratic in the quantity traded and parameterized by c
2
> 0.9 The
total cost of trading for trader j at date t with a demand djt is thus equal to
c
2
(djt)
2, for all
t < 4. Trader j’s objective at each date t < 4 is thus to maximize his expected wealth at
date 4, conditional on information available at date t and on the fact that he will be able
7This statement is true as long as there is a finite number of signals. For the extreme case of an infinite
number of signals (which is discussed in Section A.2 of the Online Appendix), biased traders, at infinity,
will observe that they have received a proportion of uninformative signals that is higher than what their
understanding of the world suggests. All our results hold if all signals are informative.
8This is in the spirit of Harris and Raviv (1993) and isolates our analysis from the influence of trading
motives based on risk sharing or consumption smoothing.
9Alternatively, we could ensure existence of an equilibrium by assuming that traders can only trade up
to a fixed amount of shares as in Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002). This different modeling framework would
not affect our results.
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to trade again in the future.10 Trader j’s wealth at date 4 is denoted by W j and is equal to∑s=3
s=0
[
djs (v − Ps)− c2 (djs)
2
]
+ v.
The cost c
2
can be viewed as an explicit transaction cost traders have to pay to submit
orders or as a proxy for the imperfect depth of financial markets. Imperfect market depth
could be related to inventory or adverse selection risks borne by liquidity providers (see Mad-
havan (2000) and Biais, Glosten, and Spatt (2005) for surveys of the market microstructure
literature dealing with those issues). The transaction cost creates limits to arbitrage and
opens the scope for potential mispricings.11
In our model, differences of opinion emerge because all traders do not encode the public
signal in the same way. On the one hand, speculators are perfectly rational in the sense that
they are endowed with the actual probability model denoted by P. On the other hand, each
individual biased trader i ∈ [0, λ] is endowed with a different probability model Pi. When
receiving a public signal st, biased trader i actually sees a signal σ
i
t.
To incorporate the confirmatory bias in our framework, we follow Rabin and Schrag
(1999) and assume that biased traders misinterpret public information when it conflicts
with their prior beliefs concerning the final cash flow.12 More precisely, we consider that a
confirmatory-biased trader treats some conflicting signals as uninformative and is otherwise
10Traders in our model are thus not myopic. However, as it will become clear below, our set up is such that
traders optimally refrain from trading dynamically over time to take advantage of the price fluctuation across
periods. Specifically, even if speculators anticipate momentum in the price over the subsequent period, they
are not going to take a larger position in this period and then unwind in the next period. At equilibrium,
they instead prefer speculating on the difference between the current asset price and the expected cash flow
it delivers at date T . This feature of our model simplifies the analysis. We thank an anonymous referee for
emphasizing this point.
11Alternative frameworks generating limits to arbitrage include noise trader risk as in De Long, Shleifer,
Summers, and Waldmann (1990), short horizons as in Shleifer and Vishny (1997), and synchronization risk
as in Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002). Barberis and Thaler (2001) survey this literature.
12Public signals constitute soft information in the sense that they open up a scope for misinterpretation.
For example, public signals could represent the announcement of a change in corporate strategy or a report
regarding the prospects of a firm’s future products. On the contrary, we consider that the amount of cash
flow distributed at date 4 is hard information in the sense that it cannot be misperceived by biased traders.
Note that, when θ < 1, the distributed cash flow, even if hard information, does not perfectly reveals the
underlying state of the world: Equation (1.2) shows that, in this case, all public signals are possible in all
states of the world.
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completely Bayesian.13
To formally define the confirmatory bias, we have to specify belief dynamics regarding
the state of the economy for each type of agents. We assume that the two states of nature
are ex-ante equiprobable for each type of trader, that is P(X = H) = Pi(X = H) = 1
2
for
every i. We denote by µt = P (X = H|s1, . . . , st), the beliefs of rational speculators (under
the correct probability model P) given the information they have received up to date t. To
alleviate notation, we define the signal history up to date t as ht = {s1, . . . , st}. We denote
by µit = Pi (X = H|σi1, . . . , σit), biased trader i’s beliefs (under probability model Pi) given
the information he has received up to date t.
We consider that a signal st is inconsistent with prior beliefs µ
i
t−1 if and only if st has
a different sign than µit−1 − 12 , the difference between the conditional and the unconditional
belief on the state of the economy. When biased trader i is bullish, that is, he believes
that the good state of the economy is more likely, he might under-react to negative signals.
Likewise, when biased trader i is bearish, he might under-react to positive signals.
We can now formally define how the confirmatory bias affects biased traders’ perception
of information. The following definition precisely characterizes biased traders’ distortion of
public signals.
Definition 1.1. For i ∈ [0, λ], the information perceived by biased trader i is σi1 = s1 and,
13In the empirical tests of our theory presented below, we use quarterly earnings announcements as a
counterpart for the public signals in our model. Earnings surprises are not limited to the disclosure of
quantitative information, but are also conveyed with value-relevant “soft” information. Market participants
can predict future firms’ outcomes by analyzing the “tone” of earnings press releases (David, Piger, and
Sedor 2012), earnings conference calls (Matsumoto et al. 2011, Mayew and Venkatachalam, 2012) or news
stories released around earnings announcements (Tetlock et al., 2008). Interestingly, Engelberg (2008) finds
that the market incorporates soft information released during earnings announcements more slowly than
hard information, which is consistent with the idea that soft information is more difficult to process and
more likely to be subject to different interpretations (Petersen, 2008). We thank an anonymous referee for
highlighting this point.
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for t ∈ {2, 3}, under the probability measure P:
σit = st1 (µit−1− 12 )st≥0 + z
i
tst1 (µit−1− 12 )st<0, (1.3)
where zit is a random variable taking values in {0, 1} with probability distribution P(zit = 0) =
q, and 1 (.) is the indicator function that takes the value 1 if the condition is satisfied and
0 otherwise. We assume that the random variables (zit)i∈[0,λ] are independent and that z
i
t is
independent from zis for s 6= t.
This definition indicates that biased traders may ignore a signal when this signal is
inconsistent with their prior beliefs, i.e., biased traders might misperceive an informative
signal as an uninformative one.14 The timing of each date t ∈ {2, 3} is thus as follows:
i) a signal is generated, ii) agents perceive a signal that might be different than the one
generated, and iii) agents update their beliefs using Bayes’ rule as if the perceived signal
were the one truly generated.
Definition (1.1) deserves some comments. First, a biased trader may ignore, with prob-
ability q, a public signal that is inconsistent with his prior beliefs. The greater is q, the
more severe the confirmatory bias is. Second, a proportion q of biased traders whose prior
beliefs are inconsistent with the public signal misperceive the signal st. This is because the
random variable zit is independent across biased traders and because traders form a contin-
uum. Third, we assume, for simplicity, that biased traders do not amplify signals that are
consistent with prior beliefs. Fourth, at date 1, biased traders see the actual signal because
they do not have formed an opinion yet. Their perception is thus not biased at this date.
14As shown in the Online Appendix, all our results hold if biased traders change the valence of signals
that are inconsistent with their prior beliefs. This more extreme way of defining the confirmatory bias is
used by Rabin and Schrag (1999) and allows our model to display belief polarization according to which,
when some traders are optimistic and others are pessimistic, news can actually make beliefs diverge even
more. It could also be interesting to study a form of confirmatory bias in which biased traders retroactively
reinterpret past evidence in light of their new view of the world, which is referred to as an “epiphany” by
Rabin and Schrag (1999). We leave open this avenue for further research that will require additional work
in experimental psychology to provide guidance for the economic modeling.
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We now turn to the analysis of the model.
2. Equilibrium prices and rational benchmark
Our model features quadratic transaction costs. Individual asset demands are thus finite
despite risk neutrality and there exists an equilibrium. Standard arguments, developed in
the Appendix, show that prices in our financial market are weighted averages of speculators’
and biased traders’ beliefs given their respective information set. They are given in the
following proposition where we denote by Pt the conditional probability P(.|ht) and by Pit
the probability Pi(.|(zih)t), where (zih)t = {s1, zi2s2, . . . , zitst}.
Proposition 2.1. At each date t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, the equilibrium price is given by:
Pt =
∫ λ
0
Pit(v = 1) di+ (1− λ)Pt(v = 1)
⇔
Pt = pL + (pH − pL) µ¯t
where µ¯t = (1− λ)µt +
∫ λ
0
µitdi represents traders’ average belief regarding the state of
the world.15
The price is thus a linear function of traders’ average belief. Let us describe explicitly the
dynamics of equilibrium prices. Denote by Pt(ht) the equilibrium price that prevails after
a history ht of actual public signals. At dates t ∈ {0, 1}, all agents perceive correctly the
public signal thus:
P0 = P1(0) = pL + (pH − pL)1
2
,
15The beliefs of biased traders depend on the realizations of the i.i.d. random variables zi. We are thus
confronted with the continuum of random variables problem. We assume that the law of large numbers for
uncountable sequence of random variables applies to our setting.
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P1(1) = pL + (pH − pL)θ,
and
P1(−1) = pL + (pH − pL)(1− θ).
At date 2, the confirmatory bias may affect biased traders’ perception: they are indeed
optimistic if s1 = 1 or pessimistic if s1 = −1. Each biased agent has a probability q to
ignore s2 if it is inconsistent with their beliefs regarding the state of the world. Due to the
assumption of independence of the variables zi, the law of large numbers implies that there
is a proportion q of biased agents that have an erroneous perception of the public signal. As
a consequence, P2(s1, s2) can take seven values:
P2(0, 0) = P0
P2(1, 0) = P2(0, 1) = P1(1)
P2(−1, 0) = P2(0,−1) = P1(−1)
P2(1, 1) = pL + (pH − pL)θ(2, 2),
P2(1,−1) = pL + (pH − pL)((1− λq)θ(1, 2) + λqθ(1, 1)),
P2(−1, 1) = pL + (pH − pL)((1− λq)θ(1, 2) + λqθ(0, 1)),
P2(−1,−1) = pL + (pH − pL)θ(0, 2),
where θ(s, k) = P(v = 1|s public signals among k are strictly positive, k−s are strictly negative).
The explicit expression for θ(s, k) is provided in the Appendix and is obtained by applying
Bayes’ rule for probability updating. Notice that the same function θ(s, k) applies both for
rational and biased traders: both types of traders use Bayes’ rule to update their beliefs.
The difference in beliefs between these traders only comes from the fact that they may not
perceive the same number of strictly positive or negative signals.
In our model, beliefs are symmetric around 1
2
. Without loss of generality, we thus focus
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on paths ht such that s1 = 1. On these paths, P3(s1 = 1, s2, s3) can take six values:
P3(1, 0, 0) = P1(1)
P3(1, 1, 0) = P3(1, 0, 1) = P2(1, 1)
P3(1, 1, 1) = pL + (pH − pL)θ(3, 3),
P3(1,−1, 0) = P3(1, 0,−1) = P2(1,−1),
P3(1, 1,−1) = P3(1,−1, 1) = pL + (pH − pL)((1− λq)θ(2, 3) + λqθ(2, 2)),
P3(1,−1,−1) = pL + (pH − pL)
(
(1− λq)θ(1, 3) + λq(1− q)θ(1, 2) + λq2θ(2, 3)) .
Before analyzing the impact of the confirmatory bias on market outcomes, it is useful
to study the benchmark case in which all traders are perfectly rational. Endogenous prices
in this benchmark are indicated by a star. This benchmark is nested in our model and
corresponds to the case in which λ = 0 or q = 0. In this case, we have P ∗t = Pt (v = 1) =
pL + (pH − pL)µt. Given the structure of the uncertainty in our model, it is straightforward
to show that the following proposition holds.
Proposition 2.2. When all traders are perfectly rational (that is, when λq = 0), market
outcomes are as follows:
• After the first public signal, expected prices are constant. In particular:
E (P ∗3 |s1 = 1) = E (P ∗2 |s1 = 1) = P ∗1 (s1 = 1) ,
and
E (P ∗3 |s1 = −1) = E (P ∗2 |s1 = −1) = P ∗1 (s1 = −1) .
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• Expected returns are null. In particular:
E (P ∗2 − P ∗1 |P ∗1 − P ∗0 ) = E (P ∗3 − P ∗2 |P ∗2 − P ∗1 ) = 0.
• Volume is null at all dates. For all t:
V ∗t = 0.
This proposition indicates that, when all traders are rational, there is no bubble. This
is a consequence of the fact that prices are a martingale. It also shows that there is no
momentum. It finally characterizes volume at date t, defined as the sum of the quantities
purchased at price Pt: Vt =
∫ 1
0
djt1 Ejt (v)>Pt
dj. In our model, there is no volume when all
traders are rational. This is because the only motive for trading, related to differences of
opinion, is in this case absent.16
3. Financial markets with the confirmatory bias
We now focus on the case in which some traders suffer from the confirmatory bias, i.e.,
on the case in which λq > 0. The confirmatory bias then generates differences of opinion
and systematic mistakes. We first offer an explanation for various phenomena that have
been documented in actual financial markets: excess volume, excess volatility, momentum,
and the occurrence of bubbles and crashes. We then highlight the distinctive impact of the
confirmatory bias by deriving new theoretical predictions on how past signals relate to future
differences of opinion and bias in beliefs updating.
We start with an example of price and trade formation to explain how beliefs, prices and
16Without transaction costs, traders would be indifferent between trading and not trading, and so the
volume would be indeterminate.
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volume evolve over time. For traders who suffer from the confirmatory bias, first impression
matters: once they have formed an opinion, biased traders tend to misperceive the subsequent
signals that contradict this prior opinion. To understand how the confirmatory bias influences
financial markets, it is thus particularly interesting to focus on mixed history paths, i.e., paths
that include signals with different signs.
3.1 An example of price and trade formation
On mixed history paths, the confirmatory bias affects beliefs. Consider for example the
mixed history path (s1 = 1, s2 = −1, s3 = −1). After observing s1 = 1, traders become
optimistic: their beliefs at date 1 are higher than at date 0, µ1 = µ
i
1 = θ > µ0 =
1
2
. Note
that, at the first two dates, t = {0, 1}, there is no volume because all traders have the same
beliefs.
Differences of opinion arise after the occurrence of the negative signal s2 = −1. Rational
speculators perceive correctly this information and their beliefs come back to their initial
level, i.e., µ2 = µ0 =
1
2
. Biased traders on the other hand are split in two groups. One group,
representing a proportion λ(1−q) of traders, perceives the negative signal correctly and ends
up with the correct belief µi2 = µ2 =
1
2
. The other group, in proportion λq, perceives a null
signal instead of the actual negative one. These biased traders thus maintain the same
optimistic belief, µi2 = θ(1, 2) = θ = µ
i
1. These differences of opinion generate trade.
Finally, after the announcement of the third public signal s3 = −1, rational speculators’
beliefs become pessimistic, µ3 = 1 − θ < 12 . In this case, biased traders are split in three
groups. Some biased traders, who correctly interpreted all public signals, hold the same
pessimistic beliefs as rational speculators, µi3 = θ(1, 3) = 1 − θ < 12 . These traders are in
proportion λ(1−q)2. The second group includes biased traders who have misinterpreted one
of the last two signals. They hold neutral beliefs, µi3 = θ(1, 2) =
1
2
, and are in proportion
2λq(1− q). The last group of biased traders includes the ones who have misinterpreted the
14
last two public signals. They hold a positive belief, µi3 = θ(2, 3) = θ, and are in proportion
λq2. Again, these differences of opinion generate trading.
On history paths with identical signals, either when they are all positive or all negative,
the confirmatory bias does not manifest itself. Prices are thus the same as in the perfectly
rational benchmark. Moreover, in our model, the sign of price changes follows the sign of
the signal that is received: if st = 1, Pt − Pt−1 > 0, if st = 0, Pt − Pt−1 = 0, and if st = −1,
Pt − Pt−1 < 0.
This example of price formation describes how the confirmatory bias influences financial
markets. It is useful to better understand the logic of the general results provided in the
next two subsections.
3.2 Explaining existing stylized facts on financial markets
The confirmatory bias provides an explanation for several empirically documented phenom-
ena: excess volume and volatility, momentum, and the occurrence of bubbles and crashes.
First, De Bondt and Thaler (1995, p. 392) indicate that “the high trading volume on or-
ganized exchanges is perhaps the single most embarrassing fact to the standard finance
paradigm.” Moreover, starting with Leroy and Porter (1981) and Shiller (1981), several con-
tributions report that asset prices are excessively volatile. These two phenomena constitute
long-standing puzzles, even if some behavioral explanations have already been proposed in
the literature as we discuss below.
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) document a momentum effect in the U.S. stock market:
at quarterly, semi-annual or yearly horizons, stocks that have performed well in the past
have a better performance than those that performed poorly. This result was confirmed in
an international context by Rouwenhorst (1998). Momentum has also been uncovered in
other financial markets, such as commodities and government bonds, for example by Asness,
Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013).
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Finally, several authors have argued that financial markets go through periods of bubbles
and crashes. For example, Shiller (2000) indicates that stock price run-ups followed by bursts
tend to occur after new technological discoveries that suggest a new “era” has begun. Xiong
and Yu (2011) offer clean evidence of a bubble on the Chinese warrant market.
The next proposition indicates that our model can accommodate these various stylized
facts.
Proposition 3.3. When some traders are prone to the confirmatory bias (that is, when
λq > 0), market outcomes are as follows:
• There is excess volume at t ∈ {2, 3}:
Vt > V
∗
t = 0.
• There is excess volatility in asset prices at t = 2 and, for λq ≥ 1
2
, at t = 3; in this case:
Var(Pt) > Var(P
∗
t ).
• There is momentum in asset prices at t = 1 and t = 2:
E(P2 − P1|P1 − P0 > 0) > 0,
E(P3 − P2|P2 − P1 > 0) > 0.
• A bubble forms after a good initial public signal:
E (P3|s1 = 1) > E (P2|s1 = 1) > P1 (s1 = 1) = P ∗1 (s1 = 1) .
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• A crash occurs after a bad initial public signal:
E (P3|s1 = −1) < E (P2|s1 = −1) < P1 (s1 = 1) = P ∗1 (s1 = −1) .
The intuitions for these results are as follows. Volume arises directly because of differences
of opinion: biased and rational traders agree to disagree. Excess volatility may arise because,
along mixed signal histories, prices are drifting away from the prices that would prevail if
all traders were rational. Indeed, biased traders tend to be overoptimistic after observing a
first positive signal and over-pessimistic after observing a first negative signal.
Referring to the example in the previous subsection, one can observe that, when a positive
signal is followed by a negative one, the price is higher than in the rational benchmark,
P2(1,−1) > P ∗2 (1,−1) = 12 . This is because, after observing a first positive signal, some
biased traders ignore the second signal which is negative, end up over-optimistic, and push
prices too high. By the same logic, we also have P2(−1, 1) < P ∗2 (−1, 1) = 12 , a case in which
prices are too low after an initially negative signal. With confirmatory-biased traders, prices
may thus be more scattered than in the rational benchmark, which explains the excessive
volatility.
Momentum arises in our model because biased traders’ beliefs at a given date affect their
future misperception of public signals. In particular, when prices increase, it is more likely
that biased traders are optimistic and therefore under-react to future bad signals. As a result
future prices are expected to be higher than current prices, which creates the momentum
effect.
In our model, a bubble forms after a first positive public signal is announced. This is
because biased traders become optimistic and are expected to ignore some future negative
signals. This phenomenon amplifies with time which explains why prices are expected to
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grow. The same intuition applies when a negative signal initially hits the market.17
Several behavioral models based on cognitive biases have been proposed to explain the
stylized facts discussed above. Most of these models display differences of opinion. Overcon-
fidence is one reason why people may display differences of opinion and agree to disagree.
It has been prominently cited to explain excess volume (see for example, Odean (1998))
and excess volatility (see Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998)). Daniel, Hirsh-
leifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) further show that, coupled with the self-attribution bias,
overconfidence may explain momentum.18Finally, Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) show that
overconfidence can lead to speculative bubbles. The representativeness heuristics has also
been invoked to rationalize momentum (see Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) and Rabin
and Vayanos (2010)). Hong and Stein (2007) indicate that excess volume and momentum
may be explained by gradual information flow or limited attention.
Our model offers a complementary explanation to these phenomena and has the fol-
lowing distinctive features: i) it provides a novel mechanism for differences of opinion, the
17Notice that, when T goes to infinity, there is a non-null probability that some biased traders end up
being sure that the wrong state of the world has occurred. This is because, if some biased traders’ beliefs
become inconsistent with the realized state of the world (for example, if the state of the world is L but the
first signal is positive), there is always a non-null set of biased traders who ignore all the signals that are
inconsistent with their initial beliefs.
One can then wonder whether it is possible that biased traders’ average beliefs may not always converge
to the truth. It is easy to show that biased traders misperception survives in the long run when q = 1.
When q < 1, one has to show that the mass of biased traders who misperceive all the signals inconsistent
with their initial belief does not converge to zero as time goes to infinity. This interesting question is left for
further research.
18Self-attribution and confirmatory biases are related but distinct psychological effects. Self-attribution
bias had been studied by Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Gervais and Odean (2001).
This bias comes into play through the interaction between private and public information. When agents
are not aware of their ability to generate precise private information, if their private signal is confirmed
by subsequent public signals, agents’ perception of their own ability rationally rises. The bias expresses
itself when public signals disconfirms the initial private signal. In this case, agents who suffer from the
self-attribution bias reduce their perceived ability but not sufficiently compared to what they should if they
were not biased.
The main difference between the self-attribution bias and the confirmatory bias is that they do not require
the same type of information (private and public information for the self-attribution bias versus public
information only for the confirmatory bias). As a result, in our model with public signals only, the self-
attribution bias has no bite. Moreover, in our empirical analysis, we only use public news and thus our
results cannot be explained by the self-attribution bias.
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confirmatory bias, which is theoretically and empirically well-grounded in the psychology
literature (see for example the survey on the confirmatory bias by Hart et al. (2009)), ii) it
is parsimonious in the sense that departures from perfect rationality are driven by only one
parameter (when q, the bias severity, is null, we are indeed back to the perfectly rational
benchmark), and iii) it offers novel empirical predictions that are derived and tested below.
3.3 Novel empirical predictions
In addition to providing a unified explanation for a variety of stylized facts, our model offers
new theoretical predictions that are tested in the next section. We study how differences of
opinion and beliefs updating are affected by the type of signals received. We now state our
most novel theoretical results.
Proposition 3.4. When some traders are prone to the confirmatory bias (that is, when
λq > 0),
• Beliefs dispersion is higher when past signals have different signs:
E (Var [ν2|s1s2<0]) > E (Var [ν2|s1s2>0]) ,
E (Var [ν3|s1s2<0 or s2s3<0]) > E (Var [ν3|s1s2>0 and s2s3>0]) ,
where νt is the probability measure characterizing beliefs distribution at date t.
• There are less beliefs revisions when signals have different signs. For example, after a
positive signal, the proportion of upward beliefs revisions is lower if at least one of the
previous signal was negative:
∫ 1
0
P(µj2 − µj1 > 0|s1 > 0, s2 > 0)dj >
∫ 1
0
P(µj2 − µj1 > 0|s1 < 0, s2 > 0)dj
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∫ 1
0
P(µj3−µj2 > 0|s1 > 0, s2 > 0, s3 > 0)dj >
∫ 1
0
P(µj3−µj2 > 0|s1 < 0 or s2 < 0, s3 > 0)dj
• A trader tends to revise his belief less often when signals have a sign that is differ-
ent from the sign of his last belief revision. For example, after a positive signal, the
probability that a trader revises upward his belief is larger if his last belief revision was
positive than if it was negative:
∫ 1
0
P(µj2 − µj1 > 0|µj1 − µj0 > 0, s2 > 0)dj >
∫ 1
0
P(µj2 − µj1 > 0|µj1 − µj0 < 0, s2 > 0)dj
∫ 1
0
P(µj3 − µj2 > 0|µj2 − µj1 > 0, s3 > 0)dj >
∫ 1
0
P(µj3 − µj2 > 0|µj2 − µj1 < 0, s3 > 0)dj
Beliefs distribution is defined for all t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} as νt =
∑
s≤k≤t ps,kDθ(s,k) where Dθ(s,k)
is the Dirac measure centered on θ(s, k) and ps,k is the proportion of traders that have the
belief θ(s, k) at time t. Note that the belief distribution depends on the public signals paths.
For instance, consider date 2 and the path {s1 = 1, s2 = −1}. Along this path, the belief
distribution charges the set {θ(1, 2), θ(2, 2)} with p1,2 = 1− λq and p2,2 = λq.
Beliefs dispersion, computed as Var [νt], thus represents the variance of the beliefs taken
across individual traders. It is explicitly characterized in the Appendix. When all traders are
rational, there is no dispersion in beliefs. The intuition for the first prediction in Proposition
3.4 is as follows. When signals with conflicting information accumulate, confirmatory-biased
traders have plenty of occasions to misperceive public signals that contradict their prior
beliefs. This explains why differences of opinion are more pronounced in our model when
there are changes in the sign of the public signals.
The two other predictions are related to the dynamics of beliefs. The second prediction
builds on the fact that the influence of a signal on biased traders’ beliefs depends on prior
signals. For example, the impact of a positive signal at date 2 depends on the signal received
at date 1. Indeed, if the first signal was positive, the positive signal at date 2 is perfectly
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perceived by biased traders. By contrast, if the first signal was negative, the positive signal
at date 2 is discarded by a fraction of biased traders. As a result, if one measures the
proportion of agents that revise upward their beliefs after receiving date 2 information, it is
equal to one in the former case (when signals have the same sign), and it is less than one in
the latter case (when signal have different signs).19
The third prediction focuses even more closely on individual traders’ beliefs updating
process. It indicates that it is more likely that a trader updates his beliefs upward after a
good signal if he previously updated his beliefs upward rather than downward. The logic is
that a trader who has previously updated downward his beliefs is more likely to be pessimistic
and thus to ignore subsequent positive signals. A similar logic applies for bad signals.
These theoretical results are tested in the next section using data on US firms’ earnings
announcements and analysts’ earnings forecasts.
4. Empirical analysis
This section provides an empirical test of our three novel theoretical predictions: when some
traders suffer from the confirmatory bias, i) traders are less likely to update their beliefs in
the same direction as the latest signal, for signals that are of a different sign compared to the
previous ones; ii) traders are less likely to update their beliefs in the same direction as the
latest signal, for signals that are of a different sign compared to their previous beliefs change;
and iii) differences of opinion among traders are larger when past signals have different signs.
To construct a test of our theory, one must construct an empirical counterpart for the
public signals in our model. For this, we build on earlier work (see for instance DellaVigna
and Pollet (2009), and Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2009)) and use quarterly earnings surprises
as a proxy for the arrival of public news. Then, we follow the literature (e.g., Diether, Malloy,
19When they are all rational, the proportion of traders who revise their beliefs in the direction of the last
signal is always equal to one.
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and Scherbina (2002)) and use the dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts as a proxy for
differences of opinion. Finally, we capture beliefs updating with analysts’ revisions of annual
earnings forecasts across quarterly earnings announcements.
We now present the sample formation, our empirical tests and the results.
4.1 Data and variables
The sample consists of all analyst-stock-year-quarter observations for which we have in-
formation on quarterly earnings announcements and analysts’ earnings forecasts. We use
quarterly earnings announcement data (and other firm-level accounting information) from
the CRSP-Compustat merged database and data on analysts’ annual earnings forecasts from
the Institutional Brokers Estimates System (I/B/E/S) database (which are available from
1982 onwards).20 When quarterly announcement dates are available in both the CRSP-
Compustat merged database and in I/B/E/S and are different, we follow DellaVigna and
Pollet (2009) and Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2009) and take the earlier date. Our full sam-
ple covers the period 1982-2014. Earnings and forecasts are all split-adjusted. From CRSP,
we obtain data on stock returns and closing stock prices. Following earlier work, we focus
on companies’ ordinary stocks - that is, companies with CRSP share codes of 10 or 11 -
traded on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ, and we exclude observations for which the stock
price is less than $5 dollars. Finally, OptionMetrics provides us with data on stocks’ implied
volatility (which are available only from 1996 onward).
Our measure of earnings surprises is the commonly used standardized unexpected earn-
ings (SUE) variable (see for instance Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990), Chan et al. (1996)
and Sadka (2006)). SUE for stock i in quarter Q is defined as (Ei,Q − Ei,Q−4 − ci,Q)/σi,Q,
where Ei,Q is the quarterly earnings per share in year-quarter Q, Ei,Q−4 the quarterly earn-
20As noted by Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002), there is a rounding error problem in the standard
I/B/E/S “Detail History” data set. We thus use data on analysts’ forecasts unadjusted for stock splits; we
then scale analysts’ forecasts by the CRSP cumulative adjustment factor.
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ings four quarters ago, ci,Q and σi,Q the average and standard deviation, respectively, of
Ei,Q − Ei,Q−4 over the previous eight quarters.21
We construct our measures of forecasts revisions and forecasts dispersion using data from
I/B/E/S. SAME-DIRECTION REV(Q) is a dummy that equals one if the analyst’s annual
earnings forecast revision, if any, made between the announcement dates of the Q-1 and Q
quarterly earnings has the same sign as SUE(Q-1), the unexpected earnings in quarter Q-
1.22 In robustness tests, we check that our results hold when focusing separately on forecasts
revisions following either positive and negative earnings surprises. For this, we construct the
variable POS REV(Q) (respectively NEG REV(Q)), a dummy that equals one if the analyst’s
annual earnings forecast revision made between the announcement dates of the Q-1 and Q
quarterly earnings is positive (respectively negative).
Forecasts dispersion is measured as the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts scaled
by the prior year-end stock price to mitigate heteroskedasticity. DISP(Q) is the standard
deviation multiplied by 100 of the most recent (annual) earnings forecast (for the current
fiscal year) of each analyst covering the stock between the announcement date of the quarterly
earnings in quarter Q-1 and the announcement date of the quarterly earnings in quarter Q
normalized by the stock price at the end of the previous fiscal year.23
For every stock, we also construct COVERAGE, the logarithm of the number of analysts
who covered the stock in the current fiscal year; LN(MKTCAP), the logarithm of the stock’s
total market capitalization (Compustat item CSHO× item PRCC F) computed at the end of
21We use earnings per share before extraordinary items from the CRSP-COMPUSTAT merged database
(variable EPSPXQ), which are then split-adjusted.
22Individual revisions are computed as the difference between the last annual earnings forecast made
between the announcement dates of the Q-1 and Q quarterly earnings and the last forecast, if any, made
before the announcement date of the Q-1 quarterly earnings. Our results are identical when we construct
SAME-DIRECTION REV(Q) based on the difference between the last annual earnings forecast made before
the end date of two consecutive fiscal quarters (instead of before the announcement dates of two consecutive
quarterly earnings).
23The results are identical if DISP(Q) is measured using the latest earnings forecast of each analyst covering
the stock between the end date of two consecutive fiscal quarters (instead of between the announcement dates
of two consecutive quarterly earnings).
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the current fiscal year; LNBM, the logarithm of the book-to-market ratio defined as in Fama
and French (2008) in the current year; and ROA, firm return on assets, defined as operating
income after depreciation (Compustat item OIBDP - item DP) over total assets (item AT)
computed at the end of the current fiscal year. Following Leahy and Whited (1996) and
Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen (2007), we use the standard deviation of daily stock returns
for firm i in the current year, SIGMA, as our baseline measure of uncertainty.24 We also
use implied volatility from options prices in robustness checks, which provides us with a
forward-looking measure of uncertainty (see for instance Bloom (2009), Kellogg (2014) and
Stein and Stone (2013)).25 As in Bloom (2009) and Stein and Stone (2013), we focus on the
implied volatility of 30-day, at-the-money options. These are options that expire in 30 days
for which the strike price is equal to the stock’s forward price. Specifically, IMPLIEDVOL
is defined as the average implied volatility of all 30-day, at-the-money stock i options issued
in the current year.26 Finally, to mitigate the effect of outliers, we windsorize all continuous
variables at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles of their respective empirical distribution.
[Table 1 here]
Table 1 presents summary statistics on the variables of interest. There are 996,129
analyst-stock-year-quarter observations (and 140,950 unique stock-year-quarters) in our sam-
ple. The mean and median analyst coverage of these stocks is 13 and 11 analysts. Forecast
dispersion, DISP(Q), is right-skewed with mean (0.605) noticeably larger than the median
24Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen (2007) show that firm-level stock returns volatility is significantly corre-
lated with a range of alternative uncertainty proxies. Our results are identical when using monthly returns
to construct stock-price volatility. As noted in Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen (2007), using stock returns at
a sufficiently high frequency has the advantage of reducing the sample variance. However, one might worry
that daily observations are more subject to noise unrelated to fundamentals than monthly observations.
25The formula for the price of an option is based on Black and Scholes (1973)’s model. Given the price of
an option, the price of the underlying, its time to maturity and strike price, and the riskless rate of interest,
the formula can be inverted to yield the volatility implied by the option.
26The results are identical if we use implied volatility from at-the-money options 60 days or 90 days to
expiration, or if we use implied volatility from either put or call options, separately.
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(0.255). Finally, the average value of NEG REV(Q) is slightly above 0.5 which indicates
that analysts are slightly more likely to revise their forecasts on annual earnings downward
over the fiscal year.
4.2 Testing the predictions
Forecasts Revisions. We first study the effect of changes in the sign of earnings surprises
on analysts’ forecasts revisions. For this, we construct SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) (re-
spectively, SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) for robustness), a dummy that equals one
if there is a change in the sign of SUEs over the previous two quarters (respectively, three
quarters).27 The null hypothesis is that, if all agents are rational, they should all revise their
forecasts in the direction of the latest signal, irrespective of the sign of any of the previous
signals – i.e., the coefficient on the variable SUE SIGN CHANGE should be null. By con-
trast, as shown in the model, when some agents suffer from the confirmatory bias, changes in
the sign of signals open opportunities for biased traders to ignore information contradicting
their prior beliefs. As a result, we expect that some of them will not update their forecasts
at the announcements of earnings news that are of a different sign compared to the previous
ones.
To examine whether this prediction holds in the data, we use a linear probability model
and estimate the following equation at the analyst-stock-year-quarter level:28
SAME-DIRECTION REVi,j,Q = α+β SUE SIGN CHANGEi,(Q−1,Q−2)+γ CONTROLSi,j,Q+δQ+ηj+εi,j,Q
(4.4)
27Our empirical analysis uses a specification at the quarterly frequency, but all our results hold if we run
regressions on a yearly basis. In this case, the first three quarterly earnings announcements in a given fiscal
year represent the signals s1, s2, and s3.
28Discrete choice models such as logit and probit become unidentified when a large number of fixed effects
is included. We therefore use below linear probability models that allow us to control in our strictest
specifications for fiscal-quarter, year-quarter, stock, and analyst fixed effects.
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SAME-DIRECTION REVi,j,Q is a dummy that equals one if analyst j annual earnings
forecast revision for stock i made between the announcement dates of the Q-1 and Q quar-
terly earnings has the same sign as the SUE announced at the end of quarter Q-1; δQ are
year-quarter fixed effects; ηj are analyst fixed effects; and εi,j,Q is the error term. All re-
gressions also control for fiscal-quarter fixed effects. In some specifications, we also include
industry and stock fixed effects.29 Equation (4.4) also includes as control variables analyst
coverage (COVERAGE), firm size (LN(MKTCAP)), book-to-market (LNBM), return on as-
set (ROA), and the volatility of stock returns (SIGMA). SIGMA is meant to control for firm
uncertainty, which has been shown to be a key driver of analyst forecast behavior. To further
mitigate the concern that SUE SIGN CHANGE might be simply reflecting uncertainty faced
by analysts regarding firms fundamentals, we also use implied-volatility from equity options
as an alternative (forward-looking) measure of uncertainty.
Finally, since forecast revisions are directly affected by the size of the earnings surprise,
we include as an additional control in Equation (4.4) the absolute value of the latest SUE. In
all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the stock level to account for serial correlation
of the error term within the same stock.30 The coefficient of interest, β, measures the average
effect of past conflicting signals on the likelihood for analysts of revising their forecasts in the
direction of the latest signal, and should be negative if the confirmatory bias is at work.31
Heterogeneous behavior across analysts. To go deeper into the empirical analysis
29We construct the 48 Fama-French industry dummies using the firm’s 4 digit SIC industry code and the
conversion table in the Appendix of Fama and French (1997).
30The statistical significance of the coefficients of interest are stronger in all regressions presented in this
paper if we report standard errors clustered at the analyst level.
31Earnings news announced in the midst of macroeconomic volatility are more likely to admit different
interpretations of the news. We thus also expect our prediction that traders are less likely to update their
beliefs in the same direction as the latest signal for signals that are of a different sign compared to the previous
ones to be stronger for signals announced in the midst of macroeconomic volatility. To test this hypothesis,
we augment Equation (1.1) by interacting the variables SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) and SUE SIGN
CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) with a dummy, MACROVOL(HIGH), that equals one if macroeconomic volatility
in quarter Q− 1 lies in the highest tercile of its empirical distribution. As shown in Tables (A.1) and (A.2)
of the Online Appendix, we do find strong empirical support for this additional prediction of our theory. We
thank an anonymous referee for suggesting us this test.
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of the confirmatory bias, we also investigate differences across analysts in their individual
forecast behavior. For this, we construct a dummy variable at the analyst-stock level which
is meant to capture cases in which the announcement of earnings news differ from the
analyst’s prior beliefs about the prospect of the stock. We capture prior beliefs with past
annual earnings forecasts revisions. Specifically, the dummy variable SIGN REVj,Q−1 6=
SIGN SUEi,Q−1 which equals one if the sign of analyst j’s earnings revision made between
the announcement dates of the earnings in quarter Q-2 and Q-1 is not the same as the sign
of the SUE announced at the end of quarter Q-1. We can then study in our empirical tests
whether two analysts that have different prior beliefs (as proxied by the sign of their prior
earnings forecast revisions on a given stock) display differences in their reaction to future
earnings announcements.
To examine whether this prediction holds in the data, we estimate the same Equa-
tion (4.4) as above, except that the independent variable of interest is in that case, SIGN
REVj,Q−1 6= SIGN SUEi,Q−1.32 The null hypothesis is that, if all agents are rational, they
should all revise their forecasts in the direction of the latest SUE, irrespective of their prior
beliefs about the prospect of the stock– i.e., the coefficient on the variable SIGN REVj,Q−1 6=
SIGN SUEi,Q−1 in the regression discussed below should be null. By contrast, if some agents
suffer from the confirmatory bias, we expect that agents for whom the announcement of earn-
ings news is inconsistent with their prior beliefs will be less likely to revise their forecasts in
the direction of the latest SUE.
Beliefs dispersion. Finally, we look at the implications of the confirmation bias for
beliefs dispersion at the stock level. Our theory predicts that a change in the sign of past
signals has a positive effect on beliefs dispersion. The null hypothesis is that, if all agents
are rational, this effect should be null: the sign of SUEs should not affect forecast dispersion
32We also include as additional control a dummy indicating whether the revision of the analyst in year-
quarter Q-1 has been positive.
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because all agents should have the same interpretation of the signal. To examine whether
this prediction holds in the data, we run the following equation at the stock-year-quarter
level:
DISPi,Q = α + β SUE SIGN CHANGEi,(Q−1,Q−2) + γ CONTROLSi,Q + δQ + εi,Q (4.5)
DISPi,Q measures beliefs dispersion for stock i in year-quarter Q, δQ are year-quarter fixed
effects, and εi,Q is the error term. All regressions also control for fiscal-quarter fixed effects. In
some specifications, we also include industry and stock fixed effects. Equation (4.5) includes
the same control variables as in Equation (4.4), namely analyst coverage (COVERAGE),
firm size (LN(MKTCAP)), book-to-market (LNBM), return on asset (ROA), the volatility
of stock returns (SIGMA), and the absolute value of the latest SUE. The coefficient of
interest, β, measures the effect of past conflicting signals on beliefs dispersion, and should
be positive if the confirmatory bias is at work.
4.3 Results
Forecast revisions. We first look at how the signs of past signals affect analysts’ forecast
revision, and report the results in Tables 2 to 5. We first run the regression detailed in
Equation (4.4). The variable of interest is SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) in columns [1] to
[3], and SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) in columns [4] to [6].
[Table 2 here]
We find support for our prediction that analysts are less likely to update their beliefs in
the same direction as the latest signal, for signals of a different sign compared to the previous
one(s): the first three columns of Table 2 indicate that, when the sign of the SUE in the last
28
quarter differs from the sign of the SUE two quarters ago, the probability for a given analyst
of revising her/his forecast in the direction of the last SUE is lower by around 2 percentage
points. This effect is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, and corresponds to a drop
of around 4% for the average analyst given that the sample mean of SAME-DIRECTION
REV(Q) is 56.7%. This result is robust when we consider a change in the sign of SUEs over
the previous three quarters (see the last three columns of Table 2).33
[Table 3 here]
We then check that these results are robust to controlling for implied volatility. As shown
in Table 3, the estimates remain very similar to those in Table 2, and statistically significant
at the 1 percent level across all specifications. Finally, we go one step further and check
whether the prediction holds in the data when looking separately at positive and negative
SUEs. For this, we split our sample into two subsamples depending on whether the latest
SUE is positive or negative. In Table 4, we find that the probability for analysts to revise
their forecasts upwards following a positive SUE in the previous quarter is significantly lower
when the SUE two quarters ago (respectively two and/or three quarters ago) has a different
sign. The same results hold for negative revisions following negative SUEs, as shown in
Table 5.
[Table 4 here]
[Table 5 here]
33The results are also robust to the way of computing the analysts’ forecast revisions. In the paper, we
compute the revisions only for analysts that issue a forecast both before and after the quarterly announcement
of interest. However, we find very similar results when we compute revisions for all analysts that have covered
the stock before the earnings announcement.
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Heterogeneous behavior across analysts. We then investigate differences across
analysts in their forecast revision behavior depending on whether earnings announcements
conflict with their prior beliefs, and report the results in Tables 6 to 8. We run the same
regression as in Equation (4.4), except that the variable of interest is now SIGN REV(Q-1)
6= SIGN SUE(Q-1).
[Table 6 here]
We find support for our prediction that analysts are less likely to update their earnings
forecasts in the same direction as the latest SUE, for SUEs of a different sign compared to
their prior beliefs: as shown in Table 6, the probability of revising a forecast in the direction
of the last SUE is lower by around 20 percentage points for an analyst with prior beliefs, as
proxied by the sign of her/his forecast revision in the previous quarter, that conflict with
the earnings surprise that have been announced. 34 This effect is statistically significant at
the 1 percent level. The size of the effect is also significant and corresponds to a decrease in
forecast revisions in the direction of the current SUE of around 35% for the average analyst.
As shown in columns [4] to [6], this result is robust to controlling for implied volatility.35
Again, we go one step further and check whether the prediction holds in the data when
looking separately at positive and negative SUEs. As predicted by the model, we find in
Table 7 that the probability of upwards revision following positive SUE is significantly lower
for analysts that have revised their forecasts downwards in the previous quarter. Finally,
the same results hold for negative revisions following negative SUEs, as shown in Table 8.
34The results are virtually identical if we proxy for analysts’ prior beliefs (either bearish or bullish) by
the sign of analysts’ last annual earnings forecast revision made in one of the two quarters before the
announcement of the Q-1 earnings.
35As for the tests presented above, the results are also robust to the way of computing the analysts’
forecast revisions.
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[Table 7 here]
[Table 8 here]
Belief dispersion. The regression results on forecast dispersion are reported in Tables
9 and 10.
[Table 9 here]
Table 9 presents estimates of different specifications of equation (4.5). Columns [2] and
[5] include industry fixed effects whereas columns [3] and [6] include stock fixed effects. The
coefficient on SUE SIGN CHANGE is always positive and statistically significant (at the
one percent confidence level), indicating that changes in the sign of SUEs are associated
with higher dispersion in analysts’ forecasts, as predicted when some agents suffer from the
confirmatory bias. The economic effect is also significant. For instance, in column [1], the
coefficient on SUE SIGN CHANGE equals 0.048. Given that the sample mean of DISP(Q)
equals 0.605, in this specification, a change in the sign of past SUEs is associated with an
increase in belief dispersion for the average firm of around 8%.
[Table 10 here]
The correlation between SUE SIGN CHANGE and SIGMA is negative and low (the
correlation equals -0.008), which mitigates the concern that the coefficient on SUE SIGN
CHANGE might simply reflect part of the effect of firm uncertainty on belief dispersion. Still,
to mitigate further this concern, we use implied volatility from stock options as an alternative
measure. Table 10 shows the results. Even though the size of the sample is reduced, the
estimates remain remarkably stable, and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, across
all specifications.
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Overall, our empirical investigation provides new stylized facts on the link between the
sign of public signals, on one hand, and analysts’ forecast dispersion and revisions, on the
other hand. We also find heterogeneous effects across analysts in their forecast behavior in the
direction predicted by the model. These stylized facts are consistent with the confirmatory
bias affecting financial analysts’ perception of information.
5. Conclusion
This paper proposes and tests a theory of financial markets based on the premise that some
traders are prone to the confirmatory bias. We model this cognitive bias by considering that
biased traders tend to misperceive public signals that are inconsistent with their prior views.
We show that, in the context of financial markets with public information only, this bias
provides a rationale for various stylized facts including excess volume, excess volatility, and
momentum.
The model also provides novel empirical predictions regarding both individual analysts’
forecast behavior and differences of opinion. At the individual level, the confirmatory bias
implies that first impression matters: i) after initial positive (respectively, negative) signals,
some traders tend to ignore subsequent signals that are negative (respectively, positive), ii)
traders that have previously updated their beliefs upward (respectively, downward) are more
likely to ignore subsequent signals that are negative (respectively, positive). At the stock
level, as conflicting signals give ample room for biased traders to misinterpret information,
the model predicts in presence of confirmatory-biased traders that differences of opinion
should be larger when past signals exhibit changes in sign.
We test these novel predictions on U.S. stock market data over the period ranging from
1982 to 2014. For each stock and quarter, we measure dispersion in analysts’ earnings
forecasts (as a proxy for disagreement), and analysts’ propensity to revise their forecasts (as
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a proxy for beliefs revisions) according to the sign of the latest earnings surprise. We then
perform empirical tests of forecast revisions at the individual level, and find (after controlling
for a variety of factors that affect analysts’ forecasts), that analysts are less likely to update
their beliefs in the same direction as the latest earnings surprise, i) following changes in the
sign of earnings surprises over the previous quarters, and ii) for earnings surprises that are of
a different sign compared to their previous beliefs. Moreover, we find at the stock level that
differences of opinion across analysts are larger when past earnings surprises exhibit changes
in sign. These results suggest that the confirmatory bias is at work in financial markets.
In future research, it would be interesting to estimate the parameters of our model and,
in particular, the proportion of biased traders on financial markets and the magnitude of the
confirmatory bias. This could be useful to evaluate the performance of a strategy designed
to profit from the mistakes of confirmatory-biased traders. Finally, our model could be used
to study optimal corporate communication. Indeed, firms that are confronted to financial
markets populated by investors prone to the confirmatory bias might have an interest in
appropriately choosing the timing of information releases.
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Table 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS
We consider a sample of stocks that have analysts’ coverage in I/B/E/S over the period from January 1982 to December 2014 and
non-missing information on quarterly earnings in the CRSP-Compustat merged database. SUE(Q) (respectively ABS SUE(Q))
are (respectively the absolute value of) standardized unexpected earnings in year-quarter Q; specifically SUE(Q) is defined as
(Ei,Q−Ei,Q−4−ci,Q)/σi,Q, where Ei,Q is the quarterly earnings per share in year-quarter Q, Ei,Q−4 the quarterly earnings four
quarters ago, ci,Q and σi,Q the average and standard deviation, respectively, of Ei,Q−Ei,Q−4 over the previous eight quarters.
POS REV(Q) (respectively NEG REV(Q)) for a given analyst and a given stock is a dummy that equals one if the analyst
covered the stock before the announcement date of the Q-1 quarterly earnings and has revised his/her annual earnings forecast
upward (respectively downward) between the announcement dates of the Q-1 and Q quarterly earnings. SAME-DIRECTION
REV(Q) is a dummy that equals one if the analyst’s annual earnings forecast revision, if any, made between the announcement
dates of the Q-1 and Q quarterly earnings has the same sign as SUE(Q-1), the unexpected earnings in quarter Q-1. Individual
revisions are computed as the difference between the last annual earnings forecast made between the announcement dates of the
Q-1 and Q quarterly earnings and the last forecast, if any, made before the announcement date of the Q-1 quarterly earnings.
DISP(Q) is the standard deviation multiplied by 100 of the most recent (annual) earnings forecast (for the current fiscal year) of
each analyst covering the stock between the announcement date of the quarterly earnings in quarter Q-1 and the announcement
date of the quarterly earnings in quarter Q normalized by the stock price at the end of the previous fiscal year. POS SUE(Q-1)
(respectively POS SUE(Q-1,Q-2)) is a dummy that equals one if SUE in quarter Q-1 (respectively in quarter Q-1 and/or in
quarter Q− 2) is positive. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) (respectively SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3)) is a dummy that
equals one if there is a change in the sign of SUEs over the previous two quarters (respectively over the previous three quarters).
SIGN REV(Q-1) 6= SIGN SUE(Q-1) is a dummy that equals one if the analyst’s annual earnings forecast revision for a given
stock, if any, made between the announcement dates of the Q-2 and Q-1 quarterly earnings has a different sign than SUE(Q-1).
COVERAGE is the logarithm of the number of analysts who covered the stock in fiscal year t. LN(MKTCAP) is the logarithm
of the stock total market capitalization (Compustat item CSHO × item PRCC F) at the end of the current fiscal year. SIGMA
is the standard deviation of daily raw returns of the stock in the current fiscal year. IMPLIEDVOL is the average of 30-day
implied volatility of all at-the-money stock i options issued in the current fiscal year. LNBM is book-to-market defined as in
Fama and French (2008) in the current year. Return on assets, ROA, is defined as operating income after depreciation (item
OIBDP - item DP) over total assets (item AT) computed at the end of the current fiscal year. All continuous variables are
windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude all observations with stock price lower than $5.
Obs Mean SD 10th 50th 90th
Analysts’ Forecast Revision (at the analyst-stock-year-quarter level)
POS REV(Q) 996129 0.454 0.498 0.000 0.000 1.000
NEG REV(Q) 996129 0.521 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000
SAME-DIRECTION REV(Q) 996129 0.567 0.495 0.000 1.000 1.000
Analysts’ Forecast Dispersion (at the stock-year-quarter level)
DISP(Q) 140950 0.605 1.119 0.047 0.255 1.383
Quarterly Earnings Surprises (at the stock-year-quarter level)
SUE(Q-1) 140950 -0.104 1.176 -1.402 -0.037 1.102
ABS SUE(Q-1) 140950 0.833 0.837 0.115 0.576 1.871
POS SUE(Q-2) 140950 0.488 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000
POS SUE(Q-2,Q-3) 140950 0.632 0.482 0.000 1.000 1.000
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) 140950 0.439 0.496 0.000 0.000 1.000
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) 140950 0.283 0.451 0.000 0.000 1.000
SIGN REV(Q-1) 6= SIGN SUE(Q-1) 602209 0.406 0.491 0.000 0.000 1.000
Firm Characteristics (at the stock-year-quarter level)
COVERAGE 140950 13.250 9.427 4.000 11.000 27.000
LN(MKTCAP) 140950 6.888 1.677 4.802 6.796 9.115
SIGMA 140950 2.654 1.315 1.301 2.355 4.384
IMPLIEDVOL 62830 0.453 0.183 0.246 0.419 0.704
LNBM 140950 -0.731 0.745 -1.713 -0.655 0.130
ROA 140950 0.031 0.032 0.004 0.031 0.065
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Table 2. FORECAST REVISION
The dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if the analyst’s annual earnings forecast revision for a given stock, if any,
made between the announcement dates of the Q-1 and Q quarterly earnings has the same sign as SUE(Q-1), the unexpected
earnings in quarter Q-1. Individual revisions are computed as the difference between the last annual earnings forecast made
between the announcement dates of the Q-1 and Q quarterly earnings and the last annual earnings forecast, if any, made before
the announcement date of the Q-1 quarterly earnings. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) is a dummy that equals one if there is a
change in the sign of SUEs over the previous two quarters. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) is a dummy that equals one if
there is one change in the sign of SUEs among the previous three quarters. ABS SUE(Q-1) is the absolute value of standardized
unexpected earnings in year-quarter Q-1. COVERAGE is the logarithm of the number of analysts who covered the stock in the
current fiscal year. LN(MKTCAP) is the logarithm of the stock total market capitalization (Compustat item CSHO × item
PRCC F) at the end of the current fiscal year. SIGMA is the standard deviation of daily raw returns of the stock in the current
fiscal year. LNBM is book-to-market defined as in Fama and French (2008) in the current year. Return on assets, ROA, is
defined as operating income after depreciation (item OIBDP - item DP) over total assets (item AT) computed at the end of
the current fiscal year. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects, fiscal-quarter fixed effects and analyst fixed effects.
Columns [2] and [5] also include industry fixed effects. Columns [3] and [6] also include stock fixed effects. All continuous
variables are windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude all observations with stock price lower than $5.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is from January 1982 to December
2014.
REVISION IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THE LATEST SUE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) -0.021∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) -0.018∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.057∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
LN(MKTCAP) -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
COVERAGE 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIGMA 0.013∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
LNBM 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
ROA 0.200∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.158∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.159∗
(0.067) (0.068) (0.090) (0.067) (0.068) (0.090)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 996129 996129 996129 996129 996129 996129
R2 0.038 0.039 0.076 0.038 0.039 0.076
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Table 3. FORECAST REVISION - ROBUSTNESS - CONTROLLING FOR IMPLIED VOLATILITY
This Table presents variants of the regressions in Table 2 in which we control for implied volatility. In columns [1] to [6], the
dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if the analyst’s annual earnings forecast revision for a given stock, if any, made
between the announcement dates of the Q-1 and Q quarterly earnings has the same sign as SUE(Q-1), the unexpected earnings
in quarter Q-1. Individual revisions are computed as the difference between the last annual earnings forecast made between
the announcement dates of the Q-1 and Q quarterly earnings and the last annual earnings forecast, if any, made before the
announcement date of the Q-1 quarterly earnings. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) is a dummy that equals one if there is a
change in the sign of SUEs over the previous two quarters. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) is a dummy that equals one if
there is one change in the sign of SUEs among the previous three quarters. ABS SUE(Q-1) is the absolute value of standardized
unexpected earnings in year-quarter Q-1. COVERAGE is the logarithm of the number of analysts who covered the stock in the
current fiscal year. LN(MKTCAP) is the logarithm of the stock total market capitalization (Compustat item CSHO × item
PRCC F) at the end of the current fiscal year. IMPLIEDVOL is the average of 30-day implied volatility of all at-the-money
stock i options issued in the current fiscal year. LNBM is book-to-market defined as in Fama and French (2008) in the current
year. Return on assets, ROA, is defined as operating income after depreciation (item OIBDP - item DP) over total assets (item
AT) computed at the end of the current fiscal year. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects, fiscal-quarter fixed effects
and analyst fixed effects. Columns [2] and [5] also include industry fixed effects. Columns [3] and [6] also include stock fixed
effects. All continuous variables are windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude all observations with
stock price lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is from
January 1996 to December 2014.
REVISION IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THE LATEST SUE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) -0.023∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) -0.022∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
LN(MKTCAP) -0.007∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
COVERAGE 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
IMPLIEDVOL 0.120∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.026) (0.020) (0.020) (0.026)
LNBM -0.002 -0.003 -0.007 -0.002 -0.003 -0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
ROA 0.243∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.106 0.244∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗ 0.108
(0.091) (0.090) (0.120) (0.091) (0.090) (0.120)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 517979 517979 517979 517979 517979 517979
R2 0.041 0.042 0.083 0.041 0.042 0.083
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Table 4. POSITIVE REVISION
This Table presents variants of the regressions in Table 2 in which we focus on analysts’ positive revisions that follow positive
earnings surprises. In columns [1] to [6], the dependent variable is for a given analyst and a given stock a dummy that equals
one if the analyst covered the stock before the announcement date of the Q-1 quarterly earnings and has revised his/her annual
earnings forecast upward between the announcement dates of the Q-1 and Q quarterly earnings. The sample is restricted to
analyst-stock-year-quarter observations for which SUE(Q-1), the unexpected earnings in quarter Q-1, is positive. NEG SUE
(Q-2) is a dummy that equals one if standardized unexpected earnings were negative two quarters ago. NEG SUE (Q-2,Q-3)
is a dummy that equals one if standardized unexpected earnings were negative two and/or three quarters ago. ABS SUE(Q-1)
is the absolute value of standardized unexpected earnings in year-quarter Q-1. COVERAGE is the logarithm of the number of
analysts who covered the stock in the current fiscal year. LN(MKTCAP) is the logarithm of the stock total market capitalization
(Compustat item CSHO × item PRCC F) at the end of the current fiscal year. SIGMA is the standard deviation of daily raw
returns of the stock in the current fiscal year. LNBM is book-to-market defined as in Fama and French (2008) in the current
year. Return on assets, ROA, is defined as operating income after depreciation (item OIBDP - item DP) over total assets (item
AT) computed at the end of the current fiscal year. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects, fiscal-quarter fixed effects
and analyst fixed effects. Columns [2] and [5] also include industry fixed effects. Columns [3] and [6] also include stock fixed
effects. All continuous variables are windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude all observations with
stock price lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is from
January 1982 to December 2014.
POSREV(Q) (Sample with SUE(Q-1)> 0 only)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
NEG SUE(Q-2) -0.017∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
NEG SUE(Q-2,Q-3) -0.014∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
LN(MKTCAP) 0.056∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
COVERAGE -0.006∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
SIGMA 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.004 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
LNBM 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
ROA 3.190∗∗∗ 3.243∗∗∗ 4.029∗∗∗ 3.189∗∗∗ 3.242∗∗∗ 4.025∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.106) (0.153) (0.105) (0.106) (0.153)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 476208 476208 476208 476208 476208 476208
R2 0.137 0.138 0.208 0.136 0.138 0.208
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Table 5. NEGATIVE REVISION
This Table presents variants of the regressions in Table 2 in which we focus on analysts’ negative revisions that follow negative
earnings surprises. In columns [1] to [6], the dependent variable is for a given analyst and a given stock a dummy that equals
one if the analyst covered the stock before the announcement date of the Q-1 quarterly earnings and has revised his/her annual
earnings forecast downward between the announcement dates of the Q-1 and Q quarterly earnings. The sample is restricted to
analyst-stock-year-quarter observations for which SUE(Q-1), the unexpected earnings in quarter Q-1, is negative. POS SUE
(Q-2) is a dummy that equals one if standardized unexpected earnings were positive two quarters ago. POS SUE (Q-2,Q-3) is
a dummy that equals one if standardized unexpected earnings were positive two and/or three quarters ago. ABS SUE(Q-1) is
the absolute value of standardized unexpected earnings in year-quarter Q-1. COVERAGE is the logarithm of the number of
analysts who covered the stock in the current fiscal year. LN(MKTCAP) is the logarithm of the stock total market capitalization
(Compustat item CSHO × item PRCC F) at the end of the current fiscal year. SIGMA is the standard deviation of daily raw
returns of the stock in the current fiscal year. LNBM is book-to-market defined as in Fama and French (2008) in the current
year. Return on assets, ROA, is defined as operating income after depreciation (item OIBDP - item DP) over total assets (item
AT) computed at the end of the current fiscal year. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects, fiscal-quarter fixed effects
and analyst fixed effects. Columns [2] and [5] also include industry fixed effects. Columns [3] and [6] also include stock fixed
effects. All continuous variables are windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude all observations with
stock price lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is from
January 1982 to December 2014.
NEGREV(Q) (Sample with SUE(Q-1)< 0 only)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
POS SUE(Q-2) -0.025∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
POS SUE(Q-2,Q-3) -0.023∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.050∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
LN(MKTCAP) -0.055∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
COVERAGE 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
SIGMA 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.008∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
LNBM -0.017∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
ROA -2.369∗∗∗ -2.383∗∗∗ -2.961∗∗∗ -2.365∗∗∗ -2.379∗∗∗ -2.955∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.091) (0.126) (0.090) (0.091) (0.126)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 519921 519921 519921 519921 519921 519921
R2 0.138 0.140 0.206 0.138 0.140 0.206
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Table 6. FORECAST REVISION - HETEROGENEOUS BEHAVIOR ACROSS ANALYSTS
The dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if the analyst’s annual earnings forecast revision for a given stock, if any,
made between the announcement dates of the Q-1 and Q quarterly earnings has the same sign as SUE(Q-1), the unexpected
earnings in quarter Q-1. Individual revisions are computed as the difference between the last annual earnings forecast made
between the announcement dates of the Q-1 and Q quarterly earnings and the last annual earnings forecast, if any, made
before the announcement date of the Q-1 quarterly earnings. SIGN REV(Q-1) 6= SIGN SUE(Q-1) is a dummy that equals
one if the analyst’s annual earnings forecast revision for a given stock, if any, made between the announcement dates of the
Q-2 and Q-1 quarterly earnings has a different sign than SUE(Q-1). POSREV(Q-1) is a dummy that equals one if the analyst
has revised his/her annual earnings forecast upward between the announcement dates of the Q-2 and Q-1 quarterly earnings.
ABS SUE(Q-1) is the absolute value of standardized unexpected earnings in year-quarter Q-1. COVERAGE is the logarithm
of the number of analysts who covered the stock in the current fiscal year. LN(MKTCAP) is the logarithm of the stock total
market capitalization (Compustat item CSHO × item PRCC F) at the end of the current fiscal year. SIGMA is the standard
deviation of daily raw returns of the stock in the current fiscal year. IMPLIEDVOL is the average of 30-day implied volatility
of all at-the-money stock i options issued in the current fiscal year. LNBM is book-to-market defined as in Fama and French
(2008) in the current year. Return on assets, ROA, is defined as operating income after depreciation (item OIBDP - item DP)
over total assets (item AT) computed at the end of the current fiscal year. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects,
fiscal-quarter fixed effects and analyst fixed effects. Columns [2] and [5] also include industry fixed effects. Columns [3] and [6]
also include stock fixed effects. All continuous variables are windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude
all observations with stock price lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The
sample period is from January 1982 to December 2014 in columns [1] to [3], and from January 1996 to December 2014 in
columns [4] to [6].
REVISION IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THE LATEST SUE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
SIGN REV(Q-1) 6= SIGN SUE(Q-1) -0.220∗∗∗ -0.219∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.175∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
POSREV(Q-1) 0.023∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.044∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
LN(MKTCAP) -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
COVERAGE 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
SIGMA 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
IMPLIEDVOL 0.102∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.027)
LNBM 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
ROA 0.115∗ 0.118∗ 0.125 0.200∗∗ 0.196∗∗ 0.140
(0.066) (0.066) (0.091) (0.093) (0.093) (0.126)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 602187 602187 602187 334821 334821 334821
R2 0.090 0.091 0.125 0.085 0.086 0.125
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Table 7. POSITIVE REVISION - HETEROGENEOUS BEHAVIOR ACROSS ANALYSTS
This Table presents variants of the regressions in Table 6 in which we focus on analysts’ positive revisions (in year-quarter Q)
that follow positive earnings surprises. In columns [1] to [6], the dependent variable is for a given analyst and a given stock a
dummy that equals one if the analyst covered the stock before the announcement date of the Q-1 quarterly earnings and has
revised his/her annual earnings forecast upward between the announcement dates of the Q-1 and Q quarterly earnings. The
sample is restricted to analyst-stock-year-quarter observations for which SUE(Q-1), the unexpected earnings in quarter Q-1,
is positive. NEGREV(Q-1) is a dummy that equals one if the analyst has revised his/her annual earnings forecast downward
between the announcement dates of the Q-2 and Q-1 quarterly earnings. ABS SUE(Q-1) is the absolute value of standardized
unexpected earnings in year-quarter Q-1. COVERAGE is the logarithm of the number of analysts who covered the stock in the
current fiscal year. LN(MKTCAP) is the logarithm of the stock total market capitalization (Compustat item CSHO × item
PRCC F) at the end of the current fiscal year. SIGMA is the standard deviation of daily raw returns of the stock in the current
fiscal year. IMPLIEDVOL is the average of 30-day implied volatility of all at-the-money stock i options issued in the current
fiscal year. LNBM is book-to-market defined as in Fama and French (2008) in the current year. Return on assets, ROA, is
defined as operating income after depreciation (item OIBDP - item DP) over total assets (item AT) computed at the end of
the current fiscal year. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects, fiscal-quarter fixed effects and analyst fixed effects.
Columns [2] and [5] also include industry fixed effects. Columns [3] and [6] also include stock fixed effects. All continuous
variables are windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude all observations with stock price lower than $5.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is from January 1982 to December
2014 in columns [1] to [3], and from January 1996 to December 2014 in columns [4] to [6].
POSREV(Q) (Sample with SUE(Q-1)> 0 only)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
NEGREV(Q-1) -0.152∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.040∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
LN(MKTCAP) 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009)
COVERAGE -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SIGMA 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
IMPLIEDVOL 0.043 0.041 0.078∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.044)
LNBM 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009)
ROA 2.898∗∗∗ 2.944∗∗∗ 3.864∗∗∗ 2.789∗∗∗ 2.812∗∗∗ 3.747∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.105) (0.163) (0.126) (0.128) (0.224)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 282360 282360 282360 146731 146731 146731
R2 0.177 0.179 0.245 0.174 0.175 0.258
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Table 8. NEGATIVE REVISION - HETEROGENEOUS BEHAVIOR ACROSS ANALYSTS
This Table presents variants of the regressions in Table 6 in which we focus on analysts’ negative revisions (in year-quarter Q)
that follow negative earnings surprises. In columns [1] to [6], the dependent variable is for a given analyst and a given stock
a dummy that equals one if the analyst covered the stock before the announcement date of the Q-1 quarterly earnings and
has revised his/her annual earnings forecast downward between the announcement dates of the Q-1 and Q quarterly earnings.
The sample is restricted to analyst-stock-year-quarter observations for which SUE(Q-1), the unexpected earnings in quarter
Q-1, is negative. POSREV(Q-1) is a dummy that equals one if the analyst has revised his/her annual earnings forecast upward
between the announcement dates of the Q-2 and Q-1 quarterly earnings. ABS SUE(Q-1) is the absolute value of standardized
unexpected earnings in year-quarter Q-1. COVERAGE is the logarithm of the number of analysts who covered the stock in the
current fiscal year. LN(MKTCAP) is the logarithm of the stock total market capitalization (Compustat item CSHO × item
PRCC F) at the end of the current fiscal year. SIGMA is the standard deviation of daily raw returns of the stock in the current
fiscal year. IMPLIEDVOL is the average of 30-day implied volatility of all at-the-money stock i options issued in the current
fiscal year. LNBM is book-to-market defined as in Fama and French (2008) in the current year. Return on assets, ROA, is
defined as operating income after depreciation (item OIBDP - item DP) over total assets (item AT) computed at the end of
the current fiscal year. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects, fiscal-quarter fixed effects and analyst fixed effects.
Columns [2] and [5] also include industry fixed effects. Columns [3] and [6] also include stock fixed effects. All continuous
variables are windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude all observations with stock price lower than $5.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is from January 1982 to December
2014 in columns [1] to [3], and from January 1996 to December 2014 in columns [4] to [6].
NEGREV(Q) (Sample with SUE(Q-1)< 0 only)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
POSREV(Q-1) -0.125∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.042∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
LN(MKTCAP) -0.049∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008)
COVERAGE 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
SIGMA 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.007∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
IMPLIEDVOL 0.053∗ 0.051∗ 0.040
(0.027) (0.027) (0.040)
LNBM -0.019∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009)
ROA -2.219∗∗∗ -2.236∗∗∗ -2.866∗∗∗ -2.093∗∗∗ -2.092∗∗∗ -2.690∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.096) (0.140) (0.131) (0.132) (0.196)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 319827 319827 319827 188090 188090 188090
R2 0.170 0.171 0.234 0.166 0.168 0.237
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Table 9. DISPERSION IN ANALYST FORECASTS
The dependent variable, DISP(Q), is the standard deviation multiplied by 100 of the most recent (annual) earnings forecast
(for the current fiscal year) of each analyst covering the stock between the announcement date of the quarterly earnings in
quarter Q-1 and the announcement date of the quarterly earnings in quarter Q normalized by the stock price at the end of
the previous fiscal year. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) is a dummy that equals one if there is a change in the sign of SUEs
over the previous two quarters. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) is a dummy that equals one if there is one change in the
sign of SUEs among the previous three quarters. ABS SUE(Q-1) is the absolute value of standardized unexpected earnings in
year-quarter Q-1. COVERAGE is the logarithm of the number of analysts who covered the stock in the current fiscal year.
LN(MKTCAP) is the logarithm of the stock total market capitalization (Compustat item CSHO × item PRCC F) at the end
of the current fiscal year. SIGMA is the standard deviation of daily raw returns of the stock in the current fiscal year. LNBM
is book-to-market defined as in Fama and French (2008) in the current year. Return on assets, ROA, is defined as operating
income after depreciation (item OIBDP - item DP) over total assets (item AT) computed at the end of the current fiscal year.
All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects and fiscal-quarter fixed effects. Columns [2] and [5] also include industry fixed
effects. Columns [3] and [6] also include stock fixed effects. All continuous variables are windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth
percentiles. We exclude all observations with stock price lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1%, respectively. The sample period is from January 1982 to December 2014.
DISP(Q)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) 0.048∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) 0.051∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.086∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
LN(MKTCAP) -0.022∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013)
COVERAGE 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SIGMA 0.274∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
LNBM 0.304∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
ROA -4.483∗∗∗ -4.560∗∗∗ -3.038∗∗∗ -4.476∗∗∗ -4.556∗∗∗ -3.036∗∗∗
(0.198) (0.216) (0.288) (0.198) (0.216) (0.288)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 140950 140950 140950 140950 140950 140950
R2 0.211 0.229 0.447 0.211 0.230 0.447
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Table 10. DISPERSION IN ANALYST FORECASTS - ROBUSTNESS - CONTROLLING FOR IMPLIED VOLATILITY
This Table presents variants of the regressions in Table 9 in which we control for implied volatility. The dependent variable,
DISP(Q), is the standard deviation multiplied by 100 of the most recent (annual) earnings forecast (for the current fiscal
year) of each analyst covering the stock between the announcement date of the quarterly earnings in quarter Q-1 and the
announcement date of the quarterly earnings in quarter Q normalized by the stock price at the end of the previous fiscal year.
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) is a dummy that equals one if there is a change in the sign of SUEs over the previous two
quarters. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) is a dummy that equals one if there is one change in the sign of SUEs among the
previous three quarters. COVERAGE is the logarithm of the number of analysts who covered the stock in the current fiscal
year. LN(MKTCAP) is the logarithm of the stock total market capitalization (Compustat item CSHO × item PRCC F) at
the end of the current fiscal year. IMPLIEDVOL is the average of 30-day implied volatility of all at-the-money stock i options
issued in the current fiscal year. LNBM is book-to-market defined as in Fama and French (2008) in the current year. Return on
assets, ROA, is defined as operating income after depreciation (item OIBDP - item DP) over total assets (item AT) computed
at the end of the current fiscal year. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects and fiscal-quarter fixed effects. Columns
[2] and [5] also include industry fixed effects. Columns [3] and [6] also include stock fixed effects. All continuous variables are
windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude all observations with stock price lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and
∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is from January 1996 to December 2014.
DISP(Q)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) 0.039∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) 0.044∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.062∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
LN(MKTCAP) 0.029∗∗∗ 0.018∗ -0.163∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.018∗ -0.164∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.020) (0.011) (0.011) (0.020)
COVERAGE 0.002∗ 0.001 0.001 0.002∗ 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
IMPLIEDVOL 2.030∗∗∗ 1.977∗∗∗ 1.698∗∗∗ 2.030∗∗∗ 1.977∗∗∗ 1.699∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.118) (0.154) (0.112) (0.118) (0.154)
LNBM 0.253∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.015) (0.019)
ROA -3.322∗∗∗ -3.284∗∗∗ -1.971∗∗∗ -3.319∗∗∗ -3.283∗∗∗ -1.971∗∗∗
(0.270) (0.286) (0.408) (0.270) (0.286) (0.408)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 62830 62830 62830 62830 62830 62830
R2 0.202 0.226 0.484 0.202 0.226 0.484
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7. Appendix
7.1 Belief dynamics
To set the stage for the analysis of the evolution of prices and volumes, we start by studying
belief dynamics.
Lemma 7.1. For speculators, belief dynamics are given by:
µt+1 = P(X = H|s1, . . . , st+1) = f(θ, µt)1 {st+1=1} + f(1− θ, µt)1 {st+1=−1} + µt1 {st+1=0},
and for biased traders (i ∈ [0, λ]),
µit+1 = Pi(X = H|s1, . . . , st+1) = f(θ, µit)1 {σit+1=1} + f(1− θ, µit)1 {σit+1=−1} + µt1 {σit+1=0},
where:
f(θ, µ) =
θµ
θµ+ (1− θ)(1− µ) .
Proof. Because the law of the rational beliefs µt under P is the same as the one of biased
beliefs µit under the biased probability Pi, it is enough to focus on belief dynamics for rational
agents. Using Bayes’ formula, we have:
P(X = H|s1, . . . , st, st+1 = 1) = P(X = H; st+1 = 1|s1, . . . , st)P(st+1 = 1|s1, . . . , st)
=
P(st+1 = 1|X = H)P(X = H|s1, . . . , st)
P(st+1 = 1|s1, . . . , st)
=
δθµt
δθµt + δ(1− θ)(1− µt)
=
θµt
θµt + (1− θ)(1− µt) .
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Likewise, Bayes’ formula implies that:
P(X = H|s1, . . . , st, st+1 = −1) = (1− θ)µt
(1− θ)µt + θ(1− µt)
P(X = H|s1, . . . , st, st+1 = 0) = µt.
We conclude by noting that:
µt+1 = P(X = H|s1, . . . , st, st+1 = 1)1 {st+1=1}
+ P(X = H|s1, . . . , st, st+1 = −1)1 {st+1=−1}
+ P(X = H|s1, . . . , st, st+1 = 0)1 {st+1=0}.

Note that for a belief history of length t, ht = (s1, . . . , st), the possible values for µt are:
θ(s, k) =
θs(1− θ)k−s
θs(1− θ)k−s + θk−s(1− θ)s . (7.6)
where s is the number of strictly positive signals with s ≤ k ≤ t, and k − s is the number
of strictly negative signals. This formula is similar to Rabin and Schrag (1999) for k = t: in
Rabin and Schrag (1999), there is no uninformative signal.
We continue this subsection by giving some results concerning the probability distribution
of the public signal. Clearly:
P(s1 = 1) =
δθ + δ(1− θ)
2
=
δ
2
.
Because of the symmetry of the model, the law of the belief process with a path starting
with s1 = −1 is obtained by changing θ in 1− θ. The symmetry allows us to only focus on
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belief paths with s1 = 1. We have:
P(s2 = 1|s1 = 1) = P(s1 = 1; s2 = 1)P(s1 = 1)
=
P(X = H)P(s1 = 1; s2 = 1|X = H) + P(X = L)P(s1 = 1; s2 = 1|X = L)
P(s1 = 1)
= δ(θ2 + (1− θ)2),
and:
P(s2 = −1|s1 = 1) = 2δθ(1− θ),
and:
P(s2 = 0|s1 = 1) = 1− δ.
Likewise, it is straightforward to prove that:
P(s3 = 1|s1 = 1; s2 = 1) = δ(θ
3 + (1− θ)3)
θ2 + (1− θ)2 ,
P(s3 = −1|s1 = 1; s2 = 1) = δθ(1− θ)
θ2 + (1− θ)2 ,
and:
P(s3 = 0|s1 = 1; s2 = 1) = 1− δ,
and:
P(s3 = 1|s1 = 1; s2 = −1) = P(s3 = −1|s1 = 1; s2 = −1) = δ
2
.
At date t, there exist 2t paths for the public signal history. Let us denote by ht =
(s1, s2, . . . , st) a path and (z
ih)t = (s1, z
i
2s2, . . . , z
i
tst) biased trader i’s belief path. A
speculator has a rational estimation of the future cash flow at date t that is given by
P(v = 1|ht) = pL + (pH − pL)µt. Biased trader i has an estimation of the future cash
flow that is given by Pi(v = 1|(zih)t) = pL + (pH − pL)µit.
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7.2 Equilibrium prices and rational benchmark
Proof of Proposition 2.1. At date 4, the final wealth of trader j, Wj, is:
W j =
t=3∑
t=0
[
djt (v − Pt)−
c
2
(
djt
)2]
+ v,
with j = ∅ referring to an arbitrageur, and j = i ∈ [0, λ] referring to a biased trader.
Since traders only consume at the last date t = 4, their objective is to maximize their
expected final wealth conditional on their information, anticipating that they may trade at
future dates. To solve for the optimal demands, we proceed backward. Because traders are
atomistic, they take prices as given. We start by solving the program of trader j at date 3:
max
dj3
Ej3
(
t=2∑
t=0
[
djt (v − Pt)−
c
2
(
djt
)2]
+ dj3 (v − P3)−
c
2
(
dj3
)2
+ v
)
.
It is straightforward to check that the objective function is concave in dj3. The first order
condition is thus necessary and sufficient to characterize the optimal demand at date 3:
dj3 =
Ej3 (v)− P3
c
.
Applying the same analysis backward, we obtain that:
djt =
Ejt (v)− Pt
c
, ∀t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} .
At date t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, the market clearing condition is given by:
∫ λ
0
Eit (v)− Pt
c
di+
∫ 1
(1−λ)
Et (v)− Pt
c
dj = 0
where 0 on the right-hand side corresponds to the fact that no new share is issued on
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the market. The first pricing equation displayed in Proposition 2.1 derives from solving the
market clearing condition for Pt and noting that Ejt (v) = P
j
t(v = 1).
The second pricing equation is obtained using the fact that Pjt(v = 1) = pL+(pH−pL)µjt ,
with j = ∅ referring to an arbitrageur, and j = i ∈ [0, λ] referring to a biased trader. 
We now analyze the benchmark case in which all traders are perfectly rational. En-
dogenous prices in this benchmark are indicated by a star. This benchmark is nested in
our model and corresponds to the case in which λ = 0 or q = 0. In this case, we have
P ∗t = Pt (v = 1) = pL + (pH − pL)µt. Given the structure of the uncertainty in our model,
we have the following proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2.2. The proof of the result on expected returns relies on the
martingale property of the belief process µt. The process µt is a martingale because:
E (µt+1|s1, . . . , st) = E (P(X = H|s1, . . . , st+1)|s1, . . . , st)
= E (E (1X=H |s1, . . . , st+1) |s1, . . . , st)
= E (1X=H |s1, . . . , st)
= µt.
The second equality derives from the definition of a probability and the third one from the
law of iterated expectations.
To see that volume, defined by V ∗t =
∫ 1
0
djt1 Ejt (v)>P ∗t
dj, is null at each date, recall that
the price is P ∗t = Pt (v = 1) = E
j
t (v), for all j and t.

We now study how asset prices, returns, and volume are influenced by the fact that some
traders are prone to the confirmatory bias. Statistical properties of equilibrium variables
are evaluated based on the true probability measure P because we take the viewpoint of an
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econometrician who would observe independent repetitions of the model.
7.3 Stylized facts
The proof of Proposition 3.3 is divided in various paragraphs in order to consider separately
the different stylized facts. We assume that λq > 0, i.e., that some traders suffer from the
confirmatory bias.
7.3.1 Excess Volume
Confirmatory bias induces excess volume. Consider for example the mixed history path
(s1 = 1, s2 = −1). The equilibrium price along this path is:
P2(1,−1) = pL + (pH − pL)(λqθ + (1− λq)θ(1, 2))
= pL + (pH − pL)(λqθ + 1− λq
2
).
There is a proportion λq of agents (corresponding to the biased traders who did not perceive
a signal at date 2 instead of the actual negative signal) who have a price estimation pL +
(pH − pL)θ, which is higher than the equilibrium price. There is also a proportion 1− λq of
agents (corresponding to the rational traders and to the biased traders who perceive correctly
the signal at date 2) who have a price estimation pL + (pH − pL)12 , which is lower than the
equilibrium price. Hence, volume equals:
V2(1,−1) =
∫ 1
0
dj21 Ej2(v)>P2
dj =
(pH − pL)λq(1− λq)
c
(θ − 1
2
) > 0 = V ∗2 (1,−1).
There are thus histories along which there is abnormally high volume compared to the
situation in which all traders are rational.
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7.3.2 Excess Volatility
To show that confirmatory bias may induce excess volatility, we start by showing that
E(Pt) = pH+pL2 , for t = 1, 2, 3. To see this, consider two opposite signal histories ht =
{s1, s2, . . . , st} and −ht = {−s1,−s2, . . . ,−st} where at least one signal si 6= 0. Consider
also the path h0t = (0, . . . , 0). We have
∑
ht
(P(ht) +P(−ht)) +P(h0t ) = 1. The law of signals
st being symmetric, P(ht) = P(−ht) and thus:
∑
ht
P(ht) =
1− (1− δ)t
2
,
because P(h0t ) = (1−δ)t.36 Moreover, using Equation (A.3.7) and the fact that f(θ, µ)+f(1−
θ, 1−µ) = 1, we can prove by induction that µt(ht) +µt(−ht) = 1 and µjt(ht) +µjt(−ht) = 1.
As a consequence, the pricing formula yields Pt(ht) + Pt(−ht) = pH + pL.
E(Pt) =
∑
ht
(P(ht)Pt(ht) + P(−ht)Pt(−ht)) + P(h0t )
pH + pL
2
=
∑
ht
P(ht) (Pt(ht) + Pt(−ht)) + P(h0t )
pH + pL
2
= (pH + pL)
∑
ht
P(ht) + P(h0t )
pH + pL
2
=
pH + pL
2
.
We deduce from the price dynamics that:
P2 = P
∗
2 + ε2,
36In a more general setting in which signal informativeness is not the same for good and bad signals, the
model would generate excess volatility only for some parameter values. However, all the other results do not
crucially rely on the symmetric structure of the signals.
57
where ε2 is the symmetric random variable given by:
ε2 = (pH − pL)λq(θ − 1
2
)(1 s1=1;s2=−1 − 1 s1=−1;s2=1).
Defining m = pH+pL
2
, we have:
Var(P2) = Var(P
∗
2 ) + Var(ε2) + 2E [(P ∗2 −m)ε2] .
Note that E [(P ∗2 −m)ε2] = 0. This is because, in all the potential signal histories (1, 1),
(1,−1), (−1, 1), and (−1,−1), there is one of the two factors in (P ∗2 −m)ε2 that is equal to
0. Indeed, we have: P ∗2 (1,−1) = P ∗2 (−1, 1) = m and ε2(1, 1) = ε2(−1,−1) = 0. Given that
Var(ε2) > 0, we conclude that:
Var(P2) > Var(P
∗
2 ).
There is thus always excess volatility for the price at date 2.
Regarding date t = 3, we have:
P3 = P
∗
3 + ε3,
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with:
ε3 = ε3(1, 1,−1)(1 s1=1;s2=1;s3=−1 − 1 s1=−1;s2=−1;s3=1)
+ ε3(1,−1, 1)(1 s1=1;s2=−1;s3=1 − 1 s1=−1;s2=1;s3=−1)
+ ε3(1,−1,−1)(1 s1=1;s2=−1;s3=−1 − 1 s1=−1;s2=1;s3=1)
+ ε3(1,−1, 0)(1 s1=1;s2=−1;s3=0 − 1 s1=−1;s2=1;s3=0)
+ ε3(1, 0,−1)(1 s1=1;s2=0;s3=−1 − 1 s1=−1;s2=0;s3=1)
+ ε3(0, 1,−1)(1 s1=0;s2=1;s3=−1 − 1 s1=0;s2=−1;s3=1)
= (pH − pL)λq(θ(2, 2)− θ)(1 s1=1;s2=1;s3=−1 − 1 s1=−1;s2=−1;s3=1)
+ (pH − pL)λq(θ(2, 2)− θ)(1 s1=1;s2=−1;s3=1 − 1 s1=−1;s2=1;s3=−1)
+ (pH − pL)λq(2θ − 1)(1 s1=1;s2=−1;s3=−1 − 1 s1=−1;s2=1;s3=1)
+ (pH − pL)λq(θ − 1
2
)(1 s1=1;s2=−1;s3=0 − 1 s1=−1;s2=1;s3=0)
+ (pH − pL)λq(θ − 1
2
)(1 s1=1;s2=0;s3=−1 − 1 s1=−1;s2=0;s3=1)
+ (pH − pL)λq(θ − 1
2
)(1 s1=0;s2=1;s3=−1 − 1 s1=0;s2=−1;s3=1).
The variance of the price at date 3 can be computed as:
Var(P3) = Var(P
∗
3 ) + Var(ε3) + 2E [(P ∗3 −m)ε3] .
We want to show that this variance is greater than Var(P ∗3 ).
We first compute Var(ε3). Because E(ε3) = 0, we have Var(ε3) = E(ε23). Moreover, we
note that for every path h3 containing only one change of sign in the public signal and no null
signal, P(h3) = δ
3θ(1−θ)
2
and P ∗3 (h3) − P ∗3 (−h3) = (ph − pL)(2θ − 1). For path h3 containing
one change of sign and a null signal, P(h3) = δ2(1− δ)θ(1− θ) while P ∗3 (h3) = m. We thus
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have:
Var(ε3) = (pH − pL)2(λq)2
[
δ3θ(1− θ)
2
(
4(θ(2, 2)− θ)2+
+ 2(2θ − 1)2)+ δ2(1− δ)θ(1− θ)6(θ − 1
2
)2
]
.
The same type of computations leads to:
E[(P ∗3 −m)ε3] = (pH − pL)2
δ3θ(1− θ)
2
(2θ − 1)λq (2(θ(2, 2)− θ)− (2θ − 1)) .
Finally:
Var(P3)− Var(P ∗3 ) = Var(ε3) + 2E[(P ∗3 −m)ε3]
= (pH − pL)2λqδ2θ(1− θ)
[
2δλq(θ(2, 2)− θ)2 + δλq(2θ − 1)2
+ (1− δ)3
2
λq(2θ − 1)2 + 2δ(2θ − 1)(θ(2, 2)− θ)− δ(2θ − 1)2
]
= (pH − pL)2λqδ2θ(1− θ)
[
2δλq(θ(2, 2)− θ)2 + 2δ(2θ − 1)(θ(2, 2)− θ)
+ (λqδ + (1− δ)3
2
λq − δ)(2θ − 1)2
]
.
Obviously, there is no excess volatility when δ = 0, i.e., when traders do not learn anything
from public signals. The only potentially negative term in the above expression is (λqδ +
(1− δ)3
2
λq− δ). A sufficient condition for this term to be positive is that λq ≥ 1
2
and δ ≤ 3
5
.
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7.3.3 Momentum
Assume that t = 1. The random event {P1 − P0 > 0} coincides with the event {s1 = 1}.
Therefore, we have to prove that E(P2 − P1|s1 = 1) > 0. But,
E(P2 − P1|s1 = 1) = E(P2(1, 1)1 s2=1 + P2(1, 0)1 s2=0 + P2(1,−1)1 s2=−1|s1 = 1)− ((pH − pL)θ + pL)
= (pH − pL)[θ(2, 2)P(s2 = 1|s1 = 1) + θP(s2 = 0|s1 = 1)
+ ((1− λq)θ(1, 2) + λqθ)P(s2 = −1|s1 = 1))− θ]
= (pH − pL)λq(θ − θ(1, 2))P(s2 = −1|s1 = 1) > 0,
where the last equality follows from the martingale property of the belief process µt. There
is thus always momentum at date 1.
At t = 2, the return P2 − P1 is positive on the event {s2 = 1} only. Thus:
E(P3 − P2|P2 − P1 > 0) = E(P3 − P2|s1 = 1; s2 = 1)P(s1 = 1; s2 = 1)P(s2 = 1)
+ E(P3 − P2|s1 = −1; s2 = 1)P(s1 = −1; s2 = 1)P(s2 = 1)
+ E(P3 − P2|s1 = 0; s2 = 1)P(s1 = 0; s2 = 1)P(s2 = 1) .
Using the martingale property of the belief process, we get:
E(P3 − P2|s1 = 1; s2 = 1) = (pH − pL)λq(θ(2, 2)− θ)P(s3 = −1|s1 = 1; s2 = 1)
E(P3 − P2|s1 = 0; s2 = 1) = (pH − pL)λq(θ − 1
2
)P(s3 = −1|s1 = 0; s2 = 1)
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and:
E(P3 − P2|s1 = −1; s2 = 1) = (pH − pL)λq(1− θ)P(s3 = 1|s1 = −1; s2 = 1)
+ (pH − pL)λq(1− θ)P(s3 = 0|s1 = −1; s2 = 1)
+ (pH − pL)λqθ(0, 2)P(s3 = −1|s1 = −1; s2 = 1)− λq(1− θ)
= (pH − pL)λq(θ(0, 2)− (1− θ))P(s3 = −1|s1 = −1; s2 = 1).
Therefore:
E(P3 − P2|P2 − P1 > 0) = (pH − pL)λq(θ(2, 2)− θ)P(s1 = 1; s2 = 1; s3 = −1)P(s2 = 1)
+ (pH − pL)λq(θ(0, 2)− (1− θ))P(s1 = −1; s2 = 1; s3 = −1)P(s2 = 1)
+ (pH − pL)λq(θ − 1
2
)
P(s1 = 0; s2 = 1; s3 = −1)
P(s2 = 1)
= (pH − pL)λq(θ − 1
2
)
P(s1 = 0; s2 = 1; s3 = −1)
P(s2 = 1)
> 0,
where the last equality uses θ(2, 2) = 1− θ(0, 2) and:
P(s1 = 1; s2 = 1; s3 = −1) = P(s1 = −1; s2 = 1; s3 = −1).
7.3.4 Bubble
In the section Momentum, we have proved that: E(P2 − P1|s1 = 1) > 0 which is equivalent
to E(P2|s1 = 1) ≥ E(P1|s1 = 1) = pL + (pH − pL)θ.
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Moreover, we have:
E(P3 − P2|s1 = 1) = E(P3 − P2|s1 = 1, s2 = 1)P(s2 = 1|s1 = 1)
+ E(P3 − P2|s1 = 1, s2 = 0)P(s2 = 0|s1 = 1)
+ E(P3 − P2|s1 = 1, s2 = −1)P(s2 = −1|s1 = 1).
We have already proved that:
E(P3 − P2|s1 = 1, s2 = 1) > 0.
And we also have:
E(P3 − P2|s1 = 1, s2 = −1) = (pH − pL)λq2 (θ − (1− θ))P(s3 = −1|s1 = 1; s2 = −1) > 0.
and
E(P3 − P2|s1 = 1, s2 = 0) = (pH − pL)λq
(
θ − 1
2
)
P(s3 = −1|s1 = 1; s2 = 0) > 0.
Therefore,
E(P3|s1 = 1) ≥ E(P2|s1 = 1).
The proof for the case of a crash follows the same logic.
7.4 Novel empirical predictions
7.4.1 Beliefs dispersion
Let us denote by νt traders’ beliefs distribution. For each history ht, νt(ht) is a probability
measure on the finite space θ(s, k), for s ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}, representing traders’ belief distri-
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bution function after observing s strictly positive signals out of k non-null signals. Various
fractions of traders have beliefs that take value in θ(s, k), for s ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}. We can thus
compute the average and the variance of the belief distribution, across traders at a given
date. We will define beliefs dispersion for a given date as the variance of each probabil-
ity measure νt(ht) and the conditional beliefs dispersion as the conditional variance of each
probability measure.
Let us write precisely traders’ beliefs distribution for t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Clearly,
ν0 = D 1
2
,
where D stands for the Dirac measure. Because all traders have the same perception of date
1 signal, the distribution of biased traders’ beliefs at date 1 is:
ν1 =
δ
2
(Dθ +D1−θ) + (1− δ)D 1
2
.
In particular, ν1(1) = Dθ and ν1(−1) = D1−θ and therefore Var ν1(1) = Var ν1(−1) = 0.
The average belief dispersion is thus E(Var ν1) = 0.
From date 2 onward, beliefs dispersion depends on the public signal’s path. More pre-
cisely, we have:
ν2 = P(s1 = 1; s2 = 1)ν2(1; 1) + P(s1 = 1; s2 = −1)ν2(1;−1)
+ P(s1 = −1; s2 = 1)ν2(−1; 1) + P(s1 = −1; s2 = −1)ν2(−1;−1)
+ P(s1 = 0; s2 = 1)ν2(0; 1) + P(s1 = 1; s2 = 0)ν2(1; 0)
+ P(s1 = 0; s2 = −1)ν2(0;−1)P(s1 = −1; s2 = 0)ν2(−1; 0)
where:
ν2(1; 1) = Dθ(2,2); ν2(1;−1) = qDθ(2,2) + (1− λq)Dθ(1,2);
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ν2(−1;−1) = Dθ(0,2); ν2(−1; 1) = qDθ(0,2) + (1− λq)Dθ(1,2).
At date 3, we have for every path h3 a dispersion measure ν3(h3). For instance:
ν3(1; 1; 1) = Dθ(3,3); ν3(1; 1;−1) = qDθ(3,3) + (1− λq)Dθ(2,3);
ν3(1;−1; 1) = qDθ(3,3)+(1−λq)Dθ(2,3); ν3(1;−1;−1) = q2Dθ(3,3)+2q(1−q)Dθ(2,3)+((1−λ)+λ(1−q)2)Dθ(1,3).
We first prove that:
E(Var(ν2)|s1s2 > 0) < E(Var(ν2)|s1s2 < 0).
We observe that:
E(Var(ν2)|s1s2 > 0) = Var(ν2)(1, 1)P(s1 = 1, s2 = 1) + Var(ν2)(−1,−1)P(s1 = −1, s2 = −1)P(s1s2 > 0)
= 0,
because Var(ν2)(1, 1) = Var(ν2)(−1,−1) = 0. On the other hand,
E(Var(ν2)|s1s2 < 0) = Var(ν2)(1,−1)P(s1 = 1, s2 = −1) + Var(ν2)(−1, 1)P(s1 = −1, s2 = 1)P(s1s2 < 0)
=
Var(ν2)(1,−1) + Var(ν2)(−1, 1)
2
> 0,
which completes the proof.
We now prove that: E (Var [ν3|s1s2<0 or s2s3<0]) > E (Var [ν3|s1s2>0 and s2s3>0]) . First, as before,
remark that:
Var [ν3|s1s2>0 and s2s3>0] = 0.
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Notice that without of generality, we may assume s1 = 1,
E(Var(ν3)|s1s2 < 0 or s2s3 < 0) = E(Var(ν3)|s1 = 1, s2 = 1, s3 = −1)P(s1 = 1, s2 = 1, s3 = −1)P(s1s2 < 0 or s2s3 < 0)
+ E(Var(ν3)|s1 = 1, s2 = −1, s3 = −1)P(s1 = 1, s2 = −1, s3 = −1)P(s1s2 < 0 or s2s3 < 0)
+ E(Var(ν3)|s1 = 1, s2 = −1, s3 = 1)P(s1 = 1, s2 = −1, s3 = 1)P(s1s2 < 0 or s2s3 < 0)
= Var(ν3)(1, 1,−1)P(s1 = 1, s2 = 1, s3 = −1)P(s1s2 < 0 or s2s3 < 0)
+ Var(ν3)(1,−1,−1)P(s1 = 1, s2 = −1, s3 = −1)P(s1s2 < 0 or s2s3 < 0)
Var(ν3)(1,−1, 1)P(s1 = 1, s2 = −1, s3 = 1)P(s1s2 < 0 or s2s3 < 0)
To conclude, it suffices to observe that the last three terms of the right-hand side are strictly
positive.
7.4.2 Beliefs revision
Let us focus on date 2. We will compute the probability of upward belief’s revision when
past public signals have different signs, and show that it is lower than the probability of
upward belief’s revision when past public signals have the same signs.
For every agent j, the probability of upward belief’s revision when past public signals have
the same signs equals one because all agents have perceived correctly the public signals, i.e.
P
(
µj2 − µj1 > 0|s1 > 0, s2 > 0
)
= 1.
Along a path where public signals have different signs, for instance s1 < 0 and s2 > 0, belief’s
revision depends on the nature of the agent. Rational agents, and a proportion λ(1− q) of
biased traders, perceive correctly the public signals and therefore revise upward their belief
after a good signal at date 2. However, there is a proportion λq of biased traders that does
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not perceive the public signal at date 2. Therefore:
P
(
µj2 − µj1 > 0|s1 < 0, s2 > 0
)
= λ(1− q) + 1− λ = 1− λq < 1.
The same line of reasoning applies at date 3. We have:
P
(
µj3 − µj2 > 0|s1 > 0, s2 > 0, s3 > 0
)
= 1.
Moreover,
P
(
µj3 − µj2 > 0|s1 < 0 or s2 < 0, s3 > 0
)
=
= P
(
µj3 − µj2 > 0|s1 < 0, s2 = 0, s3 > 0
) P(s1 < 0, s2 = 0, s3 > 0)
P(s1 < 0 or s2 < 0, s3 > 0)
+ P
(
µj3 − µj2 > 0|s1 < 0, s2 > 0, s3 > 0
) P(s1 < 0, s2 > 0, s3 > 0)
P(s1 < 0 or s2 < 0, s3 > 0)
+ P
(
µj3 − µj2 > 0|s1 = 0, s2 < 0, s3 > 0
) P(s1 = 0, s2 < 0, s3 > 0)
P(s1 < 0 or s2 < 0, s3 > 0)
+ P
(
µj3 − µj2 > 0|s1 > 0, s2 < 0, s3 > 0
) P(s1 > 0, s2 < 0, s3 > 0)
P(s1 < 0 or s2 < 0, s3 > 0)
+ P
(
µj3 − µj2 > 0|s1 < 0, s2 < 0, s3 > 0
) P(s1 < 0, s2 < 0, s3 > 0)
P(s1 < 0 or s2 < 0, s3 > 0)
.
We define:
p1 = P(s1 < 0, s2 = 0, s3 > 0) = (1− δ)δ2θ(1− θ),
p2 = P(s1 = 0, s2 < 0, s3 > 0) = (1− δ)δ2θ(1− θ),
p3 = P(s1 < 0, s2 > 0, s3 > 0) =
δ3
2
θ(1− θ),
p4 = P(s1 > 0, s2 < 0, s3 > 0) =
δ3
2
θ(1− θ),
p5 = P(s1 < 0, s2 < 0, s3 > 0) =
δ3
2
θ(1− θ).
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We thus obtain:
P
(
µj3 − µj2 > 0|s1 < 0 or s2 < 0, s3 > 0
)
= 2(1− λq) (1− δ)δ
2θ(1− θ)
P(s1 < 0 or s2 < 0, s3 > 0)
+ (1− λq)
δ3
2
θ(1− θ)
P(s1 < 0 or s2 < 0, s3 > 0)
+
δ3
2
θ(1− θ)
P(s1 < 0 or s2 < 0, s3 > 0)
+ (1− λq2)
δ3
2
θ(1− θ)
P(s1 < 0 or s2 < 0, s3 > 0)
= (1− λq) p1∑5
i=1 pi
+ (1− λq) p2∑5
i=1 pi
+ (1− λq) p3∑5
i=1 pi
+
p4∑5
i=1 pi
+ (1− λq2) p5∑5
i=1 pi
<
p1∑5
i=1 pi
+
p2∑5
i=1 pi
+
p3∑5
i=1 pi
+
p4∑5
i=1 pi
+
p5∑5
i=1 pi
= 1.
7.4.3 Individual beliefs updating
The proof of the last prediction in Proposition 3.4 derives directly from the previous proof
after remarking that, if a belief change is strictly different from zero, it has the same sign as
the signal that generated this change. For example, if one observes that µj2 − µj1 > 0, for a
given j, then we have s2 > 0.
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Online Appendix
A Mind is a Terrible Thing to Change: Confirmatory
Bias in Financial Markets
This online appendix provides extensions of the model presented in the paper. Our
baseline model includes three signals and four dates, and assumes that biased traders tend
to ignore signals that are inconsistent with their priors. In order to show the robustness of
our theoretical results, we study separately the following three variants:
• A continuous signal version of our model.
• An infinite-horizon version of our model.
• A two-signal version of our model in which biased traders, as in Rabin and Shrag (1999),
might change the valence of - and not simply ignore - signals that are inconsistent with
their priors.
This online appendix also offers additional tests for our predictions and robustness checks
for our empirical analysis. In particular, we consider the following variants for the main
specifications:
• We hypothesize that earnings news announced in the midst of macroeconomic volatility
are more likely to admit different interpretations of the news. We thus expect our
prediction that traders are less likely to update their beliefs in the same direction as
the latest SUE for SUEs that are of a different sign compared to the previous ones to be
stronger for earnings announced in the midst of macroeconomic volatility. To examine
whether this hypothesis holds in the data, we augment Equations (1.1) and (1.2) by
1
interacting the variables SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) and SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-
1,Q-2,Q-3) with a dummy, MACROVOL(HIGH), that equals one if macroeconomic
volatility in quarter Q − 1 lies in the highest tercile of its empirical distribution. We
also include MACROVOL(HIGH) as additional control variable. Following Bloom
(2009), we define macroeconomic volatility as the Chicago Board of Options Exchange
VXO index of percentage implied volatility, on a hypothetical at the money S&P100
option 30 days to expiration, from 1986 onward; and over the Pre-1986 period for which
the VXO index is unavailable, as the monthly standard deviation of the daily S&P500
index normalized to the same mean and variance as the VXO index when they overlap
from 1986 onward. Tables (A.1) to (A.2) present the results.
• Including control variables with or without logs: Tables (A.3) to (A.7).
• Constructing the dependent variables using analysts’ forecasts made between the end
date of each fiscal quarters (instead of using announcement dates of quarterly earnings):
Tables (A.8) to (A.10).
• Constructing analysts’ revisions for each analyst that has covered the stock before the
earnings announcement (and not only for analysts that issue forecasts both before and
after the quarterly announcement of interest): Tables (A.11) to (A.12).
• Controlling for uncertainty using stock price volatility from monthly returns: Tables
(A.13) to (A.15).
• Controlling for uncertainty from at-the-money options 60 days or 90 days to expiration,
or separately from either put or call options: Tables (A.16) to (A.25).
• Measuring analysts’ prior beliefs (either bearish or bullish) with the sign of analysts’
last annual earnings forecast revision made in one of the two quarters before the an-
nouncement of the Q-1 earnings: Table (A.26).
2
• Reproducing the Tables on analysts’ forecast revision with standard errors clustered
at the analyst level: Tables (A.27) to (A.32).
3
Appendix to the theoretical analysis
In the following sections, only the changes with respect to the basic model analyzed in
the paper are described.
A.1. Continuous signal structure
We assume that, conditional on the state of nature, v has a log normal distribution. Specif-
ically, v = ed where d is normally distributed with mean µX and variance σ
2. We assume
µH = 1 = −µL. Finally, information about the dividend payment is generated by the ob-
servation of public signals st whose probability distribution depends on the state of nature.
Conditional on the sate of nature, st are independent and identically normally distributed
with mean µX and variance σ
2.
If we denote by Et the conditional expectation with respect to the history generated by the
public signal s1, s2, . . . , st, the rational price is given by Pt = Pt(X = H)ΨH +Pt(X = L)ΨL
where ΨX = e
µX− 12σ2 .
We maintain our assumption regarding biased traders’ signals: σit = st1 st(µit−1− 12 )>0 +
ztst1 st(µit−1− 12 )<0, where zt is Bernoulli random variable independent of st with P(zt = 1) =
1− q.37
37Given our assumption that there are two states of the world, it seems natural to consider, as we do here,
that a signal realization is consistent with a trader’s beliefs if this particular realization was more likely under
the state of the world that was deemed most likely by the trader. However, we could also have considered
more refined expressions of the confirmatory bias. For example, we could assume that the bias depends on
the strength of the beliefs and not only on their sign. If someone has wildly optimistic priors, what would
he think if a weakly positive piece of news comes in? Would he view this correctly since it has the same
sign as his priors, as we consider in this paper? Or would he ignore it since, relative to his beliefs, it is “bad
news”? In this case, we believe that our main results would still hold given that the fundamental positive
autocorrelation in belief updating would still prevail. Additional research in psychology is needed to provide
better guidance on how to define more finely the confirmatory bias.
4
A.1.1 Stylized facts
We first prove below that Proposition 3.3 in the paper holds under continuous signals:
Proposition 3.3’. Stylized facts (Continuous signal). When some traders are
prone to the confirmatory bias (that is, when λq > 0), market outcomes are as follows:
• There is excess volume at t ∈ {2, 3}:
Vt > V
∗
t = 0.
• There is excess volatility in asset prices at t = 2 and t = 3:
Var(Pt) > Var(P
∗
t ).
• There is momentum in asset prices at t = 1 and t = 2:
E(P2 − P1|P1 − P0 > 0) > 0,
E(P3 − P2|P2 − P1 > 0) > 0.
• A bubble forms after a good initial public signal:
E (P3|s1 = 1) > E (P2|s1 = 1) > P1 (s1 = 1) = P ∗1 (s1 = 1) .
• A crash occurs after a bad initial public signal:
E (P3|s1 = −1) < E (P2|s1 = −1) < P1 (s1 = 1) = P ∗1 (s1 = −1) .
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Proof of Proposition 3.3’. The proof follows the same steps as in the paper.
Beliefs dynamics. We start by studying beliefs dynamics. Let µt = Pt(X = H). Baye’s
rule implies that
µt+1 =
µtf(1, st+1)
µtf(1, st+1) + (1− µt)f(−1, st+1) ,
where f(m,x) is the density function of the Gaussian distribution with mean m and variance
σ2.
Excess volume. In our context, excess volume emerges because there is a difference of
opinion between traders and consequently it does not depend on the choice of the probability
distribution of the public signals.
Excess volatility. As in the paper, we define ε2 = P2 − P ∗2 where:
ε2 = λq(µ1(s1)− µ2(s1, s2))1 s1s2<0.
Therefore:
Var(P2) = Var(P
∗
2 ) + Var(ε2) + 2Cov(P
∗
2 ε2).
We will show that Cov(P ∗2 ε2) > 0. First, we observe that:
µ1(−s1) = 1− µ1(s1) and µ2(−s1,−s2) = 1− µ2(s1, s2)
Thus:
E(ε2) = λq [E(µ1(s1)− µ2(s1, s2))1 s1>,0s2<0 + E(µ1(s1)− µ2(s1, s2))1 s1<0,s2>0]
= λq [E(µ1(s1)− µ2(s1, s2))1 s1>0,s2<0 + E(µ2(s1, s2))− µ1(s1)1 s1>0,s2<0]
= 0.
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Hence, Cov(P ∗2 ε2) is proportional to E[µ2(s1, s2)(µ1(s1)− µ2(s1, s2))1 s1s2<0].
Using the martingale property, we have:
E[µ2(s1, s2)(µ1(s1)− µ2(s1, s2))1 s1s2<0] = E[µ2(s1, s2)(µ1(s1)− µ2(s1, s2))(1− 1 s1s2>0)]
= −E[µ2(s1, s2)(µ1(s1)− µ2(s1, s2))1 s1s2>0]
= −E[(2µ2(s1, s2)− 1)(µ1(s1)− µ2(s1, s2))1 s1>0,s2>0]
≥ 0.
There is thus excess volatility at date 2. The same logic applies at date 3. We now turn
to the proof of the novel predictions.
Momentum. We have:
P2 − P1 = (ΨH −ΨL)(µ¯2 − µ¯1)
= (ΨH −ΨL) [µ21 s1s2>0 + (λqµ1 + (1− λq)µ2)1 s1s2<0 − µ1]
= (ΨH −ΨL) [µ2 − µ1 + λq(µ1 − µ2)1 s1s2<0] .
So:
E (P2 − P1|s1 > 0) = (ΨH −ΨL) [E (µ2 − µ1|s1 > 0) + λqE (µ1 − µ2)1 s2<0|s1 > 0)] .
Because µt is a martingale, the first term vanishes.
Moreover, on the set {s2 < 0}, µ2(s1, s2) < µ1(s1). Therefore:
E (P2 − P1|s1 > 0) > 0.
This shows that there is momentum over the first two dates.
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The proof of momentum at date 3 is much more involved and detailed below only for low
values of q in order to maintain the appendix at a reasonable length. First, we have:
E(P3 − P2|P2 − P1 > 0) = E((P3 − P2)1 s2>0)P(s2 > 0) .
It suffices to show that E((P3−P2)1 s2>0) ≥ 0. Note that the set {s2 > 0} can be decomposed
as 1 s2>0 = 1 {s2>0,s1>0}+1 {s2>0,s1<0,s1+s2>0}+1 {s2>0,s1<0,s1+s2<0}. We compute below P3−P2
on each subset.
On the set {s1 > 0, s2 > 0}, we have:
P3 − P2 = (µ3 − µ2)− λq(µ3 − µ2)1 s3<0.
Therefore, using the martingale property:
E
(
(P3 − P2)1 {s2>0,s1>0}
)
= −λqE ((µ3 − µ2)1 s2>0,s1>0,s3<0) .
On the set {s1 < 0, s1 + s2 > 0}, we have:
P3 − P2 = (λq(1− q)(µ2(s1, s3)− µ1) + (1− λq)(µ3 − µ2)) 1 s3>0
+
(
λq(µ2 − µ1) + (1− λ+ λ(1− q)2)(µ3 − µ2)
)
1 s3>0.
Using the martingale property again, we obtain:
E
(
(P3 − P2)1 {s2>0,s1<0,s1+s2>0}
)
= −λq2E ((µ2(s1, s3)− µ1)1 s1<0,s1+s2>0,s3>0)
− λq(1− q)E ((µ3 − µ2)1 s1<0,s1+s2>0,s3<0)
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In the same manner, we obtain:
E
(
(P3 − P2)1 {s2>0,s1<0,s1+s2>0}
)
= −λq2E ((µ2(s1, s3)− µ1)1 s1<0,s1+s2<0,s3>0)
− λq(1− q)E ((µ3 − µ2)1 s1<0,s1+s2<0,s3>0)
Finally:
E
(
(P3 − P2)1 {s2>0}
)
= −λqE ((µ3 − µ2)1 s2>0,s1>0,s3<0)
− λq(1− q)E ((µ3 − µ2)(1 s1<0,s1+s2<0,s3>0 + 1 s1<0,s1+s2>0,s3<0))
− λq2E ((µ2(s1, s3)− µ1)(1 s1<0,s1+s2<0,s3>0 + 1 s1<0,s1+s2<0,s3>0))
The above expression consists in three terms. Note that the first term is positive and that
the last one is negligible for low values of q. We now show that the second term is positive
or equivalently that:
A = E ((µ3 − µ2)(1 s1<0,s1+s2<0,s3>0 + 1 s1<0,s1+s2>0,s3<0)) ≤ 0.
Denote by N (x) the cumulative function of a standard Gaussian random variable and set
δ = N (1)− 1
2
= 1
2
−N (−1). Finally, remember that the joint density function of (s1, s2, s3)
is:
f(x1, x2, x3) =
1
2
(f(1, x1)f(1, x2)f(1, x3) + f(−1, x1)f(−1, x2)f(−1, x3)),
and:
µ3((x1, x2, x3) =
f(1, x1)f(1, x2)f(1, x3)
f(1, x1)f(1, x2)f(1, x3) + f(−1, x1)f(−1, x2)f(−1, x3) .
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We have:
A =
∫ 0
−∞
∫ −x1
0
∫ +∞
0
(µ3((x1, x2, x3)− µ2((x1, x2))f(x1, x2, x3) dx
+
∫ 0
−∞
∫ +∞
−x1
∫ 0
−∞
(µ3((x1, x2, x3)− µ2((x1, x2))f(x1, x2, x3) dx
=
1
2
∫ 0
−∞
∫ −x1
0
∫ +∞
0
(f(1, x1)f(1, x2)f(1, x3)− µ2((x1, x2)f(x1, x2, x3)) dx
+
1
2
∫ 0
−∞
∫ +∞
−x1
∫ 0
−∞
(f(1, x1)f(1, x2)f(1, x3)− µ2((x1, x2)f(x1, x2, x3)) dx
Integrating with respect to x3, we obtain:
A =
1
2
∫ 0
−∞
∫ −x1
0
(
1
2
+ δ)f(1, x1)f(1, x2)− µ2((1
2
+ δ)f(1, x1)f(1, x2) + (
1
2
− δ)f(−1, x1)f(−1, x2)) dx
+
1
2
∫ 0
−∞
∫ +∞
−x1
(
1
2
− δ)f(1, x1)f(1, x2)− µ2((1
2
− δ)f(1, x1)f(1, x2) + (1
2
+ δ)f(−1, x1)f(−1, x2)) dx.
Using
µ2((x1, x2) =
f(1, x1)f(1, x2)
f(1, x1)f(1, x2) + f(−1, x1)f(−1, x2) ,
we get:
A = δ
(∫ 0
−∞
∫ −x1
0
µ2f(−1, x1)f(−1, x2) dx−
∫ 0
−∞
∫ +∞
−x1
µ2f(−1, x1)f(−1, x2) dx
)
≤ δ
2
(∫ 0
−∞
∫ −x1
0
f(−1, x1)f(−1, x2) dx−
∫ 0
−∞
∫ +∞
−x1
f(−1, x1)f(−1, x2) dx
)
< 0,
where we have used µ ≤ 1
2
in the first term and µ ≥ 1
2
in the second term.

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A.1.2 Novel empirical predictions
We now prove below that Proposition 3.4. in the paper also holds under continuous signals.
Proposition 3.4’. Novel predictions (Continuous signal). When some traders are
prone to the confirmatory bias (that is, when λq > 0),
• Beliefs dispersion is higher when past signals have different signs:
E (Var [ν2|s1s2<0]) > E (Var [ν2|s1s2>0]) ,
E (Var [ν3|s1s2<0 or s2s3<0]) > E (Var [ν3|s1s2>0 and s2s3>0]) ,
where νt is the probability measure characterizing beliefs distribution at date t.
• There are less beliefs revisions when signals have different signs. For example, after a
positive signal, the proportion of upward beliefs revisions is lower if at least one of the
previous signals was negative:
∫ 1
0
P(µj2 − µj1 > 0|s1 > 0, s2 > 0)dj >
∫ 1
0
P(µj2 − µj1 > 0|s1 < 0, s2 > 0)dj
∫ 1
0
P(µj3−µj2 > 0|s1 > 0, s2 > 0, s3 > 0)dj >
∫ 1
0
P(µj3−µj2 > 0|s1 < 0 or s2 < 0, s3 > 0)dj
• A trader tends to revise his belief less often when signals have a sign that is different
from the sign of his last belief revision. For example, after a positive signal, the
probability that a trader revises upward his belief is larger if his last belief revision was
positive than if it was negative:
∫ 1
0
P(µj2 − µj1 > 0|µj1 − µj0 > 0, s2 > 0)dj >
∫ 1
0
P(µj2 − µj1 > 0|µj1 − µj0 < 0, s2 > 0)dj
11
∫ 1
0
P(µj3 − µj2 > 0|µj2 − µj1 > 0, s3 > 0)dj >
∫ 1
0
P(µj3 − µj2 > 0|µj2 − µj1 < 0, s3 > 0)dj
Proof of Proposition 3.4’. Beliefs dispersion. Again, we assume s1 > 0. On a path
where s1 > 0 and s2 > 0, all agents have the same belief µ2(s1, s2) thus the belief dispersion
is zero. More precisely, the belief measure is ν2 = Dµ2(s1,s2) where D stands for the Dirac
measure.
On a path where s1 > 0 and s2 < 0, a proportion λq of biased traders has a belief µ1(s1).
As a consequence, the dispersion ν2(s1, s2) is a Binomial random variable taking values in
µ1(s1), µ2(s1, s2) with respective probability λq and 1− λq. Observe that the average belief
µ¯2 is the mean of ν2, that is λqµ1(s1) + (1− λq)µ2(s1, s2). The belief dispersion after s1 > 0
and s2 < 0 is thus λq(1− λq)(µ1(s1)− µ2(s1, s2))2 > 0. Belief dispersion at date 2 is higher
after mixed signal histories.
At date 3, we first observe that:
E(Var(ν3|s1s2 > 0 and s2s3 > 0) = E(Var(ν3|s1 > 0, s2 > 0, s3 > 0) P(s1 > 0, s2 > 0, s3 > 0)P(s1s2 > 0 and s2s3 > 0) = 0,
whereas
E(Var(ν3|s1s2 < 0 or s2s3 < 0) = E(Var(ν3|s1 > 0, s2 > 0, s3 < 0) P(s1 > 0, s2 > 0, s3 < 0)P(s1s2 > 0 and s2s3 > 0)
+ E(Var(ν3|s1 > 0, s2 < 0, s3 < 0) P(s1 > 0, s2 < 0, s3 < 0)P(s1s2 > 0 and s2s3 > 0)
+ E(Var(ν3|s1 > 0, s2 < 0, s3 > 0) P(s1 > 0, s2 < 0, s3 > 0)P(s1s2 > 0 and s2s3 > 0) .
We conclude by observing that the last three terms are strictly positive.
Beliefs revision. We focus on date 2 (the same logic applies at later dates). We want to
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prove that:
∫ 1
0
P(µj2 − µj1 > 0|s1 > 0, s2 > 0) dj >
∫ 1
0
P(µj2 − µj1 > 0|s1 < 0, s2 > 0) dj.
On the set {s1 > 0, s2 > 0}, all agents have the same belief and we have for every j:
µj2 − µj1 =
µj1(1− µj1)(f(1, s2)− f(−1, s2))
µj1f(1, s2) + (1− µj1)f(−1, s2)
,
which is positive when s2 > 0. Therefore:
∫ 1
0
P(µj2 − µj1 > 0|s1 > 0, s2 > 0) dj = 1.
On the set {s1 > 0, s2 < 0}, there is a proportion λq of agents that misperceived the signal
s2. For an agent j of that type, σ
j
2 = 0 and thus:
µj2 − µj1 =
µj1(1− µj1)(f(1, 0)− f(−1, 0))
µj1f(1, 0) + (1− µj1)f(−1, 0)
= 0.
Therefore: ∫ 1
0
P(µj2 − µj1 > 0|s1 < 0, s2 > 0) dj = 1− λq,
which completes the proof.

A.2. Longer horizon
In this section, we consider an infinite-horizon version of our basic model: we thus set
T = +∞. To fix ideas, let us assume that the true state of the world is X = H. Rational
traders’ belief, µt = Pt(X = H), is thus a bounded martingale converging almost surely to
13
1.
We start with a simple example assuming q = 1 to show that biased traders mispercep-
tion may survive in the long run. Assume that the first signal s1 equals −1, an event of
probability δ(1 − p). Biased traders thereafter only see the negative public signals because
q = 1 (they ignore all the negative signals). Therefore, µit = Pt(X = H|s1 = 1, . . . , σt), the
belief of biased trader i, is a decreasing sequence (bounded below by zero) because biased
traders only perceive negative signals (because the first signal is assumed to be negative
and q is assumed to equal 1). As time goes to infinity, µit thus converges to 0. Therefore,
biased traders’ misperception occurs in the long run because µit does not converge to one in
probability.
The assumption that q = 1 is strong and was only made to fix ideas. If we assume instead
that q < 1, the question is whether biased traders’ average belief may not converge to 1.
One way to address this question is to study whether a biased trader’s belief may converge
with positive probability to 1X=L, the wrong state of nature. When the state of nature is
X = H (such that µt converges to 1), the distribution of the public signal is:
st =

1 with probability δθ
0 with probability 1− δ
−1 with probability δ(1− θ)
For ever-pessimistic biased traders, who always exist, the distribution of the signal at date
t > 1 is:
σt =

1 with probability δθ(1− q)
0 with probability 1− δ + δθq
−1 with probability δ(1− θ)
Therefore, if θ(1 − q) ≤ (1 − θ) or equivalently q ≥ 2θ−1
θ
, the belief of ever-pessimistic
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biased traders converges to zero: they become sure that the low state of the world has
occurred (when in fact the high state has occurred). The difficulty is to prove that the set
of ever-pessimistic biased traders has a positive probability in the long run.
To address this issue, we will focus on the long-term behavior of the biased belief dy-
namics. We will assume to be in the good state of the economy where the public signals st
are independent and identically distributed on E = {1, 0,−1} with
P(st = 1) = δθ, P(st = −1) = δ(1− θ) and P(st = 0) = 1− δ.
It is clear that the public belief µ∗t = P(H|s1, . . . , st) converges to one almost surely. We are
interested in the asymptotic behavior of µt = P(H|σ1, . . . , σt).
We introduce some useful notation:
∀µ ∈ [0, 1] µ+ = f(θ, µ) and µ− = f(1− θ, µ)
Remember that we assume that θ is strictly larger than 1/2, which in turn implies that:
∀µ ∈ [0, 1] 1 ≥ µ+ ≥ µ ≥ µ− ≥ 0.
Note that (µ+)− = µ = (µ−)+ for all µ. Define µ(k) as the |k|-th iterate of the ” + ” operator
if k ≥ 0, or ” − ” operator if k < 0. For any initial belief µ0 = µ, the process µn has state
space {µ(k) | − t ≤ k ≤ t}. To normalize the problem, if µ ≥ 1/2, define
N(µ) = min{k ≥ 0 |µ(−k) < 1/2}
and for µ < 1/2
N(µ) = min{k ≥ 0 |µ(k) ≥ 1/2}
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Observe that N(1
2
) = 1. We embed the belief process in Z with φ : E → Z as follows, if
µ ≥ 1/2, then φ(µ) = N(µ)− 1. If µ < 1/2, then φ(µ) = −N(µ) so that φ(µ(k)) = φ(µ) + k.
It follows that the process Rt = φ(µt) is a Markov chain on Z whose transitions do not
depend on µ.
Moreover, on N∗ and −N∗, the transitions correspond to two birth-death chains with
constant probabilities of transitions.
Assume θq < 1 so that µ∞ equals 0 or 1 almost surely and define f(µ) = Pµ[µ∞ = 1],
then the value of f(µ) depends only on the law of the process Rt which depends itself only
on N(µ). f is therefore piecewise constant as N(.) is piecewise constant.
Let h(N(µ)) = f(µ) with h : Z → [0, 1]. Then using standard results on birth-death
chains, we have:
f(
1
2
) = h(1) =
(
1−
(
(1− q)δ(1− θ)
δθ
)2)
+
(
1− q
q(2− q)
)(
δθ − (1− q)δ(1− θ)
δ(1− θ)
)(
(1− q)δ(1− θ)
δθ
)2
,
which is lower than 1. This indicates that there is a fraction 1− f(1
2
) of biased traders who
end up believe with certainty in the wrong state of the world being realized.
These developments correspond, in our setting, to Proposition 4 in Rabin and Schrag
(1999) in which the case of an infinite number of signals is analyzed.
A.3. Confirmatory bias modeled as in Rabin and Schrag
(1999)
We focus on a binary signal structure in which all signals are informative - i.e., there is no
signal st = 0 anymore. We consider that the random variable z takes values in {1,−1}
instead of {1, 0}. We thus consider that a biased trader changes the sign of public signals
that are inconsistent with his prior beliefs with probability q. This is exactly the set up of
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Rabin and Schrag (1999).
A.3.1 Stylized facts
We here show that the following proposition holds:
Proposition 3.3”. Stylized facts (Extreme bias). When some traders are prone to
the confirmatory bias (that is, when λq > 0), market outcomes are as follows:
• There is excess volume at t ∈ {2, 3}:
Vt > V
∗
t = 0.
• There is excess volatility in asset prices at t = 2 and, for q(1 + 4λ) > 2 , at t = 3 ;
in this case:
Var(Pt) > Var(P
∗
t ).
• There is momentum in asset prices at t = 1 and t = 2:
E(P2 − P1|P1 − P0 > 0) > 0,
E(P3 − P2|P2 − P1 > 0) > 0.
• A bubble forms after a good initial public signal:
E (P3|s1 = 1) > E (P2|s1 = 1) > P1 (s1 = 1) = P ∗1 (s1 = 1) .
• A crash occurs after a bad initial public signal:
E (P3|s1 = −1) < E (P2|s1 = −1) < P1 (s1 = 1) = P ∗1 (s1 = −1) .
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Proof of Proposition 3.3”. The proof follows the same steps as in the paper.
Belief dynamics. To set the stage for the analysis of the evolution of prices and volume,
we start by studying belief dynamics.
Lemma. For speculators, belief dynamics are given by:
P(X = H|s1, . . . , st+1) = µt+1 = f(θ, µt)1 {st+1=1} + f(1− θ, µt)1 {st+1=−1},
and for biased traders (i ∈ [0, λ]),
Pi(X = H|s1, . . . , st+1) = µit+1 = f(θ, µit)1 {σit+1=1} + f(1− θ, µit)1 {σit+1=−1},
where
f(θ, µ) =
θµ
θµ+ (1− θ)(1− µ) .
Proof. Because the law of the rational beliefs µt under P is the same as the one of biased
beliefs µit under the biased probability Pi, it is enough to focus on belief dynamics for rational
agents. Using Bayes’ formula, we have:
P(X = H|s1, . . . , st, st+1 = 1) = P(X = H; st+1 = 1|s1, . . . , st)P(st+1 = 1|s1, . . . , st)
=
P(st+1 = 1|X = H)P(X = H|s1, . . . , st)
P(st+1 = 1|s1, . . . , st)
=
θµt
θµt + (1− θ)(1− µt) .
18
Likewise, we have:
P(X = H|s1, . . . , st, st+1 = −1) = (1− θ)µt
(1− θ)µt + θ(1− µt) .
We conclude by noting that:
µt+1 = P(X = H|s1, . . . , st, st+1 = 1)1 {st+1=1} + P(X = H|s1, . . . , st, st+1 = −1)1 {st+1=−1}.

Note that for a belief history of length t, ht = (s1, . . . , st), the possible values for µt are:
θ(j, t) =
θj(1− θ)t−j
θj(1− θ)t−j + θt−j(1− θ)j . (A.3.7)
where j is the number of signal with su = 1 for u ≤ t (this is similar to Rabin and Schrag,
1999).
We continue by giving some results concerning the probability distribution of the public
signal. Clearly:
P(s1 = 1) =
θ + 1− θ
2
=
1
2
.
Because of the symmetry of the model, the law of the belief process with path starting with
s1 = −1 is obtained by changing θ in 1 − θ. Therefore, we only focus on belief paths with
s1 = 1. We have:
P(s2 = 1|s1 = 1) = P(s1 = 1; s2 = 1)P(s1 = 1)
=
P(X = H)P(s1 = 1; s2 = 1|X = H) + P(X = L)P(s1 = 1; s2 = 1|X = L)
P(s1 = 1)
= θ2 + (1− θ)2,
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and thus:
P(s2 = −1|s1 = 1) = 2θ(1− θ).
Likewise, it is straightforward to prove that:
P(s3 = 1|s1 = 1; s2 = 1) = θ
3 + (1− θ)3
θ2 + (1− θ)2 , P(s3 = −1|s1 = 1; s2 = 1) =
θ(1− θ)
θ2 + (1− θ)2 ,
and:
P(s3 = 1|s1 = 1; s2 = −1) = P(s3 = −1|s1 = 1; s2 = −1) = 1
2
.
At date t, there exist 2t paths for the public signal history. Let us denote by ht =
(s1, s2, . . . , st) a path and (z
ih)t = (s1, z
i
2s2, . . . , z
i
tst) biased trader i’s belief path. A spec-
ulator has a rational estimation of the future dividend at date t given by P(v = 1|ht) =
pL + (pH − pL)µt. Biased trader i has an estimation of the future dividend given by
Pi(v = 1|(zih)t) = pL + (pH − pL)µit.
Excess volume. Confirmatory bias induces excess volume. Consider for example the mixed
history path (s1 = 1, s2 = −1). The equilibrium price along this path is:
P2(1,−1) = pL + (pH − pL)(λqθ(2, 2) + (1− λq)θ(1, 2)).
Therefore, there is a proportion λq of agents (corresponding to the biased traders who
perceived a positive signal at date 2 instead of the actual negative signal) who have a price
estimation pL + (pH − pL)θ(2, 2) which is higher than the equilibrium price. Hence, volume
equals:
V2(1,−1) = (pH − pL)λq(1− λq)
c
(θ(2, 2)− θ(1, 2)) > V ∗2 (1,−1) = 0.
Excess volatility. Confirmatory bias may induce excess volatility. To show this result, it
is useful to note that E(Pt) = pH+pL2 , for t = 1, 2, 3. To see this, consider two opposite signal
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histories ht = {1, s2, . . . , st} and −ht = {−1,−s2, . . . ,−st}. The law of signals st being
symmetric, P(ht) = P(−ht). Moreover, Equation (A.3.7) implies that µjt(ht) + µjt(−ht) = 1.
As a consequence, the pricing formula yields Pt(ht) + Pt(−ht) = pH + pL. Finally:
E(Pt) =
∑
ht
(P(ht)Pt(ht) + P(−ht)Pt(−ht))
=
∑
ht
P(ht) (Pt(ht) + Pt(−ht))
= (pH + pL)
∑
ht
P(ht)
= (pH + pL)P(s1 = 1)
=
pH + pL
2
.
We deduce from the price dynamics that:
P2 = P
∗
2 + ε2 and P3 = P
∗
3 + ε3,
where εi are the symmetric random variables given by:
ε2(s1, s2) = ε2(1,−1)(1 s1=1;s2=−1 − 1 s1=−1;s2=1)
= (pH − pL)λq(θ(2, 2)− θ(1, 2))(1 s1=1;s2=−1 − 1 s1=−1;s2=1),
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indicating that ε2(−1, 1) = −ε2(1,−1) and ε2(1, 1) = ε2(−1,−1) = 0, and:
ε3(s1, s2, s3) = ε3(1, 1,−1)(1 s1=1;s2=1;s3=−1 − 1 s1=−1;s2=−1;s3=1)
+ ε3(1,−1, 1)(1 s1=1;s2=−1;s3=1 − 1 s1=−1;s2=1;s3=−1)
+ ε3(1,−1,−1)(1 s1=1;s2=−1;s3=−1 − 1 s1=−1;s2=1;s3=1)
= (pH − pL)λq(θ(3, 3)− θ(2, 3))(1 s1=1;s2=1;s3=−1 − 1 s1=−1;s2=−1;s3=1)
+ (pH − pL)λq(θ(3, 3)− θ(2, 3))(1 s1=1;s2=−1;s3=1 − 1 s1=−1;s2=1;s3=−1)
+ (pH − pL)λq(qθ(3, 3) + 2(1− q)θ(2, 3)
− (2− q)θ(1, 3))(1 s1=1;s2=−1;s3=−1 − 1 s1=−1;s2=1;s3=1).
Thus, noting m = pH+pL
2
, we have:
Var(P2) = Var(P
∗
2 ) + Var(ε2) + 2E [(P ∗2 −m)ε2] .
It is straightforward to see that E [(P ∗2 −m)ε2] = 0. Indeed, because P ∗(1,−1) = P ∗(−1, 1) =
m and ε2(1, 1) = ε2(−1,−1) = 0, we have:
E [(P ∗2 −m)ε2] = 0.
Therefore:
Var(P2) > Var(P
∗
2 ).
There is thus always excess volatility in the price at date 2.
Regarding date t = 3, we first compute Var(ε3). Because E(ε3) = 0, we have Var(ε3) =
E(ε23). Moreover, we note that for every path h3 containing a change in the sign of the public
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signal P(h3) = θ(1−θ)2 and
P ∗3 (h3)− P ∗3 (−h3) = (ph − pL)(2θ − 1).
Therefore:
E(ε23) = θ(1− θ)
(
ε23(1, 1,−1) + ε23(1,−1, 1) + ε23(1,−1,−1)
)
= θ(1− θ)(pH − pL)2λ2q2
{
2(θ(3, 3)− θ(2, 3))2 + [q(θ(3, 3)− θ(2, 3)) + (2− q)(θ(2, 3)− θ(1, 3))]2}
On the other hand:
E[(P ∗3 −m)ε3] =
θ(1− θ)
2
ε3(1, 1,−1) (P ∗3 (1, 1,−1)− P ∗3 (−1,−1, 1))
+
θ(1− θ)
2
ε3(1,−1, 1) (P ∗3 (1,−1, 1)− P ∗3 (−1, 1,−1))
+
θ(1− θ)
2
ε3(1,−1,−1) (P ∗3 (1,−1,−1)− P ∗3 (−1, 1, 1))
=
θ(1− θ)
2
(pH − pL)2λq(2θ − 1)(2− q)(θ(3, 3) + θ(1, 3)− 2θ(2, 3)).
Therefore:
Var(P3)− Var(P ∗3 ) = θ(1− θ)(pH − pL)2λq
{
λq
[
2(θ(3, 3)− θ(2, 3))2
+ [q(θ(3, 3)− θ(2, 3)) + (2− q)(θ(2, 3)− θ(1, 3))]2]
+ (2θ − 1)(2− q)(θ(3, 3) + θ(1, 3)− 2θ(2, 3))} .
Now, setting θ = 1
2
+ η and making an expansion of Var(P3) − Var(P ∗3 ) in a neighborhood
of 1
2
, we get:
Var(P3)− Var(P ∗3 ) =
1
4
(pH − pL)2λq(q(1 + 4λ)− 2)η + o(η).
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This expression is positive if q(1 + 4λ) > 2. This shows that there is a parameter region for
which there is excess volatility in the price at date 3.
Momentum. Assume that t = 1. The random event {P1 − P0 > 0} coincides with the
event {s1 = 1}. Therefore, we have to prove that E(P2 − P1|s1 = 1) > 0. But,
E(P2 − P1|s1 = 1) = E(P2(1, 1)1 s2=1 + P2(1,−1)1 s2=−1|s1 = 1)− ((pH − pL)θ + pL)
= (pH − pL)[θ(2, 2)P(s2 = 1|s1 = 1) + ((1− λq)θ(1, 2)
+ λqθ(2, 2))P(s2 = −1|s1 = 1))− θ]
= (pH − pL)λq(θ(2, 2)− θ(1, 2))P(s2 = −1|s1 = 1) > 0
where the last equality follows from the martingale property of the belief process µt.
There is thus always momentum at date 1.
To prove momentum at t = 2, we need to know the histories that yield P2 − P1 > 0.
Clearly, on the event {s1 = 1; s2 = 1}, the return P2 − P1 is positive. On the event
{s1 = 1; s2 = −1}, this return equals:
P2(1,−1)− P1 = (pH − pL)(λq(θ(2, 2)− θ(1, 2)) + θ(1, 2)− θ).
This is positive if and only if λq ≥ θ−θ(1,2)
θ(2,2)−θ(1,2) = θ
2 + (1− θ)2.
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Therefore, two cases have to be considered. When λq ≥ θ2 + (1− θ)2, we have:
E(P3 − P2|P2 − P1 > 0) = E(P3 − P2|s1 = 1; s2 = 1)P(s1 = 1; s2 = 1)P(P2 − P1 > 0)
+ E(P3 − P2|s1 = 1; s2 = −1)P(s1 = 1; s2 = −1)P(P2 − P1 > 0)
= E(P3 − P2|s1 = 1; s2 = 1)(θ2 + (1− θ)2)
+ E(P3 − P2|s1 = 1; s2 = −1)2θ(1− θ).
Now:
E(P3 − P2|s1 = 1; s2 = 1) = (P3(1, 1, 1)− P2(1, 1))P(s3 = 1|s1 = 1; s2 = 1)
+ (P3(1, 1,−1)− P2(1, 1))P(s3 = −1|s1 = 1; s2 = 1)
= λq(pH − pL)P(s3 = −1|s1 = 1; s2 = 1)(θ(3, 3)− θ(2, 3)),
where the last equality uses the martingale property of µt, that is:
θ(2, 2) = P(s3 = 1|s1 = 1; s2 = 1)θ(3, 3) + P(s3 = −1|s1 = 1; s2 = 1)θ(2, 3).
Similarly, we have:
E(P3−P2|s1 = 1; s2 = −1) = λq(pH − pL)
2
((1 + q)θ(3, 3) + 2(1− q)θ(2, 3)− (1− q)θ(1, 3)− 2θ(2, 2)) .
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Finally:
E(P3 − P2|P2 − P1 > 0) = λq(pH − pL)θ(1− θ)((2 + q)θ(3, 3)
+ (2(1− q)− 1)θ(2, 3)− (1− q)θ(1, 3)− 2θ(2, 2))
= λq(pH − pL)θ(1− θ)[2(θ(3, 3)− θ(2, 2)) + q(θ(3, 3)− θ(2, 3))
+ (1− q)(θ(2, 3)− θ(1, 3))] > 0.
There is thus momentum at date 2 when λq ≥ θ2 + (1− θ)2.
In the second case in which λq < θ2 + (1− θ)2, we have:
E(P3 − P2|P2 − P1 > 0) = E(P3 − P2|s1 = 1; s2 = 1)P(s1 = 1; s2 = 1)P(P2 − P1 > 0)
+ E(P3 − P2|s1 = −1; s2 = 1)P(s1 = 1; s2 = −1)P(P2 − P1 > 0)
= E(P3 − P2|s1 = 1; s2 = 1)(θ2 + (1− θ)2)
+ E(P3 − P2|s1 = −1; s2 = 1)2θ(1− θ).
By symmetry, we deduce from the first case:
E(P3−P2|s1 = −1; s2 = 1) = λq(pH − pL)
2
((1 + q)θ(0, 3) + 2(1− q)θ(1, 3)− (1− q)θ(2, 3)− 2θ(0, 2)) .
Therefore:
E(P3 − P2|P2 − P1 > 0) = λq(pH − pL)θ(1− θ)((2− q)θ(1, 3)
+ (1− q)(θ(1, 3)− θ(2, 3)) + qθ(0, 3)− 2θ(0, 2))
= λq(pH − pL)θ(1− θ)(2(θ(1, 3)− θ(0, 2)) + θ(1, 3)− θ(2, 3)
+ q (θ(0, 3) + θ(2, 3)− 2θ(1, 3))).
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Observe that E(P3−P2|P2−P1 > 0) is an increasing function of q because θ(0, 3) + θ(2, 3)−
2θ(1, 3) ≥ 0. Moreover, using Equation (A.3.7) and rearranging terms, we obtain:
2(θ(1, 3)− θ(0, 2)) + θ(1, 3)− θ(2, 3) = (2θ − 1)
(
1
θ2 + (1− θ)2 − 2
)
≤ 0.
As a consequence, when λq ≤ θ2 + (1− θ)2 there is momentum only if:
q ≥ q¯ = 2(θ(1, 3)− θ(0, 2)) + θ(1, 3)− θ(2, 3)
θ(0, 3) + θ(2, 3)− 2θ(1, 3) .
Bubble. We have proved above that: E(P2 − P1|s1 = 1) > 0 which is equivalent to
E(P2|s1 = 1) ≥ E(P1|s1 = 1) = pL + (pH − pL)θ.
Moreover, we have:
E(P3−P2|s1 = 1) = E(P3−P2|s1 = 1, s2 = 1)P(s2 = 1|s1 = 1)+E(P3−P2|s1 = 1, s2 = −1)P(s2 = 1|s1 = 1)
We have already proved that:
E(P3 − P2|s1 = 1, s2 = 1) > 0 and E(P3 − P2|s1 = 1, s2 = −1) > 0.
Therefore:
E(P3|s1 = 1) ≥ E(P2|s1 = 1).

A.3.2 Novel empirical predictions
We now prove that the following proposition holds:
Proposition 3.4”. Novel predictions (Extreme bias). When some traders are
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prone to the confirmatory bias (that is, when λq > 0),
• Beliefs dispersion is higher when past signals have different signs:
E (Var [ν2|s1s2<0]) > E (Var [ν2|s1s2>0]) ,
E (Var [ν3|s1s2<0 or s2s3<0]) > E (Var [ν3|s1s2>0 and s2s3>0]) ,
where νt is the probability measure characterizing beliefs distribution at date t.
• There are less beliefs revisions when signals have different signs. For example, after a
positive signal, the proportion of upward beliefs revisions is lower if at least one of the
previous signals was negative:
∫ 1
0
P(µj2 − µj1 > 0|s1 > 0, s2 > 0)dj >
∫ 1
0
P(µj2 − µj1 > 0|s1 < 0, s2 > 0)dj
∫ 1
0
P(µj3−µj2 > 0|s1 > 0, s2 > 0, s3 > 0)dj >
∫ 1
0
P(µj3−µj2 > 0|s1 < 0 or s2 < 0, s3 > 0)dj
• A trader tends to revise his belief less often when signals have a sign that is different
from the sign of his last belief revision. For example, after a positive signal, the
probability that a trader revises upward his belief is larger if his last belief revision was
positive than if it was negative:
∫ 1
0
P(µj2 − µj1 > 0|µj1 − µj0 > 0, s2 > 0)dj >
∫ 1
0
P(µj2 − µj1 > 0|µj1 − µj0 < 0, s2 > 0)dj
∫ 1
0
P(µj3 − µj2 > 0|µj2 − µj1 > 0, s3 > 0)dj >
∫ 1
0
P(µj3 − µj2 > 0|µj2 − µj1 < 0, s3 > 0)dj
Proof of Proposition 3.4”. Beliefs dispersion. We will describe the dynamics of
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the belief dispersion in the Rabin and Schrag model in order to show that the proof of
Proposition is similar to the main model. Let us define by νt traders’ belief dispersion. For
each history ht, νt(ht) is a probability measure on the finite space θ(x, t) for x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t}
representing traders’ belief distribution function. We will define the average belief dispersion
as the average variance of each probability measure νt(ht) and the conditional average belief
dispersion as the average of the conditional variance of each probability measure.
Let us write precisely traders’ belief dispersion for t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Clearly:
ν0 = δ 1
2
,
where δ stands for the Dirac measure. Because all traders have the same perception of date
1 signal, the distribution of biased traders’ beliefs at date 1 is:
ν1 =
1
2
(δθ + δ1−θ).
In particular, ν1(1) = δθ and ν1(−1) = δ1−θ and therefore Var ν1(1) = Var ν1(−1) = 0. The
average belief dispersion is thus E(Var ν1) = 0.
From date 2 onward, belief dispersion depends on the public signal’s path. More precisely,
we have:
ν2 = P(s1 = 1; s2 = 1)ν2(1; 1) + P(s1 = 1; s2 = −1)ν2(1;−1)
+ P(s1 = −1; s2 = 1)ν2(−1; 1) + P(s1 = −1; s2 = −1)ν2(−1;−1)
where
ν2(1; 1) = δθ(2,2), ν2(1;−1) = qδθ(2,2) + (1− λq)δθ(1,2),
ν2(−1;−1) = δθ(0,2), ν2(−1; 1) = qδθ(0,2) + (1− λq)δθ(1,2).
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At date 3, we have:
ν3 = P(s1 = 1; s2 = 1; s3 = 1)ν3(1; 1; 1) + P(s1 = 1; s2 = 1; s3 = −1)ν3(1; 1;−1)
+ P(s1 = 1; s2 = −1; s3 = 1)ν3(1;−1; 1) + P(s1 = 1; s2 = −1; s3 = −1)ν2(1;−1;−1)
+ P(s1 = −1; s2 = −1; s3 = −1)ν3(−1;−1;−1) + P(s1 = −1; s2 = −1; s3 = 1)ν3(−1;−1; 1)
+ P(s1 = −1; s2 = 1; s3 = −1)ν3(−1; 1;−1) + P(s1 = −1; s2 = 1; s3 = 1)ν2(−1; 1; 1),
where
ν3(1; 1; 1) = δθ(3,3), ν3(1; 1;−1) = qδθ(3,3) + (1− λq)δθ(2,3),
ν3(1;−1; 1) = qδθ(3,3)+(1−λq)δθ(2,3); ν3(1;−1;−1) = q2δθ(3,3)+2q(1−q)δθ(2,3)+((1−λ)+λ(1−q)2)δθ(1,3),
ν3(−1;−1;−1) = δθ(0,3), ν3(−1;−1; 1) = qδθ(0,3) + (1− λq)δθ(1,3),
ν3(−1; 1;−1) = qδθ(0,3)+(1−λq)δθ(1,3); ν3(−1; 1; 1) = q2δθ(0,3)+2q(1−q)δθ(1,3)+((1−λ)+λ(1−q)2)δθ(2,3).
Because the probability distribution of νt in the model of Rabin and Schrag are of the
same type as our main model (linear combination of Dirac measures) then the proof follows
directly.
Belief revision. We focus on date 2 because the proof is similar to the model developed in
the paper. We want to prove that:
∫ 1
0
P(µj2 − µj1 > 0|s1 > 0, s2 > 0) dj >
∫ 1
0
P(µj2 − µj1 > 0|s1 < 0, s2 > 0) dj.
On the set {s1 > 0, s2 > 0}, µj1 = θ and µj2 = θ(2, 2) for every j. Therefore, for every j,
P(µj2 − µj1 > 0|s1 > 0, s2 > 0) = 1, which implies
∫ 1
0
P(µj2 − µj1 > 0|s1 > 0, s2 > 0) dj = 1.
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On the other hand, on the set {s1 < 0, s2 > 0}, µj1 = 1 − θ and µj2 = θ(0, 2) for every j
that misperceived the signal s2. The proportion of that traders are λq. Therefore, for every
agent j that misperceived the signal s2, we have: P(µj2 − µj1 > 0|s1 < 0, s2 > 0) = 0, which
implies: ∫ 1
0
P(µj2 − µj1 > 0|s1 < 0, s2 > 0) dj = 1− λq,
and yields the result.

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Appendix to the empirical analysis
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Table A.1. FORECAST REVISION - INTERACTION WITH MACROECONOMIC VOLATILITY
This Table presents variants of the regressions in Table 2 in which we interact the variable SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2)
in columns [1] to [3], and the variable SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) in columns [4] to [6] with a dummy, MACRO-
VOL(HIGH), that equals one if macroeconomic volatility lies in the highest tercile of its empirical distribution, and the
MACROVOL(HIGH) dummy is included as additional control variable. Following Bloom (2009), we define macroeconomic
volatility as the Chicago Board of Options Exchange VXO index of percentage implied volatility, on a hypothetical at the
money S&P100 option 30 days to expiration, from 1986 onward; and over the Pre-1986 period for which the VXO index is
unavailable, as the monthly standard deviation of the daily S&P500 index normalized to the same mean and variance as the
VXO index when they overlap from 1986 onward. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) is a dummy that equals one if there is a
change in the sign of SUEs over the previous two quarters. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) is a dummy that equals one if
there is one change in the sign of SUEs among the previous three quarters. ABS SUE(Q-1) is the absolute value of standardized
unexpected earnings in year-quarter Q-1. COVERAGE is the logarithm of the number of analysts who covered the stock in the
current fiscal year. LN(MKTCAP) is the logarithm of the stock total market capitalization (Compustat item CSHO × item
PRCC F) at the end of the current fiscal year. SIGMA is the standard deviation of daily raw returns of the stock in the current
fiscal year. Return on assets, ROA, is defined as operating income after depreciation (item OIBDP - item DP) over total assets
(item AT) computed at the end of the current fiscal year. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects, fiscal-quarter fixed
effects and analyst fixed effects. Columns [2] and [5] also include industry fixed effects. Columns [3] and [6] also include stock
fixed effects. All continuous variables are windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude all observations
with stock price lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is
from January 1982 to December 2014.
REVISION IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THE LATEST SUE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) -0.008∗∗ -0.008∗∗ -0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2)×MACROVOL(HIGH) -0.036∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3)×MACROVOL(HIGH) -0.034∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
MACROVOL(HIGH) -0.009 -0.008 -0.013 -0.005 -0.004 -0.010
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.057∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
SIZE -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
COVERAGE 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIGMA 0.013∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
LNBM 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
ROA 0.202∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.159∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.159∗
(0.067) (0.068) (0.090) (0.067) (0.068) (0.090)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 996129 996129 996129 996129 996129 996129
R2 0.038 0.039 0.076 0.038 0.039 0.076
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Table A.2. FORECAST REVISION - INTERACTION WITH MACROECONOMIC VOLATILITY - ROBUSTNESS
This Table presents variants of the regressions in Table 2 in which we interact the variable SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2)
in columns [1] to [3], and the variable SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) in columns [4] to [6] with a dummy, MACRO-
VOL(HIGH), that equals one if macroeconomic volatility lies in the highest tercile of its empirical distribution, and the
MACROVOL(HIGH) dummy is included as additional control variable. Following Bloom (2009), we define macroeconomic
volatility as the Chicago Board of Options Exchange VXO index of percentage implied volatility, on a hypothetical at the
money S&P100 option 30 days to expiration. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) is a dummy that equals one if there is a change
in the sign of SUEs over the previous two quarters. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) is a dummy that equals one if there
is one change in the sign of SUEs among the previous three quarters. ABS SUE(Q-1) is the absolute value of standardized
unexpected earnings in year-quarter Q-1. COVERAGE is the logarithm of the number of analysts who covered the stock in the
current fiscal year. LN(MKTCAP) is the logarithm of the stock total market capitalization (Compustat item CSHO × item
PRCC F) at the end of the current fiscal year. IMPLIEDVOL is the average of 30-day implied volatility of all at-the-money
stock i options issued in the current fiscal year. LNBM is book-to-market defined as in Fama and French (2008) in the current
year. Return on assets, ROA, is defined as operating income after depreciation (item OIBDP - item DP) over total assets (item
AT) computed at the end of the current fiscal year. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects, fiscal-quarter fixed effects
and analyst fixed effects. Columns [2] and [5] also include industry fixed effects. Columns [3] and [6] also include stock fixed
effects. All continuous variables are windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude all observations with
stock price lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is from
January 1996 to December 2014.
REVISION IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THE LATEST SUE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) -0.006 -0.006 -0.002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2)×MACROVOL(HIGH) -0.037∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) -0.009 -0.009 -0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3)×MACROVOL(HIGH) -0.028∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
MACROVOL(HIGH) -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 0.000 0.001 -0.003
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
SIZE -0.007∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
COVERAGE 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
IMPLIEDVOL 0.118∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.026) (0.020) (0.020) (0.026)
LNBM -0.002 -0.003 -0.007 -0.002 -0.003 -0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
ROA 0.242∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.102 0.243∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.106
(0.091) (0.090) (0.120) (0.091) (0.090) (0.120)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 517979 517979 517979 517979 517979 517979
R2 0.041 0.042 0.083 0.041 0.042 0.083
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Table A.3. FORECAST REVISION - ROBUSTNESS - DIFFERENT CHOICES FOR CONTROL VARIABLES
This Table presents variants of the regression in Table 2, column [1], in which we include or not a log specification for each
control variable. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects, fiscal-quarter fixed effects and analyst fixed effects. All
continuous variables are windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude all observations with stock price
lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is from January
1982 to December 2014.
REVISION IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THE LAST SUE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) -0.021∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.057∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
LN(MKTCAP) -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
COVERAGE -0.000∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIGMA 0.017∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
LNBM 0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ROA 0.173∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.068) (0.067) (0.067)
MKTCAP -0.000
(0.000)
LN(COVERAGE) -0.000
(0.004)
LN(SIGMA) 0.051∗∗∗
(0.005)
BM 0.002
(0.004)
LN(ROA) 0.003
(0.003)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 996129 996129 996129 996129 940571
R2 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.037
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Table A.4. FORECAST REVISION - ROBUSTNESS - DIFFERENT CHOICES FOR CONTROL VARIABLES (2)
This Table presents variants of the regression in Table 2, column [4], in which we include or not a log specification for each
control variable. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects, fiscal-quarter fixed effects and analyst fixed effects. All
continuous variables are windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude all observations with stock price
lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is from January
1982 to December 2014.
REVISION IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THE LAST SUE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) -0.018∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.057∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
LN(MKTCAP) -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
COVERAGE -0.000∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIGMA 0.017∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
LNBM 0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ROA 0.172∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.068) (0.067) (0.067)
MKTCAP -0.000
(0.000)
LN(COVERAGE) -0.000
(0.004)
LN(SIGMA) 0.052∗∗∗
(0.005)
BM 0.002
(0.004)
LN(ROA) 0.003
(0.003)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 996129 996129 996129 996129 940571
R2 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.037
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Table A.5. FORECAST REVISION - HETEROGENEOUS BEHAVIOR ACROSS ANALYSTS - ROBUSTNESS - DIFFER-
ENT CHOICES FOR CONTROL VARIABLES
This Table presents variants of the regression in Table 6, column [1], in which we include or not a log specification for each
control variable. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects, fiscal-quarter fixed effects and analyst fixed effects. All
continuous variables are windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude all observations with stock price
lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is from January
1982 to December 2014.
REVISION IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THE LAST SUE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
SIGN REV(Q-1) 6= SIGN SUE(Q-1) -0.220∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
POSREV(Q-1) 0.022∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.044∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
LN(MKTCAP) -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
COVERAGE -0.000∗ 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIGMA 0.014∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
LNBM 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ROA 0.089 0.114∗ 0.114∗ 0.122∗
(0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.065)
MKTCAP -0.000
(0.000)
LN(COVERAGE) -0.000
(0.004)
LN(SIGMA) 0.041∗∗∗
(0.005)
BM 0.003
(0.004)
LN(ROA) -0.001
(0.003)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 602209 602209 602209 602209 567167
R2 0.090 0.090 0.090 0.090 0.089
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Table A.6. DISPERSION IN ANALYST FORECASTS - ROBUSTNESS - DIFFERENT CHOICES FOR CONTROL VARI-
ABLES
This Table presents variants of the regression in Table 9, column [1], in which we include or not a log specification for each
control variable. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects and fiscal-quarter fixed effects. All continuous variables are
windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude all observations with stock price lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and
∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is from January 1982 to December 2014.
DISP(Q)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.085∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
LN(MKTCAP) -0.023∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
COVERAGE 0.003∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SIGMA 0.286∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
LNBM 0.311∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011)
ROA -4.545∗∗∗ -4.479∗∗∗ -5.061∗∗∗ -4.323∗∗∗
(0.197) (0.198) (0.200) (0.199)
MKTCAP 0.000∗∗
(0.000)
LN(COVERAGE) 0.084∗∗∗
(0.013)
LN(SIGMA) 0.748∗∗∗
(0.024)
BM 0.612∗∗∗
(0.031)
LN(ROA) -0.086∗∗∗
(0.007)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 140950 140950 140950 140950 130614
R2 0.211 0.211 0.206 0.233 0.190
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Table A.7. DISPERSION IN ANALYST FORECASTS - ROBUSTNESS - DIFFERENT CHOICES FOR CONTROL VARI-
ABLES (2)
This Table presents variants of the regression in Table 9, column [4], in which we include or not a log specification for each
control variable. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects and fiscal-quarter fixed effects. All continuous variables are
windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude all observations with stock price lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and
∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is from January 1982 to December 2014.
DISP(Q)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) 0.051∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.086∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
LN(MKTCAP) -0.023∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
COVERAGE 0.003∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SIGMA 0.286∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
LNBM 0.310∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011)
ROA -4.538∗∗∗ -4.473∗∗∗ -5.055∗∗∗ -4.316∗∗∗
(0.197) (0.198) (0.200) (0.198)
MKTCAP 0.000∗∗
(0.000)
LN(COVERAGE) 0.084∗∗∗
(0.013)
LN(SIGMA) 0.747∗∗∗
(0.024)
BM 0.612∗∗∗
(0.031)
LN(ROA) -0.086∗∗∗
(0.007)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 140950 140950 140950 140950 130614
R2 0.211 0.211 0.207 0.233 0.190
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Table A.8. FORECAST REVISION - ROBUSTNESS - END OF FISCAL QUARTERS VERSUS EARNINGS ANNOUNCE-
MENT DATES
This Table present variants of the regressions in Table 2 in which individual analysts’ revisions are computed as the difference
between the last annual earnings forecast made before the end date of two consecutive fiscal quarters (instead of the difference
between the last annual earnings forecast made before the announcement dates of two consecutive quarterly earnings). SUE
SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) is a dummy that equals one if there is a change in the sign of SUEs over the previous two quarters.
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) is a dummy that equals one if there is one change in the sign of SUEs among the previous
three quarters. ABS SUE(Q-1) is the absolute value of standardized unexpected earnings in year-quarter Q-1. COVERAGE is
the logarithm of the number of analysts who covered the stock in the current fiscal year. LN(MKTCAP) is the logarithm of
the stock total market capitalization (Compustat item CSHO × item PRCC F) at the end of the current fiscal year. SIGMA is
the standard deviation of daily raw returns of the stock in the current fiscal year. LNBM is book-to-market defined as in Fama
and French (2008) in the current year. Return on assets, ROA, is defined as operating income after depreciation (item OIBDP
- item DP) over total assets (item AT) computed at the end of the current fiscal year. All regressions include year-quarter fixed
effects, fiscal-quarter fixed effects and analyst fixed effects. Columns [2] and [5] also include industry fixed effects. Columns [3]
and [6] also include stock fixed effects. All continuous variables are windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We
exclude all observations with stock price lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
The sample period is from January 1982 to December 2014.
REVISION IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THE LAST SUE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) -0.020∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) -0.018∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.057∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
LN(MKTCAP) -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
COVERAGE 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIGMA 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
LNBM -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
ROA 0.204∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.161∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.161∗
(0.068) (0.069) (0.091) (0.068) (0.069) (0.091)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 981903 981903 981903 981903 981903 981903
R2 0.038 0.039 0.076 0.038 0.039 0.076
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Table A.9. FORECAST REVISION - HETEROGENEOUS BEHAVIOR ACROSS ANALYSTS - ROBUSTNESS - END OF
FISCAL QUARTERS VERSUS EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENT DATES
This Table present variants of the regressions in Table 6 in which individual analysts’ revisions are computed as the difference
between the last annual earnings forecast made before the end of two consecutive fiscal quarters (instead of the difference
between the last annual earnings forecast made before the announcement dates of two consecutive quarterly earnings). SIGN
REV(Q-1) 6= SIGN SUE(Q-1) is a dummy that equals one if the analyst’s annual earnings forecast revision for a given stock, if
any, made between the end of the Q-2 and Q-1 fiscal quarters has a different sign than SUE(Q-1). POSREV(Q-1) is a dummy
that equals one if the analyst has revised his/her annual earnings forecast upward between the end of the Q-2 and Q-1 fiscal
quarters. ABS SUE(Q-1) is the absolute value of standardized unexpected earnings in year-quarter Q-1. COVERAGE is the
logarithm of the number of analysts who covered the stock in the current fiscal year. LN(MKTCAP) is the logarithm of the
stock total market capitalization (Compustat item CSHO × item PRCC F) at the end of the current fiscal year. SIGMA is the
standard deviation of daily raw returns of the stock in the current fiscal year. IMPLIEDVOL is the average of 30-day implied
volatility of all at-the-money stock i options issued in the current fiscal year. LNBM is book-to-market defined as in Fama and
French (2008) in the current year. Return on assets, ROA, is defined as operating income after depreciation (item OIBDP -
item DP) over total assets (item AT) computed at the end of the current fiscal year. All regressions include year-quarter fixed
effects, fiscal-quarter fixed effects and analyst fixed effects. Columns [2] and [5] also include industry fixed effects. Columns [3]
and [6] also include stock fixed effects. All continuous variables are windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We
exclude all observations with stock price lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
The sample period is from January 1982 to December 2014 in columns [1] to [3], and from January 1996 to December 2014 in
columns [4] to [6].
REVISION IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THE LAST SUE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
SIGN REV(Q-1) 6= SIGN SUE(Q-1) -0.218∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗ -0.197∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
POSREV(Q-1) 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.044∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
LN(MKTCAP) -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
COVERAGE 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
SIGMA 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
IMPLIEDVOL 0.098∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.028)
LNBM -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
ROA 0.113∗ 0.117∗ 0.118 0.201∗∗ 0.198∗∗ 0.135
(0.067) (0.067) (0.093) (0.094) (0.093) (0.128)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 589314 589314 589314 330289 330289 330289
R2 0.089 0.090 0.124 0.085 0.086 0.125
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Table A.10. DISPERSION IN ANALYST FORECASTS - ROBUSTNESS - END OF FISCAL QUARTERS VERSUS
EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENT DATES
This Table present variants of the regressions in Table 9 in which DISP(Q) is measured using the latest earnings forecast
of each analyst covering the stock between the end of two consecutive fiscal quarters (instead of using the latest earnings
forecast of each analyst covering the stock between the announcement dates of two consecutive quarterly earnings). SUE SIGN
CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) is a dummy that equals one if there is a change in the sign of SUEs over the previous two quarters. SUE
SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) is a dummy that equals one if there is one change in the sign of SUEs among the previous three
quarters. ABS SUE(Q-1) is the absolute value of standardized unexpected earnings in year-quarter Q-1. COVERAGE is the
logarithm of the number of analysts who covered the stock in the current fiscal year. LN(MKTCAP) is the logarithm of the
stock total market capitalization (Compustat item CSHO × item PRCC F) at the end of the current fiscal year. SIGMA is the
standard deviation of daily raw returns of the stock in the current fiscal year. LNBM is book-to-market defined as in Fama and
French (2008) in the current year. Return on assets, ROA, is defined as operating income after depreciation (item OIBDP -
item DP) over total assets (item AT) computed at the end of the current fiscal year. All regressions include year-quarter fixed
effects, fiscal-quarter fixed effects and analyst fixed effects. Columns [2] and [5] also include industry fixed effects. Columns [3]
and [6] also include stock fixed effects. All continuous variables are windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We
exclude all observations with stock price lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
The sample period is from January 1982 to December 2014.
DISP(Q)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) 0.048∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) 0.051∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.085∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
LN(MKTCAP) -0.023∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.030∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013)
COVERAGE 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SIGMA 0.274∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
LNBM 0.303∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
ROA -4.474∗∗∗ -4.562∗∗∗ -3.068∗∗∗ -4.468∗∗∗ -4.557∗∗∗ -3.067∗∗∗
(0.200) (0.219) (0.290) (0.200) (0.219) (0.290)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 139436 139436 139436 139436 139436 139436
R2 0.212 0.230 0.448 0.212 0.230 0.448
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Table A.11. FORECAST REVISION - ROBUSTNESS - ALTERNATIVE MEASURE OF FORECAST REVISION
This Table present variants of the regressions in Table 2 in which the dependent variable, the dummy REVISION IN THE SAME
DIRECTION AS THE LAST SUE, is computed for each analyst that covered the stock before the earnings announcement
of quarter Q-1 (instead of considering only analysts that have issued a forecast both before and after the the announcement
date of quarter Q-1). SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) is a dummy that equals one if there is a change in the sign of SUEs
over the previous two quarters. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) is a dummy that equals one if there is one change in the
sign of SUEs among the previous three quarters. ABS SUE(Q-1) is the absolute value of standardized unexpected earnings in
year-quarter Q-1. COVERAGE is the logarithm of the number of analysts who covered the stock in the current fiscal year.
LN(MKTCAP) is the logarithm of the stock total market capitalization (Compustat item CSHO × item PRCC F) at the end
of the current fiscal year. SIGMA is the standard deviation of daily raw returns of the stock in the current fiscal year. LNBM
is book-to-market defined as in Fama and French (2008) in the current year. Return on assets, ROA, is defined as operating
income after depreciation (item OIBDP - item DP) over total assets (item AT) computed at the end of the current fiscal year.
All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects, fiscal-quarter fixed effects and analyst fixed effects. Columns [2] and [5] also
include industry fixed effects. Columns [3] and [6] also include stock fixed effects. All continuous variables are windsorized
at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude all observations with stock price lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is from January 1982 to December 2014.
REVISION IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THE LAST SUE
(considering all analysts covering the stock before the earnings announcement)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) -0.018∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) -0.016∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.056∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
SIZE -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
COVERAGE 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIGMA 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
LNBM 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
ROA 0.238∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗
(0.075) (0.075) (0.100) (0.075) (0.075) (0.100)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 673626 673626 673626 673626 673626 673626
R2 0.044 0.045 0.088 0.044 0.045 0.088
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Table A.12. FORECAST REVISION - HETEROGENEOUS BEHAVIOR ACROSS ANALYSTS - ROBUSTNESS - AL-
TERNATIVE MEASURE OF FORECAST REVISION
This Table present variants of the regressions in Table 6 the dependent variable, the dummy REVISION IN THE SAME
DIRECTION AS THE LAST SUE, is computed for each analyst that covered the stock before the earnings announcement of
quarter Q-1 (instead of considering only analysts that have issued a forecast both before and after the the announcement date
of quarter Q-1). SIGN REV(Q-1) 6= SIGN SUE(Q-1) is a dummy that equals one if the analyst’s annual earnings forecast
revision for a given stock, if any, made between the end of the Q-2 and Q-1 fiscal quarters has a different sign than SUE(Q-1).
POSREV(Q-1) is a dummy that equals one if the analyst has revised his/her annual earnings forecast upward between the end
of the Q-2 and Q-1 fiscal quarters. ABS SUE(Q-1) is the absolute value of standardized unexpected earnings in year-quarter
Q-1. COVERAGE is the logarithm of the number of analysts who covered the stock in the current fiscal year. LN(MKTCAP)
is the logarithm of the stock total market capitalization (Compustat item CSHO × item PRCC F) at the end of the current
fiscal year. SIGMA is the standard deviation of daily raw returns of the stock in the current fiscal year. SIGMA is the standard
deviation of daily raw returns of the stock in the current fiscal year. IMPLIEDVOL is the average of 30-day implied volatility
of all at-the-money stock i options issued in the current fiscal year. LNBM is book-to-market defined as in Fama and French
(2008) in the current year. Return on assets, ROA, is defined as operating income after depreciation (item OIBDP - item DP)
over total assets (item AT) computed at the end of the current fiscal year. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects,
fiscal-quarter fixed effects and analyst fixed effects. Columns [2] and [5] also include industry fixed effects. Columns [3] and [6]
also include stock fixed effects. All continuous variables are windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude
all observations with stock price lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The
sample period is from January 1982 to December 2014 In columns [1] to [3], and from January 1996 to December 2014 in
columns [4] to [6].
REVISION IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THE LAST SUE
(considering all analysts covering the stock before the earnings announcement)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
SIGN REV(Q-1) 6= SIGN SUE(Q-1) -0.221∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.199∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.175∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
POSREV(Q-1) 0.024∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.045∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
LN(MKTCAP) -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.007∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
COVERAGE 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
SIGMA 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
IMPLIEDVOL 0.100∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.028)
LNBM 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
ROA 0.115∗ 0.119∗ 0.123 0.189∗∗ 0.185∗∗ 0.126
(0.066) (0.067) (0.092) (0.093) (0.093) (0.126)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 582219 582219 582219 325443 325443 325443
R2 0.091 0.092 0.126 0.086 0.087 0.126
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Table A.13. FORECAST REVISION - ROBUSTNESS - ALTERNATIVE VOLATILITY MEASURE
This Table presents variants of the regressions in Table 2 in which we use the standard deviation of monthly returns of each
stock in the current fiscal year as an alternative measure of volatility. In columns [1] to [6], the dependent variable is a dummy
that equals one if the analyst’s annual earnings forecast revision for a given stock, if any, made between the announcement
dates of the Q-1 and Q quarterly earnings has the same sign as SUE(Q-1), the unexpected earnings in quarter Q-1. Individual
revisions are computed as the difference between the last annual earnings forecast made between the announcement dates of
the Q-1 and Q quarterly earnings and the last annual earnings forecast, if any, made before the announcement date of the
Q-1 quarterly earnings. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) is a dummy that equals one if there is a change in the sign of SUEs
over the previous two quarters. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) is a dummy that equals one if there is one change in the
sign of SUEs among the previous three quarters. ABS SUE(Q-1) is the absolute value of standardized unexpected earnings in
year-quarter Q-1. COVERAGE is the logarithm of the number of analysts who covered the stock in the current fiscal year.
LN(MKTCAP) is the logarithm of the stock total market capitalization (Compustat item CSHO × item PRCC F) at the end
of the current fiscal year. SIGMA(MONTHLY) is the standard deviation of monthly raw returns of the stock in the current
fiscal year. LNBM is book-to-market defined as in Fama and French (2008) in the current year. Return on assets, ROA, is
defined as operating income after depreciation (item OIBDP - item DP) over total assets (item AT) computed at the end of
the current fiscal year. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects, fiscal-quarter fixed effects and analyst fixed effects.
Columns [2] and [5] also include industry fixed effects. Columns [3] and [6] also include stock fixed effects. All continuous
variables are windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude all observations with stock price lower than $5.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is from January 1982 to December
2014.
REVISION IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THE LAST SUE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) -0.024∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) -0.021∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.059∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
LN(MKTCAP) -0.010∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.010∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ 0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
COVERAGE 0.000 0.000∗ -0.000 0.000 0.000∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIGMA(MONTHLY) 0.210∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.042) (0.035) (0.035) (0.042)
LNBM -0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
ROA 0.256∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗
(0.070) (0.071) (0.094) (0.070) (0.071) (0.094)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 938322 938322 938322 938322 938322 938322
R2 0.039 0.040 0.078 0.039 0.040 0.078
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Table A.14. FORECAST REVISION - HETEROGENEOUS BEHAVIOR ACROSS ANALYSTS - ROBUSTNESS - AL-
TERNATIVE VOLATILITY MEASURE)
This Table present variants of the regressions in Table 6 in which we use the standard deviation of monthly returns of each
stock in the current fiscal year as an alternative measure of volatility. SIGN REV(Q-1) 6= SIGN SUE(Q-1) is a dummy that
equals one if the analyst’s annual earnings forecast revision for a given stock, if any, made between the end of the Q-2 and Q-1
fiscal quarters has a different sign than SUE(Q-1). POSREV(Q-1) is a dummy that equals one if the analyst has revised his/her
annual earnings forecast upward between the end of the Q-2 and Q-1 fiscal quarters. ABS SUE(Q-1) is the absolute value of
standardized unexpected earnings in year-quarter Q-1. COVERAGE is the logarithm of the number of analysts who covered
the stock in the current fiscal year. LN(MKTCAP) is the logarithm of the stock total market capitalization (Compustat item
CSHO × item PRCC F) at the end of the current fiscal year. SIGMA(MONTHLY) is the standard deviation of monthly raw
returns of the stock in the current fiscal year. LNBM is book-to-market defined as in Fama and French (2008) in the current
year. Return on assets, ROA, is defined as operating income after depreciation (item OIBDP - item DP) over total assets (item
AT) computed at the end of the current fiscal year. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects, fiscal-quarter fixed effects
and analyst fixed effects. Columns [2] and [5] also include industry fixed effects. Columns [3] and [6] also include stock fixed
effects. All continuous variables are windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude all observations with
stock price lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is from
January 1982 to December 2014 in columns [1] to [3], and from January 1996 to December 2014 in columns [4] to [6].
REVISION IN THE SAME DIRECTION
AS THE LAST SUE
[1] [2] [3]
SIGN REV(Q-1) 6= SIGN SUE(Q-1) -0.227∗∗∗ -0.226∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
POSREV(Q-1) 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.045∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
LN(MKTCAP) -0.009∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
COVERAGE 0.000 0.001∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIGMA(MONTHLY) 0.164∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.035) (0.045)
LNBM 0.000 -0.000 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
ROA 0.185∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗
(0.069) (0.070) (0.097)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
Analyst FE Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes
Observations 559656 559656 559656
R2 0.094 0.095 0.130
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Table A.15. DISPERSION IN ANALYST FORECASTS - ROBUSTNESS - ALTERNATIVE VOLATILITY MEASURE
This Table presents variants of the regressions in Table 9 in which we use the standard deviation of monthly returns of each
stock in the current fiscal year as an alternative measure of volatility. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) is a dummy that equals
one if there is a change in the sign of SUEs over the previous two quarters. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) is a dummy that
equals one if there is one change in the sign of SUEs among the previous three quarters. ABS SUE(Q-1) is the absolute value
of standardized unexpected earnings in year-quarter Q-1. COVERAGE is the logarithm of the number of analysts who covered
the stock in the current fiscal year. LN(MKTCAP) is the logarithm of the stock total market capitalization (Compustat item
CSHO × item PRCC F) at the end of the current fiscal year. SIGMA(MONTHLY) is the standard deviation of monthly raw
returns of the stock in the current fiscal year. LNBM is book-to-market defined as in Fama and French (2008) in the current
year. Return on assets, ROA, is defined as operating income after depreciation (item OIBDP - item DP) over total assets (item
AT) computed at the end of the current fiscal year. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects, fiscal-quarter fixed effects
and analyst fixed effects. Columns [2] and [5] also include industry fixed effects. Columns [3] and [6] also include stock fixed
effects. All continuous variables are windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude all observations with
stock price lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is from
January 1982 to December 2014.
DISP(Q)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) 0.046∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) 0.048∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.098∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
LN(MKTCAP) -0.069∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ -0.257∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗ -0.257∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.015) (0.007) (0.007) (0.015)
COVERAGE 0.010∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SIGMA(MONTHLY) 4.542∗∗∗ 4.312∗∗∗ 3.115∗∗∗ 4.541∗∗∗ 4.311∗∗∗ 3.117∗∗∗
(0.177) (0.185) (0.200) (0.177) (0.185) (0.200)
LNBM 0.285∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014)
ROA -4.877∗∗∗ -4.970∗∗∗ -3.181∗∗∗ -4.871∗∗∗ -4.966∗∗∗ -3.180∗∗∗
(0.205) (0.226) (0.298) (0.205) (0.226) (0.298)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 133814 133814 133814 133814 133814 133814
R2 0.201 0.221 0.445 0.201 0.221 0.445
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Table A.16. FORECAST REVISION - ROBUSTNESS - CONTROLLING FOR IMPLIED VOL (FROM 60 DAYS OP-
TIONS)
This Table presents variants of the regressions in Table 3 in which implied volatility is computed from 60-day at-the-money
stock i options issued in the current fiscal year. In columns [1] to [6], the dependent variable is a dummy that equals one
if the analyst’s annual earnings forecast revision for a given stock, if any, made between the announcement dates of the Q-1
and Q quarterly earnings has the same sign as SUE(Q-1), the unexpected earnings in quarter Q-1. Individual revisions are
computed as the difference between the last annual earnings forecast made between the announcement dates of the Q-1 and
Q quarterly earnings and the last annual earnings forecast, if any, made before the announcement date of the Q-1 quarterly
earnings. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) is a dummy that equals one if there is a change in the sign of SUEs over the previous
two quarters. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) is a dummy that equals one if there is one change in the sign of SUEs among
the previous three quarters. ABS SUE(Q-1) is the absolute value of standardized unexpected earnings in year-quarter Q-1.
COVERAGE is the logarithm of the number of analysts who covered the stock in the current fiscal year. LN(MKTCAP) is the
logarithm of the stock total market capitalization (Compustat item CSHO × item PRCC F) at the end of the current fiscal
year. IMPLIEDVOL is the average of 60-day implied volatility of all at-the-money stock i options issued in the current fiscal
year. LNBM is book-to-market defined as in Fama and French (2008) in the current year. Return on assets, ROA, is defined as
operating income after depreciation (item OIBDP - item DP) over total assets (item AT) computed at the end of the current
fiscal year. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects, fiscal-quarter fixed effects and analyst fixed effects. Columns [2]
and [5] also include industry fixed effects. Columns [3] and [6] also include stock fixed effects. All continuous variables are
windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude all observations with stock price lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and
∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is from January 1996 to December 2014.
REVISION IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THE LAST SUE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) -0.023∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) -0.022∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
LN(MKTCAP) -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
COVERAGE 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
IMPLIEDVOL (60 DAYS OPTION) 0.124∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.027) (0.020) (0.020) (0.027)
LNBM -0.002 -0.003 -0.007 -0.002 -0.003 -0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
ROA 0.249∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.110 0.250∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.112
(0.091) (0.091) (0.120) (0.091) (0.091) (0.120)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 517317 517317 517317 517317 517317 517317
R2 0.041 0.042 0.083 0.041 0.042 0.083
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Table A.17. FORECAST REVISION - ROBUSTNESS - CONTROLLING FOR IMPLIED VOL (FROM 90 DAYS OP-
TIONS)
This Table presents variants of the regressions in Table 3 in which implied volatility is computed from 90-day at-the-money
stock i options issued in the current fiscal year. In columns [1] to [6], the dependent variable is a dummy that equals one
if the analyst’s annual earnings forecast revision for a given stock, if any, made between the announcement dates of the Q-1
and Q quarterly earnings has the same sign as SUE(Q-1), the unexpected earnings in quarter Q-1. Individual revisions are
computed as the difference between the last annual earnings forecast made between the announcement dates of the Q-1 and
Q quarterly earnings and the last annual earnings forecast, if any, made before the announcement date of the Q-1 quarterly
earnings. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) is a dummy that equals one if there is a change in the sign of SUEs over the previous
two quarters. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) is a dummy that equals one if there is one change in the sign of SUEs among
the previous three quarters. ABS SUE(Q-1) is the absolute value of standardized unexpected earnings in year-quarter Q-1.
COVERAGE is the logarithm of the number of analysts who covered the stock in the current fiscal year. LN(MKTCAP) is the
logarithm of the stock total market capitalization (Compustat item CSHO × item PRCC F) at the end of the current fiscal
year. IMPLIEDVOL is the average of 90-day implied volatility of all at-the-money stock i options issued in the current fiscal
year. LNBM is book-to-market defined as in Fama and French (2008) in the current year. Return on assets, ROA, is defined as
operating income after depreciation (item OIBDP - item DP) over total assets (item AT) computed at the end of the current
fiscal year. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects, fiscal-quarter fixed effects and analyst fixed effects. Columns [2]
and [5] also include industry fixed effects. Columns [3] and [6] also include stock fixed effects. All continuous variables are
windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude all observations with stock price lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and
∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is from January 1996 to December 2014.
REVISION IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THE LAST SUE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q1,Q2) -0.024∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) -0.012∗∗ -0.011∗ -0.013∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
ABS SUE(Q2) 0.070∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
ABS SUE(Q3) 0.045∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
COVERAGE 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
SIZE -0.016∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.005 -0.011∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009)
IMPLIEDVOL (90 DAYS OPTION) 0.027 0.034 0.074∗ 0.031 0.044 0.033
(0.026) (0.027) (0.044) (0.026) (0.027) (0.044)
LNBM 0.007∗ 0.005 0.016∗ 0.007∗ 0.002 0.005
(0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
ROA 0.344∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.082 0.030 -0.076 -0.106
(0.083) (0.091) (0.171) (0.078) (0.087) (0.161)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 18379 18379 18379 19614 19614 19614
R2 0.027 0.031 0.227 0.016 0.020 0.211
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Table A.18. FORECAST REVISION - ROBUSTNESS - CONTROLLING FOR IMPLIED VOL (FROM 30 DAYS CALLS)
This Table presents variants of the regressions in Table 3 in which implied volatility is computed from 30-day at-the-money
stock i calls issued in the current fiscal year. In columns [1] to [6], the dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if
the analyst’s annual earnings forecast revision for a given stock, if any, made between the announcement dates of the Q-1
and Q quarterly earnings has the same sign as SUE(Q-1), the unexpected earnings in quarter Q-1. Individual revisions are
computed as the difference between the last annual earnings forecast made between the announcement dates of the Q-1 and
Q quarterly earnings and the last annual earnings forecast, if any, made before the announcement date of the Q-1 quarterly
earnings. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) is a dummy that equals one if there is a change in the sign of SUEs over the previous
two quarters. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) is a dummy that equals one if there is one change in the sign of SUEs among
the previous three quarters. ABS SUE(Q-1) is the absolute value of standardized unexpected earnings in year-quarter Q-1.
COVERAGE is the logarithm of the number of analysts who covered the stock in the current fiscal year. LN(MKTCAP) is the
logarithm of the stock total market capitalization (Compustat item CSHO × item PRCC F) at the end of the current fiscal
year. IMPLIEDVOL is the average of 30-day implied volatility of all at-the-money stock i calls issued in the current fiscal
year. LNBM is book-to-market defined as in Fama and French (2008) in the current year. Return on assets, ROA, is defined as
operating income after depreciation (item OIBDP - item DP) over total assets (item AT) computed at the end of the current
fiscal year. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects, fiscal-quarter fixed effects and analyst fixed effects. Columns [2]
and [5] also include industry fixed effects. Columns [3] and [6] also include stock fixed effects. All continuous variables are
windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude all observations with stock price lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and
∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is from January 1996 to December 2014.
REVISION IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THE LAST SUE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) -0.023∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) -0.022∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
LN(MKTCAP) -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
COVERAGE 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
IMPLIEDVOL (30 DAYS CALL) 0.121∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.026) (0.020) (0.020) (0.026)
LNBM -0.002 -0.003 -0.007 -0.002 -0.003 -0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
ROA 0.244∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗ 0.107 0.245∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.110
(0.091) (0.091) (0.120) (0.091) (0.090) (0.120)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 517979 517979 517979 517979 517979 517979
R2 0.041 0.042 0.083 0.041 0.042 0.083
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Table A.19. FORECAST REVISION - ROBUSTNESS - CONTROLLING FOR IMPLIED VOL (FROM 30 DAYS PUTS)
This Table presents variants of the regressions in Table 3 in which implied volatility is computed from 30-day at-the-money
stock i puts issued in the current fiscal year. In columns [1] to [6], the dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if
the analyst’s annual earnings forecast revision for a given stock, if any, made between the announcement dates of the Q-1
and Q quarterly earnings has the same sign as SUE(Q-1), the unexpected earnings in quarter Q-1. Individual revisions are
computed as the difference between the last annual earnings forecast made between the announcement dates of the Q-1 and
Q quarterly earnings and the last annual earnings forecast, if any, made before the announcement date of the Q-1 quarterly
earnings. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) is a dummy that equals one if there is a change in the sign of SUEs over the previous
two quarters. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) is a dummy that equals one if there is one change in the sign of SUEs among
the previous three quarters. ABS SUE(Q-1) is the absolute value of standardized unexpected earnings in year-quarter Q-1.
COVERAGE is the logarithm of the number of analysts who covered the stock in the current fiscal year. LN(MKTCAP) is the
logarithm of the stock total market capitalization (Compustat item CSHO × item PRCC F) at the end of the current fiscal
year. IMPLIEDVOL is the average of 30-day implied volatility of all at-the-money stock i puts issued in the current fiscal
year. LNBM is book-to-market defined as in Fama and French (2008) in the current year. Return on assets, ROA, is defined as
operating income after depreciation (item OIBDP - item DP) over total assets (item AT) computed at the end of the current
fiscal year. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects, fiscal-quarter fixed effects and analyst fixed effects. Columns [2]
and [5] also include industry fixed effects. Columns [3] and [6] also include stock fixed effects. All continuous variables are
windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude all observations with stock price lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and
∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is from January 1996 to December 2014.
REVISION IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THE LAST SUE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) -0.023∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) -0.022∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
LN(MKTCAP) -0.007∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
COVERAGE 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
IMPLIEDVOL (30 DAYS PUT) 0.116∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.026) (0.019) (0.019) (0.026)
LNBM -0.002 -0.003 -0.007 -0.002 -0.003 -0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
ROA 0.242∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.105 0.243∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.108
(0.091) (0.090) (0.120) (0.091) (0.090) (0.120)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 517979 517979 517979 517979 517979 517979
R2 0.041 0.042 0.083 0.041 0.042 0.083
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Table A.20. DISPERSION IN ANALYST FORECASTS - ROBUSTNESS - CONTROLLING FOR IMPLIED VOL (FROM
60 DAYS OPTIONS)
This Table presents variants of the regressions in Table 10 in which implied volatility is computed from 60-day at-the-money
stock i options issued in the current fiscal year. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) is a dummy that equals one if there is a change
in the sign of SUEs over the previous two quarters. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) is a dummy that equals one if there
is one change in the sign of SUEs among the previous three quarters. ABS SUE(Q-1) is the absolute value of standardized
unexpected earnings in year-quarter Q-1. COVERAGE is the logarithm of the number of analysts who covered the stock in the
current fiscal year. LN(MKTCAP) is the logarithm of the stock total market capitalization (Compustat item CSHO × item
PRCC F) at the end of the current fiscal year. IMPLIEDVOL is the average of 60-day implied volatility of all at-the-money
stock i options issued in the current fiscal year. LNBM is book-to-market defined as in Fama and French (2008) in the current
year. Return on assets, ROA, is defined as operating income after depreciation (item OIBDP - item DP) over total assets
(item AT) computed at the end of the current fiscal year. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects and fiscal-quarter
fixed effects. Columns [2] and [5] also include industry fixed effects. Columns [3] and [6] also include stock fixed effects. All
continuous variables are windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude all observations with stock price
lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is from January
1996 to December 2014.
DISP(Q)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) 0.040∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) 0.044∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.060∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
SIZE 0.034∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗ -0.161∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.020) (0.011) (0.011) (0.020)
COVERAGE 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
IMPLIEDVOL (60 DAYS OPTION) 2.125∗∗∗ 2.080∗∗∗ 1.801∗∗∗ 2.125∗∗∗ 2.080∗∗∗ 1.802∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.123) (0.162) (0.116) (0.123) (0.162)
LNBM 0.261∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.015) (0.019)
ROA -3.182∗∗∗ -3.125∗∗∗ -1.921∗∗∗ -3.179∗∗∗ -3.123∗∗∗ -1.921∗∗∗
(0.268) (0.286) (0.406) (0.268) (0.286) (0.406)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 62683 62683 62683 62683 62683 62683
R2 0.206 0.230 0.486 0.206 0.230 0.486
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Table A.21. DISPERSION IN ANALYST FORECASTS - ROBUSTNESS - CONTROLLING FOR IMPLIED VOL (FROM
90 DAYS OPTIONS)
This Table presents variants of the regressions in Table 10 in which implied volatility is computed from 90-day at-the-money
stock i options issued in the current fiscal year. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) is a dummy that equals one if there is a change
in the sign of SUEs over the previous two quarters. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) is a dummy that equals one if there
is one change in the sign of SUEs among the previous three quarters. ABS SUE(Q-1) is the absolute value of standardized
unexpected earnings in year-quarter Q-1. COVERAGE is the logarithm of the number of analysts who covered the stock in the
current fiscal year. LN(MKTCAP) is the logarithm of the stock total market capitalization (Compustat item CSHO × item
PRCC F) at the end of the current fiscal year. IMPLIEDVOL is the average of 90-day implied volatility of all at-the-money
stock i options issued in the current fiscal year. LNBM is book-to-market defined as in Fama and French (2008) in the current
year. Return on assets, ROA, is defined as operating income after depreciation (item OIBDP - item DP) over total assets
(item AT) computed at the end of the current fiscal year. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects and fiscal-quarter
fixed effects. Columns [2] and [5] also include industry fixed effects. Columns [3] and [6] also include stock fixed effects. All
continuous variables are windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude all observations with stock price
lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is from January
1996 to December 2014.
DISP(Q)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) 0.040∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) 0.044∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.060∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
SIZE 0.037∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.019) (0.011) (0.011) (0.019)
COVERAGE 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
IMPLIEDVOL (90 DAYS OPTION) 2.215∗∗∗ 2.176∗∗∗ 1.914∗∗∗ 2.215∗∗∗ 2.176∗∗∗ 1.915∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.129) (0.172) (0.121) (0.129) (0.172)
LNBM 0.267∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.015) (0.020) (0.016) (0.015) (0.020)
ROA -3.099∗∗∗ -3.018∗∗∗ -1.873∗∗∗ -3.096∗∗∗ -3.017∗∗∗ -1.873∗∗∗
(0.268) (0.287) (0.406) (0.268) (0.286) (0.406)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 62513 62513 62513 62513 62513 62513
R2 0.208 0.232 0.487 0.208 0.232 0.487
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Table A.22. DISPERSION IN ANALYST FORECASTS - ROBUSTNESS - CONTROLLING FOR IMPLIED VOL (FROM
30 DAYS CALLS)
This Table presents variants of the regressions in Table 10 in which implied volatility is computed from 30-day at-the-money
stock i calls issued in the current fiscal year. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) is a dummy that equals one if there is a change in
the sign of SUEs over the previous two quarters. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) is a dummy that equals one if there is one
change in the sign of SUEs among the previous three quarters. ABS SUE(Q-1) is the absolute value of standardized unexpected
earnings in year-quarter Q-1. COVERAGE is the logarithm of the number of analysts who covered the stock in the current
fiscal year. LN(MKTCAP) is the logarithm of the stock total market capitalization (Compustat item CSHO × item PRCC F)
at the end of the current fiscal year. IMPLIEDVOL is the average of 30-day implied volatility of all at-the-money stock i calls
issued in the current fiscal year. LNBM is book-to-market defined as in Fama and French (2008) in the current year. Return on
assets, ROA, is defined as operating income after depreciation (item OIBDP - item DP) over total assets (item AT) computed
at the end of the current fiscal year. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects and fiscal-quarter fixed effects. Columns
[2] and [5] also include industry fixed effects. Columns [3] and [6] also include stock fixed effects. All continuous variables are
windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude all observations with stock price lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and
∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is from January 1996 to December 2014.
DISP(Q)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) 0.039∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) 0.044∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.062∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
LN(MKTCAP) 0.028∗∗∗ 0.017 -0.165∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.017 -0.165∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.020) (0.011) (0.011) (0.020)
COVERAGE 0.002∗ 0.001 0.001 0.002∗ 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
IMPLIEDVOL (30 DAYS CALL) 2.016∗∗∗ 1.963∗∗∗ 1.677∗∗∗ 2.015∗∗∗ 1.963∗∗∗ 1.678∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.118) (0.153) (0.111) (0.118) (0.153)
LNBM 0.252∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.015) (0.020)
ROA -3.360∗∗∗ -3.317∗∗∗ -1.982∗∗∗ -3.357∗∗∗ -3.316∗∗∗ -1.982∗∗∗
(0.270) (0.287) (0.409) (0.270) (0.287) (0.409)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 62830 62830 62830 62830 62830 62830
R2 0.200 0.225 0.484 0.200 0.225 0.484
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Table A.23. DISPERSION IN ANALYST FORECASTS - ROBUSTNESS - CONTROLLING FOR IMPLIED VOL (FROM
30 DAYS PUTS)
This Table presents variants of the regressions in Table 10 in which implied volatility is computed from 30-day at-the-money
stock i puts issued in the current fiscal year. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) is a dummy that equals one if there is a change in
the sign of SUEs over the previous two quarters. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) is a dummy that equals one if there is one
change in the sign of SUEs among the previous three quarters. ABS SUE(Q-1) is the absolute value of standardized unexpected
earnings in year-quarter Q-1. COVERAGE is the logarithm of the number of analysts who covered the stock in the current
fiscal year. LN(MKTCAP) is the logarithm of the stock total market capitalization (Compustat item CSHO × item PRCC F)
at the end of the current fiscal year. IMPLIEDVOL is the average of 30-day implied volatility of all at-the-money stock i puts
issued in the current fiscal year. LNBM is book-to-market defined as in Fama and French (2008) in the current year. Return on
assets, ROA, is defined as operating income after depreciation (item OIBDP - item DP) over total assets (item AT) computed
at the end of the current fiscal year. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects and fiscal-quarter fixed effects. Columns
[2] and [5] also include industry fixed effects. Columns [3] and [6] also include stock fixed effects. All continuous variables are
windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude all observations with stock price lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and
∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is from January 1996 to December 2014.
DISP(Q)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) 0.039∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) 0.044∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.062∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
LN(MKTCAP) 0.028∗∗∗ 0.017 -0.164∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.017 -0.164∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.020) (0.011) (0.011) (0.020)
COVERAGE 0.003∗∗ 0.002 0.001 0.003∗∗ 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
IMPLIEDVOL (30 DAYS PUT) 2.019∗∗∗ 1.965∗∗∗ 1.689∗∗∗ 2.019∗∗∗ 1.965∗∗∗ 1.690∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.117) (0.152) (0.112) (0.118) (0.152)
LNBM 0.254∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.015) (0.019)
ROA -3.314∗∗∗ -3.280∗∗∗ -1.970∗∗∗ -3.311∗∗∗ -3.279∗∗∗ -1.970∗∗∗
(0.270) (0.286) (0.408) (0.270) (0.286) (0.408)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 62830 62830 62830 62830 62830 62830
R2 0.202 0.227 0.485 0.202 0.227 0.485
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Table A.24. FORECAST REVISION - HETEROGENEOUS BEHAVIOR ACROSS ANALYSTS - ROBUSTNESS - CON-
TROLLING FOR IMPLIED VOL (FROM 60 DAYS AND 90 DAYS OPTIONS)
This Table present variants of the regressions in Table 6 in which implied volatility is computed from 60-day and 90-day at-
the-money stock i options issued in the current fiscal year. SIGN REV(Q-1) 6= SIGN SUE(Q-1) is a dummy that equals one
if the analyst’s annual earnings forecast revision for a given stock, if any, made between the end of the Q-2 and Q-1 fiscal
quarters has a different sign than SUE(Q-1). POSREV(Q-1) is a dummy that equals one if the analyst has revised his/her
annual earnings forecast upward between the end of the Q-2 and Q-1 fiscal quarters. ABS SUE(Q-1) is the absolute value of
standardized unexpected earnings in year-quarter Q-1. COVERAGE is the logarithm of the number of analysts who covered
the stock in the current fiscal year. LN(MKTCAP) is the logarithm of the stock total market capitalization (Compustat item
CSHO × item PRCC F) at the end of the current fiscal year. IMPLIEDVOL is the average of 60-day implied volatility of all
at-the-money stock i options issued in the current fiscal year in columns [1] to [3], and the average of 90-day implied volatility
of all at-the-money stock i options issued in the current fiscal year in columns [4] to [6]. LNBM is book-to-market defined
as in Fama and French (2008) in the current year. Return on assets, ROA, is defined as operating income after depreciation
(item OIBDP - item DP) over total assets (item AT) computed at the end of the current fiscal year. All regressions include
year-quarter fixed effects, fiscal-quarter fixed effects and analyst fixed effects. Columns [2] and [5] also include industry fixed
effects. Columns [3] and [6] also include stock fixed effects. All continuous variables are windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth
percentiles. We exclude all observations with stock price lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1%, respectively. The sample period is from January 1996 to December 2014.
REVISION IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THE LAST SUE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
SIGN REV(Q-1) 6= SIGN SUE(Q-1) -0.198∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
POSREV(Q-1) 0.027∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
LN(MKTCAP) -0.007∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
COVERAGE 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
IMPLIEDVOL (60 DAYS OPTION) 0.105∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.028)
IMPLIEDVOL (90 DAYS OPTION) 0.108∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.029)
LNBM 0.000 -0.000 -0.006 -0.000 -0.001 -0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
ROA 0.204∗∗ 0.201∗∗ 0.142 0.212∗∗ 0.209∗∗ 0.146
(0.093) (0.093) (0.126) (0.093) (0.093) (0.126)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 334395 334395 334395 333899 333899 333899
R2 0.085 0.086 0.125 0.085 0.086 0.125
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Table A.25. FORECAST REVISION - HETEROGENEOUS BEHAVIOR ACROSS ANALYSTS - ROBUSTNESS - CON-
TROLLING FOR IMPLIED VOL (FROM 30 DAYS CALLS AND PUTS)
This Table present variants of the regressions in Table 6 in which implied volatility is computed from 60-day and 90-day at-
the-money stock i options issued in the current fiscal year. SIGN REV(Q-1) 6= SIGN SUE(Q-1) is a dummy that equals one
if the analyst’s annual earnings forecast revision for a given stock, if any, made between the end of the Q-2 and Q-1 fiscal
quarters has a different sign than SUE(Q-1). POSREV(Q-1) is a dummy that equals one if the analyst has revised his/her
annual earnings forecast upward between the end of the Q-2 and Q-1 fiscal quarters. ABS SUE(Q-1) is the absolute value of
standardized unexpected earnings in year-quarter Q-1. COVERAGE is the logarithm of the number of analysts who covered
the stock in the current fiscal year. LN(MKTCAP) is the logarithm of the stock total market capitalization (Compustat item
CSHO × item PRCC F) at the end of the current fiscal year. IMPLIEDVOL is the average of 30-day implied volatility of all
at-the-money stock i calls issued in the current fiscal year in columns [1] to [3], and the average of 30-day implied volatility of
all at-the-money stock i puts issued in the current fiscal year in columns [4] to [6]. LNBM is book-to-market defined as in Fama
and French (2008) in the current year. Return on assets, ROA, is defined as operating income after depreciation (item OIBDP
- item DP) over total assets (item AT) computed at the end of the current fiscal year. All regressions include year-quarter fixed
effects, fiscal-quarter fixed effects and analyst fixed effects. Columns [2] and [5] also include industry fixed effects. Columns [3]
and [6] also include stock fixed effects. All continuous variables are windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We
exclude all observations with stock price lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
The sample period is from January 1996 to December 2014.
REVISION IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THE LAST SUE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
SIGN REV(Q-1) 6= SIGN SUE(Q-1) -0.198∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.175∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.175∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
POSREV(Q-1) 0.027∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
LN(MKTCAP) -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
COVERAGE 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
IMPLIEDVOL (30 DAYS CALL) 0.103∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.028)
IMPLIEDVOL (30 DAYS PUT) 0.099∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.027)
LNBM -0.000 -0.001 -0.006 -0.000 -0.001 -0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
ROA 0.200∗∗ 0.197∗∗ 0.140 0.198∗∗ 0.194∗∗ 0.138
(0.093) (0.093) (0.126) (0.093) (0.093) (0.126)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 334837 334837 334837 334837 334837 334837
R2 0.085 0.086 0.125 0.085 0.086 0.125
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Table A.26. FORECAST REVISION - HETEROGENOUS BEHAVIOR ACROSS ANALYSTS - ROBUSTNESS - PAST
REVISIONS OVER THE PREVIOUS TWO QUARTERS
This Table present variants of the regressions in Table 6 in which the variable of interest is SIGN REV(Q-1,Q-2) 6= SIGN
SUE(Q-1) is a dummy that equals one if the last analyst’s annual earnings forecast revision made in one of the two quarters
before the announcement of the Q-1 earnings has a different sign than SUE(Q-1). POSREV(Q-1) (respectively POSREV(Q-2))
is a dummy that equals one if the analyst has revised his/her annual earnings forecast upward between the announcement dates
of the Q-2 and Q-1 quarterly earnings (respectively Q-3 and Q-2 quarterly earnings) . ABS SUE(Q-1) is the absolute value of
standardized unexpected earnings in year-quarter Q-1. COVERAGE is the logarithm of the number of analysts who covered
the stock in the current fiscal year. LN(MKTCAP) is the logarithm of the stock total market capitalization (Compustat item
CSHO × item PRCC F) at the end of the current fiscal year. SIGMA is the standard deviation of daily raw returns of the
stock in the current fiscal year. IMPLIEDVOL is the average of 30-day implied volatility of all at-the-money stock i options
issued in the current fiscal year. LNBM is book-to-market defined as in Fama and French (2008) in the current year. Return on
assets, ROA, is defined as operating income after depreciation (item OIBDP - item DP) over total assets (item AT) computed
at the end of the current fiscal year. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects, fiscal-quarter fixed effects and analyst
fixed effects. Columns [2] and [5] also include industry fixed effects. Columns [3] and [6] also include stock fixed effects. All
continuous variables are windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude all observations with stock price
lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is from January
1982 to December 2014 in columns [1] to [3], and from January 1996 to December 2014 in columns [4] to [6].
REVISION IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THE LATEST SUE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
SIGN REV(Q-1,Q-2) 6= SIGN SUE(Q-1) -0.215∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗ -0.194∗∗∗ -0.172∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
POSREV(Q-1) 0.019∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
POSREV(Q-2) 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.045∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
LN(MKTCAP) -0.007∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
COVERAGE 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
SIGMA 0.011∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
IMPLIEDVOL 0.100∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.027)
LNBM 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.000 -0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
ROA 0.139∗∗ 0.140∗∗ 0.137 0.181∗∗ 0.176∗∗ 0.107
(0.063) (0.063) (0.087) (0.088) (0.088) (0.120)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 744285 744285 744285 401880 401880 401880
R2 0.084 0.084 0.116 0.080 0.081 0.117
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Table A.27. FORECAST REVISION - STANDARD ERRORS CLUSTERED AT THE ANALYST LEVEL
The dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if the analyst’s annual earnings forecast revision for a given stock, if any,
made between the announcement dates of the Q-1 and Q quarterly earnings has the same sign as SUE(Q-1), the unexpected
earnings in quarter Q-1. Individual revisions are computed as the difference between the last annual earnings forecast made
between the announcement dates of the Q-1 and Q quarterly earnings and the last annual earnings forecast, if any, made before
the announcement date of the Q-1 quarterly earnings. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) is a dummy that equals one if there is a
change in the sign of SUEs over the previous two quarters. SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) is a dummy that equals one if
there is one change in the sign of SUEs among the previous three quarters. ABS SUE(Q-1) is the absolute value of standardized
unexpected earnings in year-quarter Q-1. COVERAGE is the logarithm of the number of analysts who covered the stock in the
current fiscal year. LN(MKTCAP) is the logarithm of the stock total market capitalization (Compustat item CSHO × item
PRCC F) at the end of the current fiscal year. SIGMA is the standard deviation of daily raw returns of the stock in the current
fiscal year. LNBM is book-to-market defined as in Fama and French (2008) in the current year. Return on assets, ROA, is
defined as operating income after depreciation (item OIBDP - item DP) over total assets (item AT) computed at the end of
the current fiscal year. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects, fiscal-quarter fixed effects and analyst fixed effects.
Columns [2] and [5] also include industry fixed effects. Columns [3] and [6] also include stock fixed effects. All continuous
variables are windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude all observations with stock price lower than $5.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is from January 1982 to December
2014.
REVISION IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THE LATEST SUE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2) -0.021∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SUE SIGN CHANGE(Q-1,Q-2,Q-3) -0.018∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.057∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SIZE -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
COVERAGE 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIGMA 0.013∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LNBM 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ROA 0.200∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.030) (0.023) (0.023) (0.030)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 996129 996129 996129 996129 996129 996129
R2 0.038 0.039 0.076 0.038 0.039 0.076
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Table A.28. POSITIVE REVISION - STANDARD ERRORS CLUSTERED AT THE ANALYST LEVEL
This Table presents variants of the regressions in Table A.27 in which we focus on analysts’ positive revisions that follow
positive earnings surprises. In columns [1] to [6], the dependent variable is for a given analyst and a given stock a dummy
that equals one if the analyst covered the stock before the announcement date of the Q-1 quarterly earnings and has revised
his/her annual earnings forecast upward between the announcement dates of the Q-1 and Q quarterly earnings. The sample is
restricted to analyst-stock-year-quarter observations for which SUE(Q-1), the unexpected earnings in quarter Q-1, is positive.
NEG SUE (Q-2) is a dummy that equals one if standardized unexpected earnings were negative two quarters ago. NEG SUE
(Q-2,Q-3) is a dummy that equals one if standardized unexpected earnings were negative two and/or three quarters ago. ABS
SUE(Q-1) is the absolute value of standardized unexpected earnings in year-quarter Q-1. COVERAGE is the logarithm of
the number of analysts who covered the stock in the current fiscal year. LN(MKTCAP) is the logarithm of the stock total
market capitalization (Compustat item CSHO × item PRCC F) at the end of the current fiscal year. SIGMA is the standard
deviation of daily raw returns of the stock in the current fiscal year. LNBM is book-to-market defined as in Fama and French
(2008) in the current year. Return on assets, ROA, is defined as operating income after depreciation (item OIBDP - item DP)
over total assets (item AT) computed at the end of the current fiscal year. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects,
fiscal-quarter fixed effects and analyst fixed effects. Columns [2] and [5] also include industry fixed effects. Columns [3] and [6]
also include stock fixed effects. All continuous variables are windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude
all observations with stock price lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The
sample period is from January 1982 to December 2014.
POSREV(Q) (Sample with SUE(Q-1)> 0 only)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
NEG SUE(Q-2) -0.017∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
NEG SUE(Q-2,Q-3) -0.014∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SIZE 0.056∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
COVERAGE -0.006∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIGMA 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
LNBM 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ROA 3.190∗∗∗ 3.243∗∗∗ 4.029∗∗∗ 3.189∗∗∗ 3.242∗∗∗ 4.025∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.054) (0.063) (0.053) (0.054) (0.063)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 476208 476208 476208 476208 476208 476208
R2 0.137 0.138 0.208 0.136 0.138 0.208
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Table A.29. NEGATIVE REVISION - STANDARD ERRORS CLUSTERED AT THE ANALYST LEVEL
This Table presents variants of the regressions in Table A.27 in which we focus on analysts’ negative revisions that follow
negative earnings surprises. In columns [1] to [6], the dependent variable is for a given analyst and a given stock a dummy
that equals one if the analyst covered the stock before the announcement date of the Q-1 quarterly earnings and has revised
his/her annual earnings forecast downward between the announcement dates of the Q-1 and Q quarterly earnings. The sample
is restricted to analyst-stock-year-quarter observations for which SUE(Q-1), the unexpected earnings in quarter Q-1, is negative.
POS SUE (Q-2) is a dummy that equals one if standardized unexpected earnings were positive two quarters ago. POS SUE
(Q-2,Q-3) is a dummy that equals one if standardized unexpected earnings were positive two and/or three quarters ago. ABS
SUE(Q-1) is the absolute value of standardized unexpected earnings in year-quarter Q-1. COVERAGE is the logarithm of
the number of analysts who covered the stock in the current fiscal year. LN(MKTCAP) is the logarithm of the stock total
market capitalization (Compustat item CSHO × item PRCC F) at the end of the current fiscal year. SIGMA is the standard
deviation of daily raw returns of the stock in the current fiscal year. LNBM is book-to-market defined as in Fama and French
(2008) in the current year. Return on assets, ROA, is defined as operating income after depreciation (item OIBDP - item DP)
over total assets (item AT) computed at the end of the current fiscal year. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects,
fiscal-quarter fixed effects and analyst fixed effects. Columns [2] and [5] also include industry fixed effects. Columns [3] and [6]
also include stock fixed effects. All continuous variables are windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude
all observations with stock price lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The
sample period is from January 1982 to December 2014.
NEGREV(Q) (Sample with SUE(Q-1)< 0 only)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
POS SUE(Q-2) -0.025∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
POS SUE(Q-2,Q-3) -0.023∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.050∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SIZE -0.055∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
COVERAGE 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIGMA 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LNBM -0.017∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
ROA -2.369∗∗∗ -2.383∗∗∗ -2.961∗∗∗ -2.365∗∗∗ -2.379∗∗∗ -2.955∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.053) (0.041) (0.041) (0.053)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 519921 519921 519921 519921 519921 519921
R2 0.138 0.140 0.206 0.138 0.140 0.206
61
Table A.30. FORECAST REVISION - HETEROGENEOUS BEHAVIOR ACROSS ANALYSTS - STANDARD ERRORS
CLUSTERED AT THE ANALYST LEVEL
The dependent variable is a dummy that equals one if the analyst’s annual earnings forecast revision for a given stock, if any,
made between the announcement dates of the Q-1 and Q quarterly earnings has the same sign as SUE(Q-1), the unexpected
earnings in quarter Q-1. Individual revisions are computed as the difference between the last annual earnings forecast made
between the announcement dates of the Q-1 and Q quarterly earnings and the last annual earnings forecast, if any, made
before the announcement date of the Q-1 quarterly earnings. SIGN REV(Q-1) 6= SIGN SUE(Q-1) is a dummy that equals
one if the analyst’s annual earnings forecast revision for a given stock, if any, made between the announcement dates of the
Q-2 and Q-1 quarterly earnings has a different sign than SUE(Q-1). POSREV(Q-1) is a dummy that equals one if the analyst
has revised his/her annual earnings forecast upward between the announcement dates of the Q-2 and Q-1 quarterly earnings.
ABS SUE(Q-1) is the absolute value of standardized unexpected earnings in year-quarter Q-1. COVERAGE is the logarithm
of the number of analysts who covered the stock in the current fiscal year. LN(MKTCAP) is the logarithm of the stock total
market capitalization (Compustat item CSHO × item PRCC F) at the end of the current fiscal year. SIGMA is the standard
deviation of daily raw returns of the stock in the current fiscal year. IMPLIEDVOL is the average of 30-day implied volatility
of all at-the-money stock i options issued in the current fiscal year. LNBM is book-to-market defined as in Fama and French
(2008) in the current year. Return on assets, ROA, is defined as operating income after depreciation (item OIBDP - item DP)
over total assets (item AT) computed at the end of the current fiscal year. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects,
fiscal-quarter fixed effects and analyst fixed effects. Columns [2] and [5] also include industry fixed effects. Columns [3] and [6]
also include stock fixed effects. All continuous variables are windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude
all observations with stock price lower than $5. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The
sample period is from January 1982 to December 2014 in columns [1] to [3], and from January 1996 to December 2014 in
columns [4] to [6].
REVISION IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS THE LATEST SUE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
SIGN REV(Q-1) 6= SIGN SUE(Q-1) -0.220∗∗∗ -0.219∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.175∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
POSREV(Q-1) 0.023∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.044∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SIZE -0.009∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.008∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
COVERAGE 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ -0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIGMA 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
IMPLIEDVOL 0.102∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
LNBM 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.006∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ROA 0.115∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.037) (0.039) (0.039) (0.052)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 602187 602187 602187 334821 334821 334821
R2 0.090 0.091 0.125 0.085 0.086 0.125
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Table A.31. POSITIVE REVISION - HETEROGENEOUS BEHAVIOR ACROSS ANALYSTS - STANDARD ERRORS
CLUSTERED AT THE ANALYST LEVEL
This Table presents variants of the regressions in Table A.30 in which we focus on analysts’ positive revisions (in year-quarter
Q) that follow positive earnings surprises. In columns [1] to [6], the dependent variable is for a given analyst and a given stock
a dummy that equals one if the analyst covered the stock before the announcement date of the Q-1 quarterly earnings and has
revised his/her annual earnings forecast upward between the announcement dates of the Q-1 and Q quarterly earnings. The
sample is restricted to analyst-stock-year-quarter observations for which SUE(Q-1), the unexpected earnings in quarter Q-1,
is positive. NEGREV(Q-1) is a dummy that equals one if the analyst has revised his/her annual earnings forecast downward
between the announcement dates of the Q-2 and Q-1 quarterly earnings. ABS SUE(Q-1) is the absolute value of standardized
unexpected earnings in year-quarter Q-1. COVERAGE is the logarithm of the number of analysts who covered the stock in the
current fiscal year. LN(MKTCAP) is the logarithm of the stock total market capitalization (Compustat item CSHO × item
PRCC F) at the end of the current fiscal year. SIGMA is the standard deviation of daily raw returns of the stock in the current
fiscal year. IMPLIEDVOL is the average of 30-day implied volatility of all at-the-money stock i options issued in the current
fiscal year. LNBM is book-to-market defined as in Fama and French (2008) in the current year. Return on assets, ROA, is
defined as operating income after depreciation (item OIBDP - item DP) over total assets (item AT) computed at the end of
the current fiscal year. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects, fiscal-quarter fixed effects and analyst fixed effects.
Columns [2] and [5] also include industry fixed effects. Columns [3] and [6] also include stock fixed effects. All continuous
variables are windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude all observations with stock price lower than $5.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is from January 1982 to December
2014 in columns [1] to [3], and from January 1996 to December 2014 in columns [4] to [6].
POSREV(Q) (Sample with SUE(Q-1)> 0 only)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
NEGREV(Q-1) -0.152∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗ -0.095∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.129∗∗∗ -0.060∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
NEGREV(Q-2)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.040∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
SIZE 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
COVERAGE -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIGMA 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
IMPLIEDVOL 0.043∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.021)
LNBM 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
ROA 2.898∗∗∗ 2.944∗∗∗ 3.864∗∗∗ 2.789∗∗∗ 2.812∗∗∗ 3.747∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.058) (0.074) (0.071) (0.072) (0.100)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 282360 282360 282360 146731 146731 146731
R2 0.177 0.179 0.245 0.174 0.175 0.258
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Table A.32. NEGATIVE REVISION - HETEROGENEOUS BEHAVIOR ACROSS ANALYSTS - STANDARD ERRORS
CLUSTERED AT THE ANALYST LEVEL
This Table presents variants of the regressions in Table A.30 in which we focus on analysts’ negative revisions (in year-quarter
Q) that follow negative earnings surprises. In columns [1] to [6], the dependent variable is for a given analyst and a given stock
a dummy that equals one if the analyst covered the stock before the announcement date of the Q-1 quarterly earnings and
has revised his/her annual earnings forecast downward between the announcement dates of the Q-1 and Q quarterly earnings.
The sample is restricted to analyst-stock-year-quarter observations for which SUE(Q-1), the unexpected earnings in quarter
Q-1, is negative. POSREV(Q-1) is a dummy that equals one if the analyst has revised his/her annual earnings forecast upward
between the announcement dates of the Q-2 and Q-1 quarterly earnings. ABS SUE(Q-1) is the absolute value of standardized
unexpected earnings in year-quarter Q-1. COVERAGE is the logarithm of the number of analysts who covered the stock in the
current fiscal year. LN(MKTCAP) is the logarithm of the stock total market capitalization (Compustat item CSHO × item
PRCC F) at the end of the current fiscal year. SIGMA is the standard deviation of daily raw returns of the stock in the current
fiscal year. IMPLIEDVOL is the average of 30-day implied volatility of all at-the-money stock i options issued in the current
fiscal year. LNBM is book-to-market defined as in Fama and French (2008) in the current year. Return on assets, ROA, is
defined as operating income after depreciation (item OIBDP - item DP) over total assets (item AT) computed at the end of
the current fiscal year. All regressions include year-quarter fixed effects, fiscal-quarter fixed effects and analyst fixed effects.
Columns [2] and [5] also include industry fixed effects. Columns [3] and [6] also include stock fixed effects. All continuous
variables are windsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles. We exclude all observations with stock price lower than $5.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample period is from January 1982 to December
2014 in columns [1] to [3], and from January 1996 to December 2014 in columns [4] to [6].
NEGREV(Q) (Sample with SUE(Q-1)< 0 only)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
POSREV(Q-1) -0.125∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.118∗∗∗ -0.116∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ABS SUE(Q-1) 0.042∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SIZE -0.049∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
COVERAGE 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SIGMA 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
IMPLIEDVOL 0.053∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.019)
LNBM -0.019∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.057∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
ROA -2.219∗∗∗ -2.236∗∗∗ -2.866∗∗∗ -2.093∗∗∗ -2.092∗∗∗ -2.690∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.048) (0.065) (0.064) (0.065) (0.092)
Fiscal-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Analyst FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No Yes No No Yes No
Stock FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 319827 319827 319827 188090 188090 188090
R2 0.170 0.171 0.234 0.166 0.168 0.237
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